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This thesis presents a comparative analysis of the pre-trial process and 
detention practices in England and Wales, and Nigeria, and the rights therein 
available to arrested persons, detainees and suspects at the custodial stage of 
proceedings. 
The thesis also attempts to understand how rights are effectively translated 
from theory to practice. To achieve this, this study begins, against the 
backdrop of the generally-accepted tripartite form of regulation, by examining 
the legal and institutional framework governing the detention stage and the 
entire pre-trial system in both jurisdictions from a theoretical perspective, 
before analysing the delivery and protection of the rights in practice, as well as 
the mechanisms in existence to facilitate a realignment or ensure a smoother 
delivery of the rights in practice, where a lacuna exists between the existence 
of the rights in theory and their protection in practice.  
The study finds that rights development is a work in progress and finds that, 
on the theoretical level, the rights sought to be protected in both jurisdictions 
are essentially the same. However, there are differences in the nature of the 
rights as they exist and, as a result of a number of inherent shortcomings of the 
different frameworks and a number of attitudinal factors in both jurisdictions, 
the rights are not always thoroughly or effectively protected in practice. The 
study also finds that the clarity of the provisions which establish the rights to 
be protected, or the lack thereof, are of great importance in the protection of 
the rights in practice. 
The thesis concludes by analysing the realignment mechanisms in place in 
both jurisdictions, including the external influence of the respective regional 
rights systems, and contends that the most important means of achieving the 
best rights’ practice begins with a clear statement of the goal and a clearly 
delineated framework; and that despite the presence of external factors to 
facilitate development and realignment in an increasingly converging criminal 
justice world, the strongest and most efficient way to bridge the gap between 
theory and practice is by a strong political will and a clearly delineated 
internal legal and institutional framework.  
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This thesis conducts a comparative analysis of the detention practices in 
England and Wales1 and Nigeria, and the rights available to arrested persons, 
detainees and suspects at the custodial stage of the criminal process. As may 
be common knowledge, both jurisdictions are generally recognised as 
common law jurisdictions, and practice an adversarial system of adjudication. 
To the uninitiated, and to non-comparative law academics, there is perhaps a 
general misconception that comparative studies or analyses are usually only 
conducted between two or more jurisdictions which are considered to be from 
different legal families. 
In attempting to justify the need to compare the law and practice of two legal 
systems in the same broad legal family, however, the following excerpt should 
perhaps be considered: 
“Comparative methodology barely calls for extended justification in 
an era of globalisation and increasingly cosmopolitan law…. In the 
field of criminal justice, self-consciously ‘comparative’ perspectives 
typically compare and contrast common law adversarial systems with 
their ‘inquisitorial’ counterparts in western European jurisdictions…. 
Even if legal systems within and beyond the common law family are 
increasingly being shaped by a global law of human rights, each 
 
1 Any reference hereinafter to England, in this chapter, and indeed the entire thesis, implies a 
reference to both England and Wales. 
 2 
jurisdiction will continue to make its own juridical accommodations 
between the demands of universal legal standards and local 
procedural traditions.”2 
It derives from the above that a comparative analysis of aspects of any 
national legal framework need not necessarily occur between two jurisdictions 
that are considered to be members of the two separate legal traditions or 
families within which most legal systems are usually grouped: the adversarial 
and inquisitorial traditions,3 as the lines differentiating between the systems 
are found to be increasingly more blurry as time progresses, as a result of 
cosmopolitanism and a global convergence of procedural elements in 
practice;4 an effect which is often attributable, as shall subsequently be 
discussed within this thesis, to the emergence, in the mid-twentieth (20th) 
century, of a global quest to protect human rights, and the subsequent 
establishment of the different regional rights systems that presently exist.5 
This blurring of the lines of division between the systems is to the effect that, 
in modern times, it is not impossible to discover jurisdictions generally 
considered to be within the same legal families with divergent practices or 
provisions relating to the same issue, and jurisdictions from separate legal 
 
2 Paul Roberts and Jill Hunter, “Introduction – The Human Rights Revolution in Criminal 
Evidence and Procedure” in Paul Roberts and Jill Hunter (Eds.), Criminal Evidence and 
Human Rights: Reimagining Common Law Procedural Traditions (Hart, 2012), pp 4-5. 
3 See, generally, Richard Vogler, A World View of Criminal Justice (Ashgate, 2005) 
4 This claim has also been made by John Jackson and Sarah Summers, who argue that a 
common set of criminal procedure and evidence values are emerging in today’s jurisprudence, 
beyond the typical adversarial/inquisitorial divide. See John D. Jackson and Sarah J. 
Summers, The Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence: Beyond the Common Law and Civil 
Law Traditions (Cambridge, 2012) 
5 The United Nations, for example, was established in 1948, as was the European Human 
Rights System in 1959, and the African System, in its first incarnation in 1963. 
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families with convergent views and practices.6 Thus, it is opined, that a 
comparison of specific legal provisions or practices between two or more 
jurisdictions within the same broad legal family is as equally justifiable as a 
comparison between jurisdictions from different legal traditions. 
The foregoing notwithstanding, the comparison attempted across the length of 
this thesis ought not to be dismissed as merely a straightforward comparison 
of the detention practices in two jurisdictions with little or no academic value. 
As detailed in Chapter 1.2, below, the choice to conduct a comparative 
analysis was borne from the colonial relationship which existed between 
England and Nigeria, the developmental stages of the different regional human 
rights systems that both jurisdictions belong to, and the nature of the 
relationship between both jurisdictions and their respective regional rights 
systems. 
 
6 The power of the courts in England to draw adverse inferences from silence, for example, is 
provided for by Sections 34 – 37 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. This 
practice in England is convergent with the practice in Germany, which practices what is 
considered an inquisitorial legal tradition, but not on all fours with the practice in the United 
States of America, another common law jurisdiction. See, generally, John Jackson, “Re-
conceptualizing the right of silence as an effective fair trial standard” (2009) ICLQ 835. 
Similarly, the concept of plea bargaining, previously foreign to the inquisitorial legal tradition, 
is now practiced in Germany. See Thomas Weigend, “The Decay of the Inquisitorial Ideal: 
Plea Bargaining Invades German Criminal Procedure, in John Jackson, Máximo Langer and 
Peter Tillers (Eds), Crime, Procedure and Evidence in a Comparative and International 
Context: Essays in Honour of Professor Mirjan Damaška (Hart, 2008). Dr Dimitrios 
Giannoulopoulos has also, in his research into the use of improperly obtained evidence in 
court, identified convergent practices in France and England (who have non-automatic 
exclusionary rules) and Greece and the United States (who have automatic exclusionary 
rules), despite both England and France, and Greece and the United States belonging to 
different legal traditions. See, generally, Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos, “L' exclusion de preuves 
pénales déloyales : une étude comparée des droits américain, anglais, français et hellénique” 
(PhD Thesis, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris I), 2009). The findings of his research have 
been subsumed, and form an integral part of his forthcoming monograph on improperly-
obtained evidence (Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos, Improperly Obtained Evidence in Anglo-
American and Continental Law (Hart, 2020)) 
 4 
In assessing the colonial relationship that existed between England and 
Nigeria, and in light of the fact that the criminal justice system in the latter 
was birthed from the system in the former, it was hypothesised that the 
solution or changes in policy required to address the issues and challenges 
faced by the latter might be found by looking at the history of the former, and 
how some of these challenges were addressed. Put more simply, it was 
hypothesised that, by studying how England addressed some of its challenges 
and issues with the protection of rights at the detention stage, more light might 
be shed on how best Nigeria might address similar challenges and issues, in 
light of the fact that the criminal justice system as it exists in Nigeria was 
birthed from the English criminal justice system.7 
It was also discovered very early on in the research process that the legislative 
and statutory instruments that provided and/or established the pre-trial and 
detention rights in Nigeria were very frequently sparsely-worded and 
ambiguous, to the extent that there was no clear minimum standard for the 
delivery of these rights in practice, in contrast to the provisions in the 
legislative and statutory instruments of England, which were well-worded, 
clear and unambiguous. This prompted a slight adjustment of the theoretical 
analysis to include an assessment of the effect, or lack thereof, of the clarity of 
statutory provisions on the protection and delivery in practice of the rights 
established therein. 
 
7 This hypothesis proved to have merit as, as argued in chapter 3.2.2.3 below for example, the 
power of the police in Nigeria to prosecute offences has posed, and continues to pose, a major 
challenge in the protection of custodial rights in practice. This had previously been the case in 
England, prior to the establishment of the Crown Prosecution Service, and the subsequent 
removal of the powers of prosecution from the police in England. 
 5 
Essentially, the comparative study conducted in this thesis was not a merely 
straightforward comparison between two jurisdictions within the same legal 
family, but sought to determine if there were any lessons to be learned from 
the experiences of its colonial power, by a state emerging from independence; 
and whether there was any effect of a lack of clarity in the statutory provisions 
establishing rights on the delivery and protection in practice of the said rights 
sought to be protected. 
 
1.1 THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM AND THE NEED TO PROTECT 
FAIR TRIAL RIGHTS 
The comparative analysis that this thesis conducts, as previously highlighted, 
is conducted between two jurisdictions that are members of the same broad 
legal family: the adversarial system and, as a precursor to the analysis, the 
importance of the need to protect fair trial rights in the adversarial legal 
tradition ought to be emphasised. 
Without embarking on a full-scale historiography of the common law or 
tracing the origins of the adversarial trial as far as the practices which 
originated in the Star Chamber in the thirteenth (13) century, it is perhaps 
suffice to state that there is a seemingly common acceptance that England is 
the birthplace of the adversarial criminal process.8 
 
8 For more on the origins of the adversarial system, see, generally, Delmas-Marty, M. and 
Spencer, J. R. (Eds.), European Criminal Procedures (Cambridge, 2002), Radzinowicz, L., A 
History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750 (Stevens, London, 1948 – 
1986); and Richard Vogler, n 3. 
 6 
In its present incarnation, within the extent of the understanding of this 
researcher, the adversarial criminal process adopts a ‘trial-centred’ approach to 
the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. To practitioners of 
the adversarial process, the most important stage of the entire process is the 
trial stage, which is also where the legal tradition derives its name. The trial is 
held before a neutral adjudicator, usually a judge and jury,9 and is conducted 
by lawyers representing both the prosecution and the defence presenting their 
version of the facts of the immediate case before the aforementioned 
adjudicator, whose role it is to determine the questions of fact and law raised 
by counsel on either side. Thus, the representatives of both the prosecution and 
the defendant are viewed as adversaries before the adjudicator. 
In approaching the trial process from the adversarial perspective, and in a bid 
to emphasise the need for fair trial rights, there is perhaps a necessity to refer 
to the trial, or indeed the entire criminal process, using the metaphor of the art 
of pugilism. In the sport, skilled boxers of different sizes and skill sets abound, 
but most, if not all, competitive fights are held only between fighters within 
the same weight division. This is usually in a bid to ensure that fights are 
deemed to have been fair, and between two contestants of similar weight and 
strength. 
 
9 Mirjan Damaška has written in great detail about the significance of the division of the 
tribunal into judge and jury, and the concentrated character of trials in the adversarial system 
or, as he termed it, “day-in-court” justice. See Mirjan Damaška, Evidence Law Adrift (Yale, 
1997).  It should also be noted, however, that there are a number of jurisdictions that are 
considered common law jurisdictions, which do not have a mode of trial which employs a 
jury. After independence from England, a number of former colonies, including Ghana and 
Nigeria, abandoned the jury, possibly because of its association with an oppressive imperial 
regime. See Hans, Valerie P., "Jury Systems Around the World" (2008). Cornell Law Faculty 
Publications. Paper 305. http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/305, last accessed on 15-08-
2018. 
 7 
By extension, therefore, for an adversarial trial to be deemed fair, the parties to 
the trial ought to be seemingly equal in their weight and strength, or should be 
allowed the same opportunity to present the weight and strength of their 
respective cases in equal measure. To wit, both the prosecution and defence 
should arguably be allowed the same time to prepare their cases, and be 
subject to the same freedom to conduct their case, as well as face the same 
restrictions to the nature and type of evidence they are able to tender before 
the courts. Ultimately, there must be a balance of powers and limitations 
available to both prosecution and defence. 
The need for this balance, it is contended, is the birthplace of fair trial rights. 
As Vogler notes,10 and as indeed is common knowledge, the vesting of the 
responsibility of prosecution of offences in the Crown or the state creates an 
imbalance of powers and resources available to both parties to conduct their 
respective cases. Thus, the restrictions placed on the prosecution, and the 
rights and freedoms vested in the defendant were established to further 
promote the quest for a balance or fairness of proceedings. As a result, the 
right to a fair trial is generally seen as crucial to the delivery of justice. 
In the latter part of the twentieth (20th) century, this right to a fair trial has 
been seen as extending beyond the commencement of the trial stage, to the 
investigative and custodial stages of proceedings or the pre-trial stage, 
generally. This, as has been argued several times by different authors, and 
before a number of courts, is essential to maintain the fairness of 
 
10 Richard Vogler, n 3, at p 132 
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proceedings,11 In the adversarial system, as Bradley highlights, the pre-trial 
stage begins with an investigation stage that is “openly non-neutral but rather, 
at least after it has focused on a suspect, is aimed at collecting evidence that 
will prove his guilt.”12 Having already established that the point at which an 
accused person’s guilt or innocence should be determined is at the conclusion 
of the trial, and at no point before, it therefore stands to reason that all 
necessary steps should be taken to preserve the accused’s presumption of 
innocence, despite the investigative stage within the adversarial system 
seemingly already established in a manner that has the potential to defeat this 
presumption.13 
It is important to note that a violation of the rights available at the pre-trial 
stage of proceedings, or a failure to provide same might not axiomatically 
nullify the validity or fairness of the entire criminal process, provided that 
redress and/or the opportunity to rectify any imbalance that might occur as a 
result of the accused being denied his custodial rights is sought during trial.14 
 
1.2 RESEARCH JUSTIFICATION 
The raison d'être for commencing the research for this thesis, speaking 
succinctly, was borne from a desire to examine the rights available to accused 
 
11 This has also been held in a number of cases before the English national courts and the 
European Court of Human rights including, most notably, in Salduz v Turkey [2008] 49 EHRR 
421 
12 Craig M. Bradley, “Overview”, in Craig M. Bradley (Ed), Criminal Procedure: A 
Worldwide Study (2nd Edition, Carolina Academic Press, 2007), xvii 
13 As shall be discussed in the next chapter, the primary investigative body in both 
jurisdictions under review is the police, which is a state-funded institution, which 
axiomatically implies an imbalance of resources 
14 In the next chapter, the effect(s) of a violation of the custodial rights available in both 
jurisdictions on the trial process will be considered when analyzing the individual rights. 
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persons and suspects at the pre-trial stage, and the extent to which the said 
rights were protected, primarily in Nigeria. It is commonly known amongst 
academics and practitioners, and the general Nigerian Public that the criminal 
justice system is in a general state of disrepair.15 One of the ways this disrepair 
is manifested is in the slow throughput of cases through the entire process, and 
this, as shall be discussed subsequently, is attributable to a number of factors, 
including long pre-trial detention periods and long trial periods, the combined 
effect of which is a clear violation of the reasonable time requirement of the 
right to a fair trial as established by a few international treaties and 
conventions, including the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights,16 both of which Nigeria 
has ratified. The research topic was therefore borne out of a decision to 
discover the full extent of the effect of the rights framework and the custodial 
regime as a contributory factor in the general state of affairs of the criminal 
process in Nigeria. 
The decision to make it a comparative study was greatly influenced by the 
general view held by several eminent comparative scholars of the importance 
of legal comparativism and of its effect on globalisation and the convergence 
of procedural elements across different jurisdictions.17 The choice to base the 
comparison of the custodial regime in Nigeria with the custodial regime in 
England was, in addition to the obvious need to place a restriction on the 
 
15 Editorial, “Criminal Justice Sector: Canvassing for a Change”, Nigerian Law Times (July 
2011) 
16 Articles 10 and 7 of the UDHR and ACHR, respectively, provide for the right to a fair trial. 
17 See, for example, John D. Jackson and Sarah J. Summers, The Internationalisation of 
Criminal Evidence: Beyond the Common Law and Civil Law Traditions (Cambridge, 2012), 
pp 3 – 29. See also, Aude Dorange and Stewart Field, “Reforming Defence Rights in French 
Police Custody: A Coming Together in Europe?”, (2012) 16 E&P 153 
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scope of the research, based on two reasons: the relationship between the two 
jurisdictions, and the relationship between the European Human Rights 
System and its member states, including England. 
In respect of the former, Nigeria derived its legal system from England, by 
virtue of its colonial past, and is viewed as the progeny of the adversarial 
system established and practiced therein.18 It was thus envisioned that the 
research, by comparing the custodial regimes and the practices therein, would 
serve to illustrate how far the version of adversarialism practiced in Nigeria, 
albeit limited to the pre-trial stage, had departed from the English version in 
the fifty-eight (58) years since it gained its independence.19 The work done is 
nevertheless comparative in nature, and is based on the hypothesis that rights 
development is a work in progress and that the legal system of Nigeria, having 
been greatly influenced by the colonial rule of the United Kingdom, would 
inevitably tread the same path as England in terms of developmental stages 
encountered in striving to achieve the best rights’ practices. In other words, it 
is the hypothesis of this researcher that the steps taken, and problems 
encountered by Nigeria, a state emerging from independence in its quest to 
protect fair trial rights would be remarkably similar to those previously 
encountered by its former colonial power, England. It was also hypothesized, 
as stated earlier, that the solution to some of the issues and challenges 
currently being faced in protecting custodial rights in Nigeria might be found 
by analyzing the issues and challenges previously faced in England. 
 
18 See, generally, T. O. Elias, Nigeria: The Development of its Laws and Constitution (Stevens 
& Sons Ltd, 1967) 
19 Nigeria gained its independence from the United Kingdom on October 1st, 1960. 
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The second reason for selecting England as the base of comparison was based 
on the need to test the hypotheses that there is an effect of the clarity, or lack 
thereof, of the statutory provisions establishing rights, and that there is a 
significant effect of the regional rights systems on local rights practices. In 
respect of the first hypothesis, as stated earlier, it was discovered that the 
statutory provisions in Nigeria are sparsely worded, whilst the provisions in 
England are detailed, clear and unambiguous. In respect of the second, 
England’s relationship with the European Human Rights System and the 
latter’s effect on local practices, not restricted to the custodial regime, has 
been frequently documented and examined. Additionally, the European 
System is generally viewed as the most proactive regional rights system,20 and 
has placed the greatest pressures for convergence of practice on its member 
states. By contrast, the African Human Rights System is viewed as the least 
developed regional system,21 so the comparative analysis of the custodial 
regimes is extended to the effect of the development and proactivity of the 
respective regional rights systems on the local practices of both jurisdictions, 
taking into account the reputations of the strengths of the European and 
African Systems of Human Rights and their respective relationships with their 
member states, not limited to the jurisdictions primarily considered herein. 
To summarise therefore, by way of a conclusion, the research contained and 
presented herein constitutes a theoretical analysis of the hypotheses that a 
clear and unambiguous statement of the rights available to an accused person 
would be delivered into practice quicker than a sparsely worded statutory 
 
20 Steiner, H. J.; Alston P. and Goodman, R., International Human Rights In Context: Law, 
Politics, Morals (3rd Edition, Oxford, 2007), pp 933 – 1019. 
21 Ibid 
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provision, fraught with ambiguities; and that a state emerging from 
independence would face the same challenges previously encountered by its 
former colonial ruler, and stands to draw from the experiences of the colonial 
state. It also seeks to assess the role and the effect of regional rights 
mechanisms in achieving the best detention practices within their member 
states. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In light of the aforementioned raison d'être behind the commencement of the 
immediate research, this thesis attempts to answer the following specific 
questions: 
i. What rights do suspects have in England and Nigeria during detention 
before a formal charge and detention pending the determination of the 
case brought against them? 
ii. How well are these rights observed in practice? Is there a disparity 
between the theoretical existence and the practical observance of these 
rights, and what are the factors responsible for this disparity, if any? 
iii. In bridging the gap between the theoretical existence and practical 
observance of these rights, what is the effect of detailed and clearly 
stated legislative instruments in attempting to improve compliance 
with due process? 
iv. What is the role of the regional human rights framework in achieving 
the best rights’ practice at the custodial stage of proceedings? 
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v. In striving to achieve the best rights’ practice, are there any lessons to 
be learned by a state emerging from independence from the 
developmental challenges faced by its former colonial ruler? 
 
1.4 METHODOLOGY 
The methodology employed in the research for this thesis was primarily 
doctrinal. It was not envisioned at the onset of the comparative study that 
analysing the relevant laws and statutory instruments that established the 
respective legal and institutional frameworks in both jurisdictions, as well as 
the available literature dealing with the subject would pose any great difficulty 
in answering any of the aforementioned research questions, including what 
rights were available to accused persons and whether any lessons could be 
learned from the developmental challenges of a former colonial ruler. The 
works of renowned experts in the fields of criminal procedure and 
comparative criminal law in both jurisdictions including, Cape, Jackson, 
Hodgson, Giannoulopoulos, Spronken, Adeyemi, Elias, Osamor, Ajomo, 
Okagbue, Aguda and Doherty, to mention a few, were considered.  
Perhaps the research question that was envisioned as posing the toughest 
challenge, at the onset, of answering through a purely doctrinal study was the 
second question, relating to translating the rights from theory to practice, and 
observing the delivery of the rights to practice. Quite simply, the question was 
asked, can the law in practice be examined largely from a literature review? 
Fortunately, however, during the course of researching the topic, given the 
extensive literature available on the law in practice, as well as the practical 
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challenges stemming from protection of custodial rights in England,22 it was 
the opinion and assumption of the researcher that embarking on a large-scale 
empirical study of the detention practices of the jurisdictions under 
consideration would neither be necessary nor cost-effective. 
However, following the discovery of a dearth of relevant literature and other 
secondary sources dealing with the subject in Nigeria readily available online, 
two separate trips to the locus were required, from December 2011 to 
February 2012, and again from December 2012 to January 2013, in order to 
enable the researcher visit libraries in Nigeria in search of relevant literature. 
Additionally, the researcher also conducted a severely limited empirical study 
in January 2013. The study was intended primarily to be illusory, and shed 
light on some relevant information not readily available via the limited 
academic literature and other secondary sources considered. The methodology 
employed in the empirical study is explained in detail in Chapter 3.4, below. 
In analysing the detention practices, the theoretical model that was employed 
also necessitated a study of the respective regional rights systems to which 
both jurisdictions belonged. Beginning with the hypothesis that rights 
development was a work in progress, and was usually in response to a 
 
22 See generally, for example, Layla Skinns, “"I'm a detainee; get me out of here": predictors 
of access to custodial legal advice in public and privatized police custody areas in England 
and Wales” (2009) Brit. J. C. 399; Layla Skinns, “The Right to Legal Advice in the Police 
Station: Past, Present and Future” (2011) Crim. L. R. 19; Vicky Kemp, “”No Time for a 
Solicitor”: Implications for Delays on the Take-Up of Legal Advice” (2013) Crim. L. R. 184; 
Vicky Kemp, “PACE, Performance Targets and Legal Protections” (2014) Crim. L. R. 278; 
Kemp, V., Balmer, N. J. and Pleasance, P., “Whose Time is it Anyway? Factors Associated 
with Duration in Police Custody” (2012) Crim. L. R. 736; Layla Skinns, Police Custody: 
Governance, Legitimacy and Reform in the Criminal Justice Process (Routledge, 2011); and 
Sue Easton, Silence and Confessions: The Suspect as the Source of Evidence (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014) 
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miscarriage of justice of some sort,23 the first step was an analysis of how far 
the rights in practice had departed from the provisions of the statutory 
instruments which brought the said rights into existence. Following on from 
this, the steps taken in reforming the rights practices were also taken into 
consideration. To further test the hypothesis, the roles of the respective 
regional rights systems in rights development were also analysed. This 
analysis was not restricted to the direct relationship between the two 
jurisdictions and their respective rights systems, but was extended to the role 
played in the rights development of their member states more generally. 
At this juncture, it is imperative to note that despite the existence of a Shari’a 
criminal system in Nigeria,24 the study of the custodial regime therein contains 
very little reference to or any in-depth consideration of the Shari’a criminal 
procedure. This is as a result of a two main reasons, namely: 
First, following the discovery of the dearth of literature on the subject, and in 
light of the insecurity and violence which has plagued Northern Nigeria for the 
better part of the last decade,25 the researcher, in the interests of personal 
safety and security could not make a visit to the locus to consult the local 
libraries. During the empirical study, however, responses from a few Northern 
states were nevertheless obtained. 
 
23 See Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process (4th Edition, Oxford, 
2010), p. 9 
24 Following its return to democratic rule in 1999, twelve (12) of the nineteen (19) Northern 
states of Nigeria enacted a Shari’a penal code for the adjudication of criminal matters within 
their borders. See, generally, Ruud Peters, Islamic Criminal Law in Nigeria (Spectrum Books, 
2003) and Gunner J. Weimann, Islamic Criminal Law in Northern Nigeria: Politics, Religion, 
Judicial Practice (Amsterdam University Press, 2010) 
25 Chothia, F., “Who are Nigeria’s Boko Haram Islamists?” (BBC Africa, May 2015), 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501, last accessed 23-09-2015 
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Secondly, Peters and Weimann raise several criticisms about the nature in 
which the Shari’a codes were drafted and implemented that called their 
constitutionality into question;26 a fact which satisfied the researcher that, in 
addition to the fact that the Shari’a regime introduced in Nigeria focused more 
on the trial of offences, which falls outside the ambit of this thesis, and the fact 
that the pre-trial or custodial regime in the Shari’a context is still within the 
purvey of the Nigeria Police Force, the rights provisions contained in the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 had supremacy over any 
inconsistencies that might exist in the Shari’a penal codes, especially in light 
of the provision of Section 1(3) of said Constitution, which establishes its 
supremacy as the grund norm and invalidates any provision found to be 
inconsistent with the provisions thereto.27 The foregoing notwithstanding, the 
current practice of Shari’a in Nigeria is highlighted briefly in the next chapter. 
 
1.5 CHAPTER BREAKDOWN 
The thesis is structured as follows: 
Having introduced the nature of the research contained in this thesis in the 
current chapter, in the next chapter, Chapter Two, the legal and institutional 
framework of both jurisdictions is examined in a bid to determine, and answer 
the first research question on a purely theoretical basis, and ascertain what the 
rights sought to be protected in both jurisdictions are, and the framework 
 
26 Peters, n 24, pp 37 – 42; and Weimann, n 24, pp 129 – 131  
27 This was also decided upon in Uzodinma v Commissioner of Police [1982] (1) NCR 27, 
which challenged the legality of a provision that denied accused persons the right to 
representation by legal practitioner in Nigeria before an Upper Area Court. 
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established by the statutory instruments with a view to implementing the rights 
in practice. 
Chapter Three attempts to answer the second, third and fifth research 
questions, by analysing the protection of the rights in practice, and attempting 
to ascertain the intrinsic shortcomings of the legislative instruments which 
hinder a smooth delivery of the rights in practice, as well as attitudinal factors 
attributable to the parties involved at this stage of proceedings, and the effect 
of same on the delivery of the rights in practice. 
In Chapter Four, having established the lacunae between the rights sought to 
be protected in theory and the actual protection of the rights in practice, the 
mechanisms available in both jurisdictions for bridging the gap or realigning 
towards the best rights’ practices are assessed, including internal and external 
realignment mechanisms, which also extend to the role of the regional rights 
mechanisms and their effect on the local protection of rights within the 
jurisdictions being compared, in a bid to answer the fourth research question. 
Chapter Five is the concluding chapter, which summarises the arguments and 
findings expressed across the length and breadth of the thesis, and concludes 
the thesis by proposing recommendations for even better protection of the pre-
trial rights of accused persons in both jurisdictions. 
 
1.6 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
There were two significant limitations to the research undertaken. The first of 
these was encountered by the discovery of the dearth of relevant literature and 
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other secondary sources on the custodial regime of Nigeria, which may have 
had the unwittingly unfortunate effect of creating the impression within this 
thesis of a research bias towards England, and a lot of arguments and 
contentions relating to Nigeria appear to be based purely on conjecture. 
The resolution to this problem was the conducting of the severely limited 
empirical study, which birthed its own limitations which served as the second 
significant limitation to the research conducted herein. The limitations to the 
study and the resolutions thereto are reported in detail in Chapter 3.4, below.
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
Since the turn of the 20th century, essentially, the protection and enforcement 
of fundamental human rights has been deemed as a very important element in 
the administration of government, and indeed every sphere of human 
interaction. This is evidenced by the numerous international documents 
dealing with the protection of rights, as well as provisions contained in 
different local legislative instruments enacted by states.1 This quest to protect 
and enforce rights manifests itself in different areas of law, including the 
Criminal Justice sector, extending as far as the pre-trial stage.2 As an 
introduction to, and before embarking on the analysis of the central idea of this 
thesis, i.e., comparing the detention practices of England and Wales3 and 
Nigeria, and the rights available to suspects4 therein; it would hitherto seem 
essential to establish the context and the scope of the comparison. Thus, this 
chapter shall identify, examine and compare the rights available to suspects 
and accused persons in both England and Nigeria, but as a precursor, examine 
the legal and institutional framework governing the pre-trial stages of both 
 
1 The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948; the European Convention 
of Human Rights 1953; the Human Rights Act 1998; and Chapter IV (Fundamental Rights) of 
the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999; are a few examples of such 
international documents and local legislative instruments which provide for the protection of 
rights. 
2 For a discussion of this, see Section 2.3, below. 
3 Any reference to England hereinafter shall include both England and Wales. 
4 As a result of these rights being made available to persons at all stages of the criminal 
process, and as a result of the different terms used in the different statutory instruments, the 
terms “suspect”, “accused person” and “detainee” are used interchangeably throughout this 
thesis to refer to a person who is being subjected or on the precipice of being subjected to the 
criminal process. 
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jurisdictions, specifically the police station process and the custodial stage, by 
giving a brief historiography before progressing to an analysis of the current 
legal and institutional frameworks in both jurisdictions, albeit only from a 
theoretical perspective.5 It should be noted that this chapter begins on the 
assumption that it is trite knowledge to all that the key parties involved in the 
pre-trial stage of proceedings in the adversarial system, which both 
jurisdictions practice, are the police, the suspect and the prosecution.6 
 
2.1 THE PRE-TRIAL STAGE  
2.1.1 Historiography 
In discussing succinctly the historiography of the pre-trial process in England, 
the intention is not to delve as far back as the Norman Conquest and, coupled 
with the knowledge that this information is readily available in a plethora of 
other sources,7 only the following remarks concerning the historical 
development of the pre-trial stage in England might be necessary. 
 The entirety of the criminal process in England developed in true common 
law fashion. The police forces in England, in the modern form that we are 
familiar with and that today’s police forces have developed from, were first 
 
5 A comparison of the jurisdictions from a practical perspective shall be made in the next 
chapter. 
6 Of course, there are other parties to the entire criminal process, such as witnesses and 
victims, but any discussions relevant to these other parties fall outside the pre-trial stage, and 
thus, outside the purview of this thesis. 
7 See, for example, L. Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration 
from 1750 (Stevens, London, 1948 – 1986), and David Bentley, English Criminal Justice in 
the Nineteenth Century (Hambledon, 1998) 
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established in the early to mid-nineteenth century.8 Prior to the enactment and 
eventual coming into force of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
(PACE), whose main effect was “authorising and regulating”9 policing 
practices, and regularising the legal framework of the pre-trial stage, the pre-
trial process was different, albeit not drastically so. The police had a few 
additional powers than in current times: in addition to the powers of stop and 
search, arrest and investigation, prior to PACE, the police also had the power 
to prosecute certain offences, with the majority of prosecution at the 
magistrates’ courts being presented by police officers.10 This power of 
prosecution was very often abused, and misused, which led to the setting up of 
the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (RCCP) to look into Police 
Powers and the prosecution process, and it is the recommendations contained 
in the report of this commission, published in 1981,11 that led to the 
promulgation and subsequent coming into force of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984,12 and the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, which 
changed the terrain of the pre-trial process in England, or at the very least, 
caused the spark that brought about the change to said terrain: as shall be seen 
 
8 The Metropolitan Police Act 1829 created the Metropolitan Police force,and created a model 
on which subsequent police forces were set up to resemble. For an in-depth discussion on the 
history and development of the police in England, see Malcolm Davies, Hazel Croall and Jane 
Tyrer, Criminal Justice (4th Edition, Pearson, 2010) pp 161 – 165; and, generally, L. 
Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law, vol 3: Cross-Currents in the Movement for 
the Reform of the Police (Stevens, London, 1956) 
9 A phrase coined by David Dixon, in reference to the legislative policy behind the enactment 
of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 in David Dixon, “Authorise and Regulate: A 
Comparative Perspective on the Rise and Fall of a Regulatory Strategy” in Ed Cape and 
Richard Young (Eds.), Regulating Policing: The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Past, 
Present and Future (Oxford, 2008) 
10 John Long, “Keeping PACE? Some Front Line Policing Perspectives” in Cape and Young 
(Eds.), supra, p 93 
11 Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, 1981, Cmnd 8092 (Philips 
Commission) 
12 Hereinafter “PACE” 
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in the next section, there are other legislative instruments which govern 
various aspects of the pre-trial stage; but the current pre-trial regime as it 
exists is merely an updated version of the regime introduced by both Acts. 
The entire legal system in Nigeria, not just the criminal process or the pre-trial 
process strictly speaking, was birthed as a result of the United Kingdom’s 
colonial rule over it. Speaking matter-of-factly, the nation recognised as 
Nigeria did not exist until the amalgamation of the Protectorates of Southern 
and Northern Nigeria in January 1914.13 
Prior to the arrival of the colonial masters, there were numerous indigenous 
systems of dispute resolution and systems of justice amongst the numerous 
indigenous tribes occupying the terrain that is now known as Nigeria. Some of 
these dispute resolution processes still remain, and are a part of the legal 
framework, albeit in the realm of civil law and procedure. Essentially, criminal 
adjudication has shifted from the indigenous practices to the adversarial 
practices established by colonialism. It should be noted that this shift to the 
adversarial process of adjudication does not mean that no crimes exist in 
Nigeria that have originated from its pre-colonial days, it is only the mode of 
adjudication that has made a complete departure from what existed in the 
years before colonisation.14 
 
13 For more on the history of Nigeria and its legal system, see M. Ayo Ajomo and I. E. 
Okagbue (Eds.), Human Rights and the Administration of Criminal Justice in Nigeria (NIALS 
Research Series No 1, 1991), pp 18 – 34. Also see, generally, B. O. Nwabueze, A 
Constitutional History of Nigeria (Hurst, 1982) and C. O. Okonkwo and M. E. Naish, 
Criminal Law in Nigeria (2nd Edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 1980) 
14 E. O. Oloyede, “The Present Scope of the Nigerian Criminal Law”, in T. O. Elias (Ed.), 
Law and Social Change in Nigeria (University of Lagos and Evans, 1972) pp 183 – 186, and 
Ajomo and Okagbue, ibid, pp24 – 27. Also see, generally, T. O. Elias, Nigeria: The 
Development of its Laws and Constitution (Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1967) 
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The growth and development of the pre-trial system in Nigeria, the entire legal 
system in actuality, has also been largely hampered by long periods of military 
rule and governance.15 Each military government would, in turn, suspend the 
constitution of the day and put in place its own decrees. Since 1999, 
fortunately, there has been consistency of government, and democratic rule 
has prevailed without any further intervention from the military. Nigeria now 
operates as a federation, with the National Assembly enacting laws that 
operate on the federal level, with each state also possessing the power to 
legislate on its own criminal laws and procedure.16 The effect of this, as will 
be discussed later,17 is yet to fully manifest itself as there is no significant 
difference between the federal and state laws concerning criminal procedure,18 
and the pre-trial process has remained virtually unchanged and is, in essence, 
the same process that was introduced by the colonial masters. 
In exercise of their power to legislate on their own criminal laws and 
procedure, in 2000 and 2001, twelve (12) of the nineteen Northern, mainly-
Islamic states in Nigeria, enacted Shari’a penal codes.19 The introduction of 
 
15 The military overthrew the new (at the time) civilian government by a coup d’état in 1966, 
and save for a brief return to democracy from 1979 to 1983, Nigeria was ruled by several 
military rulers with power changing hands by virtue of further coups and counter coups. 
Democratic rule was reinstated in 1999, with the election of a civilian president, Gen. 
Olusegun Obasanjo (rtd.). 
16 See Section 4 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. 
17 See Section 2.2.2.1, below 
18 A fact that made a study of the Nigerian system, or an analysis of the pre-trial stage rather 
straightforward, regardless of the federal system of government, which includes a hierarchy of 
federal and state courts. With the return to democracy in 1999, the steps taken by the different 
State Houses of Assembly in respect of legislating on Crime and Criminal Procedure was 
merely to localise the relevant Federal Act and declare it in force within the state. 
19 Zamfara State enacted the first Shari’a penal code on the 27th of January, 2000, followed by 
Niger, Jigawa, Kano, Kebbi, Sokoto, Katsina, Yobe, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, and Kaduna 
States. See Ruud Peters, Islamic Criminal Law in Nigeria (Spectrum Books, 2003), pp 13 – 
17, and Gunner J. Weimann, Islamic Criminal Law in Northern Nigeria: Politics, Religion, 
Judicial Practice (Amsterdam University Press, 2010), p. 15. 
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the Shari’a penal codes, it is submitted, has had no significant effect on the 
scope of this thesis, i.e., the detention rights of suspects and accused persons. 
The Shari’a penal codes are silent on procedural steps, and focus strictly on 
the creation of offences and the trial stage, which both fall outside the ambit of 
this thesis, which is the pre-trial stage. Additionally, the Shari’a penal codes 
contain no rights-related provisions. As it were, it is herein assumed that the 
intendment of the drafters of the respective Shari’a penal codes only sought to 
introduce new offences, and not a wholesale reupholstering of the criminal 
procedure within the respective states. 
Additionally, as Peters reports, notwithstanding the introduction of the Shari’a 
penal codes, there is a problem with enforcement, owing to the fact that the 
police in Nigeria is a federal institution who still remain in charge of the pre-
trial stage, and have not been trained to enforce the Shari’a codes.20 Further, as 
stated in the previous chapter, Peters and Weimann have raised several 
criticisms about the nature in which the Shari’a codes were drafted and 
implemented that called their constitutionality into question.21 As it were, the 
effects of the introduction of the Shari’a penal codes on the detention rights of 
accused persons following Nigeria’s return to democratic rule, or the lack 
thereof, are not in issue, and are not considered within this thesis. 
2.1.2 Current Pre-Trial Practices 
As already highlighted, the main parties to the pre-trial process in both 
jurisdictions are the police, the suspect and the prosecution. In the next section 
we shall examine in greater detail the legislative instruments that govern the 
 
20 Peters, Ibid, p 29. 
21 Peters, n 19, pp 37 – 42; and Weimann, n 19, pp 129 – 131  
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terrain and how the different institutions operate and interact with one another; 
but, as a precursor to that, this section highlights the current pre-trial practices 
in England and Nigeria, in a bid to illustrate and also establish the similarities, 
in both jurisdictions, of the terrain within which the custodial rights regimes 
operate. 
The role of the police in the entire criminal process cannot and should not be 
underestimated. They are the gateway to the criminal justice system, as it is 
their response to a purported criminal act, usually the arrest of a suspected 
offender, which commences the process of criminal adjudication, which 
culminates in the conviction or acquittal of the suspect by a court of competent 
jurisdiction.22 According to Ofori-Amankwah, the success or failure of any 
system of criminal justice depends to a large extent on the police service and 
their level of intelligence, efficiency, humanism and sensitivity to the values 
of the society.23 Or as Gibson and Cavadino put it,  the criminal process 
“begins when a crime comes to the notice of the authorities…”24 Quirk goes 
further to state that the police occupy an anomalous position in the criminal 
justice process, as they are accorded an inquisitorial, investigative role in an 
adversarial system, yet they continue to be perceived, by both themselves and 
 
22 For a detailed look at the entire adversarial criminal process, see generally, Andrew 
Ashworth and Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process (4th Edition, Oxford, 2010); Penny 
Darbyshire, Darbyshire on the English Legal System (10th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011); 
Gary Slapper and David Kelly, The English Legal System (14th Edition, Routledge, 2013); 
Oluwatoyin Doherty, Criminal Procedure in Nigeria: Law and Practice(Blackstone, 1990); J. 
A. Yakubu and A. T. Oyewo, Criminal Law and Procedure in Nigeria (Malthouse, 2000); 
Delmas-Marty, M. and Spencer, J. R. (Eds.), European Criminal Procedures (Cambridge, 
2002) pp 142 – 217; Richard Vogler,  A World View of Criminal Justice (Ashgate, 2005); and 
Craig M. Bradley (Ed.), Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study (2nd Edition, Carolina 
Academic Press, 2007), etc. 
23 E. H. Ofori-Amankwah, Selected Essays in Criminal Justice (KNUST-UPP, 2005), p49 
24 Bryan Gibson and Paul Cavadino, Introduction to the Criminal Justice Process (2nd Edition, 
Waterside Press, 2002), p54 
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the public, as agents of the prosecution.25  The powers of arrest are wide-
ranging, and are conferred on the police in England by virtue of Part III 
(Sections 24 – 33, inclusive) of PACE, as amended by Section 110 of the 
Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005; and in Nigeria by Sections 24 
and 25 of the Police Act 2004,26 Part 2 (Sections 3 – 29) of the Administration 
of Criminal Justice Act 2015, Part 2 (Sections 3 – 10) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 200427 and Chapter IV (Sections 26 – 46) of the Criminal 
Procedure Code 2004.28  
Generally, the powers of arrest conferred on the police in England and Nigeria 
are remarkably similar, and the police, by virtue of the aforementioned 
statutory provisions, may arrest, with or without a warrant, persons who are 
suspected of committing an offence, or persons who have been caught in the 
course of committing an offence. Persons who have been arrested are to be 
taken to the nearest police station as soon as possible and without unnecessary 
delay. 
It should be noted, and as pointed out by Michael Zander, that the police have 
a wide discretion in deciding how and when to respond to a crime,29 and, 
indeed, not every arrest will result in a person being put through the entire 
criminal justice process. It should also be noted that, as further indication of 
the weight and effect of the police discretion in the administration of criminal 
justice, not every arrest made results in the trial of the arrested person. 
 
25 Hannah Quirk, “The Significance of Culture in Criminal Procedure Reform: Why the 
Revised Disclosure Scheme Cannot Work” (2006) 10 E&P 42, at p 48. 
26 Police Act, Cap P19, LFN 2004 
27 Hereinafter “CPA” 
28 Hereinafter “CPC” 
29 Michael Zander, Cases and Materials on the English Legal System (10th Edition, 
Cambridge, 2007) pp 241-242 
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Occasionally, especially in cases involving minor offences or misdemeanours, 
arrested persons are merely cautioned and released without having to answer 
to a formal charge.30 
An arrest is usually preceded by a period of investigation, although it is 
possible for investigation to commence or continue after arrests have been 
made. Investigation is performed by the police,31 and could be performed in 
different ways including, but not limited to, the interrogation of suspects and 
eyewitnesses, as well as forensic examination of evidentiary samples obtained 
from the locus in quo. 
If a suspect is arrested before the conclusion of the investigation, there are 
provisions for a maximum time he may be detained before being arraigned 
before a court. In both jurisdictions, this period is ordinarily thirty-six (36) or 
forty-eight (48) hours, respectively, although this detention period can be 
extended in special circumstances.32  
After the conclusion of investigation by the police, if there is sufficient 
evidence gathered which would, on a balance of probabilities, suggest the 
involvement of the suspect in the crime committed, the file is usually passed 
on to the prosecution, and a charge proffered against the suspect. The Crown 
Prosecution Service, established in 1985, is the body responsible for the 
prosecution of all criminal offences in England;33 whilst in Nigeria, 
prosecution of offences is performed by the Attorney-General of the 
 
30 See Davies, Croall and Tyrer, n8, pp 187 – 199. 
31 As conferred on them in England and Nigeria by Part V of PACE, Part V of the CPC and 
Part IV of the Police Act 2004, respectively. 
32 For a detailed analysis of these provisions, see Sections 2.3, below. 
33 Section 1, Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 
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Federation and the Attorneys-General of the thirty-six (36) states.34 
Additionally, the police in Nigeria also have the power to prosecute certain 
offences. Usually, they may prosecute misdemeanours and minor offences; 
prosecution of felonies usually falling within the purview of the Office of the 
Attorneys-General of the Federation and States.35 
The most important party in the pre-trial stage is the suspect. Indeed, the 
criminal justice system as a concept exists for the determination of the guilt, or 
innocence, of a person where a criminal act has occurred and there is a need 
for redress.36 The adversarial system is built on the presumption of a suspect’s 
innocence until his guilt is established; thus, there are several safeguards that 
exist to ensure, at least on a theoretical level, that the suspect is treated as 
though he were innocent. These rights include the right to be informed of the 
reasons for his arrest, and the right to reasonable time to prepare his defence; 
which segues into the suspect defending himself, in person or with the 
assistance of a legal practitioner. Current issues that arise from these rights are 
issues relating to how legal assistance is provided for at the police station, 
including time and frequency of consultation with counsel at the police station 
and presence, or lack thereof, of counsel during interrogation.37 
In brief, the current pre-trial practice in both jurisdictions is that the police are 
responsible for the investigation of offences and the arrest of suspects. After 
arrests have been made, and investigations concluded, the evidence gathered is 
 
34 Sections 174 and 211, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. It should be 
noted that both sections are identically-worded, the difference being that the former provides 
for the powers of the Attorney-General of the Federation, and the latter the powers of the 
Attorney-General of a State 
35 See Section 2.2.2.1 below for a detailed discussion. 
36 Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne, n 22, p 2 
37 See Section 2.3 below for an analysis of these rights and issues arising therefrom. 
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passed on to the relevant prosecuting body, and a charge proffered against the 
suspect. The suspect is then given, or is expected to be given, time within 
which to prepare his defence. These elements of the pre-trial stage shall be 
examined in greater detail subsequently, but perhaps the only notable 
distinction between the pre-trial practices in both jurisdictions is that in 
Nigeria, the police have the power to prosecute offences, and the role of 
investigator and prosecution is occasionally played by the same party. This, as 
one would imagine, and as shall be discussed later on in the chapter,38 could 
create potential for abuse. 
From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that, with the exception of the power 
of prosecution being vested in the Nigeria Police Force, the parties to the pre-
trial process in both jurisdictions are essentially the same, and these parties are 
vested with the same powers and responsibilities. Thus, it is hypothesised that 
the rights available at the custodial stage ought to be remarkably similar, even 
if only on a purely theoretical level. 
The next section takes a detailed look at the provisions of the relevant 







38 Section 2.2.2.1, below 
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2.2 CURRENT LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
2.2.1 England 
There are numerous international treaties and conventions, as well as some 
local legislative instruments and cases (local and international), which form 
part of the legal framework of the pre-trial stage in England; and the 
provisions contained in some of these legislative instruments establish the 
institutions which constitute the institutional framework of the pre-trial stage. 
The current legislative instruments governing the pre-trial stage in England, 
include, in varying degrees, PACE, the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, the Human Rights Act 1998, the 
Police Act 1996, the Police and Justice Act 2006, the Serious Organised Crime 
and Police Act 2005, the Access to Justice Act 1999, the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, the European Convention 
on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 
and the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Two recent 
cases that have had an impact on the legal framework in England are Salduz v 
Turkey39 and Cadder40.  This is by no means an exhaustive list of statutory 
instruments or cases, but the aforementioned are the most commonly cited 
statutory instruments and cases in any current discussion of the legal 
framework of England. In such discussions also, PACE is usually considered 
the primary legislative instrument, and even the most cursory of glances on 
related provisions in a few of these instruments would show a lot of 
similarities in the nature of rights provided. The adversarial system is hinged 
 
39 Salduz v Turkey [2008] 49 EHRR 421 
40 Cadder v HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 43 
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on procedural fairness, which struggles to find a balance between granting the 
police sufficient powers in performing their duties of thoroughly investigating 
offences and making arrests where necessary, and the need to preserve the 
presumption of a suspect’s innocence until his guilt is ascertained; and the 
laws governing the pre-trial process are reflective of this. For example, on the 
one hand, Part III of PACE grants wide powers of arrest with or without a 
warrant, but also places a duty on the arresting officer to inform the person of 
the reasons for his arrest;41 and a failure to do so could result in the arrest 
being declared unlawful.42 
The analysis of the current legal and institutional framework in this section, 
bearing in mind the nature of the adversarial system, shall be done by 
considering the legislative instruments and institutions on either side of the 
balance, i.e., by looking at the legal framework and institutions relating to 
police powers and prosecution together, before delving into those relating to 
the suspect and the preparation of his defence. 
2.2.1.1 The Police and Prosecution – Powers, Policies and Practices 
The Police, as is trite knowledge, are the primary institution at the pre-trial 
stage, on this side of the adversarial coin. The current institutional set-up of 
the police is federal in nature. The Police in England is established by the 
Police Act 1996, and is made up of forty-three (43) different autonomous 
territorial police forces, with each police force responsible for one of the 
corresponding forty-three (43) police areas; each area comprising one or more 
 
41 Section 28, PACE 
42 Section 28(3) 
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of the local government areas or counties in England.43 Each of these police 
forces is independent, with the Chief Constable of each force (the chief police 
officer in the Metropolitan and City of London police forces is called 
“Commissioner”, not “Chief Constable”) seised with powers of operational 
control over the relevant force in the relevant area. He is responsible for 
determining the style of policing and the priorities for their area within their 
budget and according to national and local policing plans.44 
The police in England have a wide range of powers, and arguably need to have 
such wide-ranging powers to perform their duties amicably. Whether they 
pursue the performance of their duties under the ambit of the “due process” or 
“crime control” models,45 the police need to be granted wide-ranging powers. 
These powers ordinarily include the powers of stop and search; entry, search 
and seizure; arrest; interrogation; and detention. As highlighted above, they 
also exercise a wide discretion in the performance of their duties.46 In the face 
of these wide-ranging powers of the police, coupled with an equally wide-
ranging discretion in the exercise of their powers, there is the need to regulate 
these powers in a bid to prevent abuse, and to maintain the adversarial 
balance.  
 
43 For a full list of the 43 different police forces and a delineation of the geographical terrain 
of England into the different respective areas, see “List of UK Police Forces”, available at 
http://www.police.uk/forces/, last accessed on 29-08-14 
44 Davies, et al, n8, p 188 
45 Herbert L. Packer’s models for evaluating the criminal process. See Herbert L. Packer, The 
Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford, 1968), pp 149 – 173. 
46 Zander, n 29, pp 241 – 242 
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Regulation has been defined as “any activity, legal, political, social, economic 
or psychological, the purpose of which is to steer the flow of events.”47 Owers 
is of the opinion that efficiency in the Criminal Justice System needs always to 
be set against fairness, due process and human rights, and speaks generally of 
the importance of having a regulatory ombudsman on ground to assess the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the Criminal Justice System.48 There is a 
general acceptance by several academics that any regulation or regulatory 
instrument should have three elements:  
“the goal (the rule or standard against which behaviour is to be 
assessed); monitoring (to evaluate what happens in reality); and 
realignment (through mechanisms for enforcing rules or promoting 
adherence to standards where monitoring shows significant deviation 
from them)”49  
In expanding on this, Sanders distinguishes between ‘regulation’ and ‘control’. 
He defines ‘control’ as: 
 “a situation where powers can only be exercised on the basis of a 
command or permission; where any abuse of, or deviation from the 
scope of the power would be apparent to some form of higher or 
 
47 Peter Grabosky, “On the interface of criminal justice and regulation”, in Hannah Quirk, 
Toby Seddon and Graham Smith (Eds.), Regulation and Criminal Justice: Innovations in 
Policy and Research (Cambridge, 2010), p 73 
48 See, generally, Anne Owers, “The regulation of criminal justice: inspectorates, ombudsmen 
and inquiries”, in Quirk, Seddon and Smith (Eds.), n 47, pp 237 – 260. 
49 Ed Cape and Richard Young, in Cape and Young, n 9, p 2, citing Sanders, in the same 
publication, at p 50. 
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supervisory authority; and where that abuse or deviation would be the 
subject of some form of reprimand or discipline.”50 
Relying heavily on Crawford’s argument using the metaphor of the difference 
between ‘steering’ and ‘rowing’,51 Sanders argues comprehensively that in a 
regulatory state, the notion of ‘control’ as the main regulatory mechanism 
ought to be rejected, as this would involve the state ‘rowing’ all aspects of a 
societal boat. He supports Crawford’s contention that, given the “complexity 
of the modern state”, it would be unrealistic in most respects for the state to 
‘row’; thus the state ought to seek to ‘steer’, by adopting the tripartite form of 
regulation.52 
In achieving the first element, it becomes glaringly obvious that there must be 
a law, or legislative instrument, which creates the standard against which to 
assess behaviour. This is the goal, and is provided for in England by PACE 
and a host of other legislative instruments. 
As previously highlighted, PACE is the primary legislative instrument in 
England, with respect to the pre-trial stage in England, with particular focus on 
the powers of the police; powers which include stop and search, arrest, 
investigation of offences, etc.,53 and it was enacted to regularise the previously 
fragmented legal framework of the pre-trial process in England. By enacting 
 
50 Sanders, Ibid 
51 Adam Crawford, “Networked Governance and the Post-Regulatory State? Steering, Rowing 
and Anchoring the Provision of Policing and Security” (2006) 10 Theoretical Criminology 
449; although Sanders notes that the analogies of ‘rowing’ and ‘steering’ were first coined by 
David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, in Osborne and Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the 
Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector (Plume, 1993) 
52 Sanders, op cit 
53 In a bid not to go beyond the scope of this thesis, only the sections dealing with police 
powers of arrest, detention and interrogation are considered. 
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PACE, Parliament intended to increase the powers of the police, but deal with 
the dilemma of balancing a wide scope of powers needed for the police to 
function effectively whilst ensuring, at least theoretically, that the 
infringement of civil liberties were kept to a minimum.54  
In respect of the three main powers of the police in England that this thesis is 
concerned, namely arrest, detention and interrogation, there are provisions 
contained in the Act and in the different Codes of Practice, which impose 
duties on the police which purport to find the balance between powers and 
civil liberties. Upon arrest, a person must be informed of his arrest and the 
reasons for his arrest as soon as practicable;55 and a person who is detained at 
the station has rights and liberties to maintain the adversarial balance for the 
period he is detained, including at the point of interrogation. These rights are 
dealt with in greater detail in subsequent sections of this chapter, but an 
innovation of PACE that directly affected the institutional framework of 
policing in England was the creation of the role of the custody officer and the 
creation of the custody suite.56  
The role of custody officer is a monitoring one, and entrusts in a constable of 
the rank of no less than Sergeant the duty to ensure that all arrests are made 
legitimately, that the detainee is informed as soon as practicable of the reasons 
for his arrest and detention, and that all officers involved in the interrogation, 
detention and general treatment of an accused person do so in accordance with 
 
54 Ozin, P., Norton, H., & Spivey, P., PACE: A Practical Guide to the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984. (Oxford, 2006), cited in Benz, S., “The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984: balancing civil liberties and public security”, (2012) Diffusion:UCLAN, Vol.5, Issue 2, 
available at http://atp.uclan.ac.uk/buddypress/diffusion/?p=1255, last accessed on 25-07-2014.  
55 Section 28 of PACE. 
56 Section 36 of PACE 
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Code C of the Codes of Practice.57 The custody officer’s role is also to keep a 
detailed custody report for every detainee at the police station and, at regular 
intervals, to make a decision about the continued detention of a detainee vis-à-
vis releasing him on police bail. By this establishment of the role of custody 
officer, the Act, in addition to providing the rules and the goal of regulation, 
also provided a mechanism to monitor the compliance of the police with the 
provisions contained therein.  
In addition to the custody officer, the Police Act also established Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services 
(HMICFRS) whose primary function is to assess and report on the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the Police forces in England.58 There is also the 
Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC), formerly the Independent 
Police Crimes Commission (IPCC),59 whose primary function is to oversee the 
police complaints system and investigate the most serious incidents and 
complaints involving the police, which although arguably a part of the 
monitoring stage, do not primarily deal with the monitoring of the delivery of 
the rights in practice at the custodial or pre-trial stage, and are therefore not 
engaged or analysed within this thesis. 
The third element of regulation – realignment – appears to be the purview of 
Parliament and, the obvious means by which this occurs is by amendment of 
statutes as and when necessary. Parliament has continued to amend the Act, 
particularly the Codes of Practice, in an attempt to correct deviation from the 
 
57 Sections 36 – 38 of PACE 
58 See the official website of the HMICFRS, available at 
https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/, last accessed on 16-08-2018. 
59 See the official website of the IOPC, available at https://www.policeconduct.gov.uk/, last 
accessed on 16-08-2018. 
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goal, and PACE has continued to evolve over the years to the point where, 
according to Cape and Young, it has become “a complex piece of legislation 
which, for those who are unfamiliar with its intricacies, is hard to 
understand”.60 The fact that Parliament has continued to amend the Codes of 
Practice, it would appear, is an indication of a strong political will which, 
similar to the tripartite forms of regulation, is an essential tool in rights 
development. 
At this juncture, it might be imperative to digress and attempt a working 
definition of the term “political will”. As with several jurisprudential and 
theoretical concepts, there is probably no universally accepted definition of the 
concept, nor does this researcher make any attempt to lay claim to being well-
versed in the concept of political will. However, in this thesis, it is argued as a 
factor that contributes to the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the realignment 
mechanisms. Thus, it is important to define the term within the context as shall 
be employed across the length and breadth of this thesis. 
As Brinkerhoff argues, the term “political will”, or the lack thereof, has been 
frequently identified as the culprit for poor anti-corruption measures, reform 
practices and political failings generally, despite remaining under-defined and 
poorly understood as a concept.61 There appears to be a consensus amongst 
political observers and academics alike of the difficulty in pinpointing an 
accurate definition of the term “political will”.62 Post, et al, conducted an 
 
60 Cape and Young, n 9, p 1. 
61 D. W. Brinkerhoff, “Unpacking the Concept of Political Will to Confront Corruption”, 
2010, available at http://www.u4.no/publications/unpacking-the-concept-of-political-will-to-
confront-corruption/, last accessed on 14-09-2015 
62 A publication by the Department for International Development points out that despite a 
lack of clarity as to what the term really means, it is commonly used “as a catch-all concept, 
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intensive study of the concept and carefully considered previous attempts at 
defining the concept, before attempting to define political will as “the extent of 
committed support among key decision makers for a particular policy solution 
to a particular problem”,63 and it is this definition of political will that is 
herein adopted throughout this thesis in reference to the concept.64 As the 
authors explain in detail across the entirety of their article, this definition is 
subdivided into four components, namely:  
(i) “a sufficient set of decision makers;  
(ii) with a common understanding of a particular problem on the 
formal agenda;  
(iii) is committed to supporting;  
(iv) commonly perceived, potentially effective policy solution.65 
In juxtaposing this definition of political will against the tripartite form of 
regulation that has been considered earlier in this chapter, and is referenced 
 
the meaning of which is so vague that it does little to enrich our understanding of the political 
and policy processes”. See “Understanding ‘Political Will’”, available at 
http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Outputs/Mis_SPC/R8236Appendix3.pdf, last accessed on 14-09-
2015. Also, Post, et al, have noted the proliferation of the use of the term without proper 
definition. As they report, An online search for the term “political will” generates millions of 
hits, and have been used by a plethora of persons, from President Obama of the United States 
to the United Nations in a range of contexts, ranging from climate change to health-care 
reform to more efficient energy use. See L. A. Post, A. N. W. Raile and E. D. Raile, “Defining 
Political Will”, (2010) Politics & Policy, Volume 38, No. 4, 653, at 654 
63 Ibid, at 659. 
64 For more on the concept of political will, see generally, and in addition to the 
aforementioned; Craig Charney, “Political Will: What is it? How is it Measured?”, available at 
http://www.charneyresearch.com/resources/political-will-what-is-it-how-is-it-measured/, last 
accessed on 14-09-2015; Sina Odugbemi, “Whose Will Constitutes ‘Political Will’?”,  June 
2009, available at http://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/whose-will-constitutes-political-
will, last accessed on 14-09-2015; D. W. Brinkerhoff, “Assessing Political Will For Anti-
Corruption Efforts: An Analytic Framework”, (2000) 20 Public Admin. Dev. 239; Lawrence 
Woocher, “Deconstructing “Political Will”: Explaining the Failure to Prevent Deadly Conflict 
and Mass Atrocities”, (2001) 12 JPIA 179; and Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai, “Political Will in 
Combating Corruption in Developing and Transition Economies: A Comparative Study of 
Singapore, Hong Kong and Ghana” (2009) 16 Journal of Financial Crime (4) 387 
65 Post, et al, op cit., p 659 
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across the length and breadth of this thesis, the first component of this 
definition is a reference to the parties directly responsible for realignment 
towards the goal, namely the legislative arm of government in both 
jurisdictions and the superior courts of record vested with the powers of 
judicial interpretation. The second component of this definition, it is opined, 
can only be achieved via effective monitoring of the operation of the goal in 
practice, and the fourth is essentially the aim of realignment. As a result, it is 
contended that the third component of political will – the commitment to 
supporting the realignment aims – becomes a key factor upon which the 
success, or failure, of realignment is hinged. 
It would appear that the regulatory framework of the police in England, 
spearheaded by PACE, is a good example of the tripartite form that is 
generally accepted. However, as is typical of any academic discussion, PACE 
has divided opinion. Some academics have lauded the arrival of PACE, whilst 
others have criticised its arrival for a number of reasons. It would appear that 
the bulk of the debate surrounding PACE and its provisions tend to revolve 
around the adversarial balance. Academics such as Zander, Dixon and Cape, 
for example, have argued that the enactment of coming into force of PACE 
tilted the balance of procedural fairness in favour of the police by granting 
them such wide-ranging powers.66  
Other commentators were of the opinion that the increased protection of 
liberties and rights in PACE would result in an increase in paperwork, 
especially when taking into consideration the detailed nature of the custody 
 
66 Zander, op. cit.; Cape and Young, op. cit.; and David Dixon, Law in Policing: Legal 
Regulation and Police Practices (Clarendon, 1997) 
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report, as well as an overall reduction in police efficiency.67 Sanders was also 
critical of the fact that the police was self-regulated, and expressed his doubts 
over the ability of the attempt by PACE to regulate coercive powers.68 
In the face of these criticisms over the wide-ranging nature of the powers of 
the police, it should be pointed out that, as noted by Davies et al, these powers 
are not limitless, and an infringement thereof may result in civil or criminal 
proceedings and/or disciplinary action being instituted against the offending 
officer.69 Davies et al state that despite the initial fears by parties on either side 
of the adversarial scale – fears that the enactment of PACE would result in an 
increase in police powers at the expense of civil liberties on the one hand, and 
fears that it would result in reduced efficiency of the police on the other – 
research since the passing of the Act give no indication that any of these 
concerns or fears have been borne into existence.70 
It would appear that the divergent opinions concerning what direction the 
scales of the adversarial balance are tipped might be related to the conceptions 
of the relationship between legal rules and policing, as pointed out by Dixon. 
Dixon suggests that there are three main approaches in understanding the 
relationship between law and policing: the legalistic-bureaucratic approach, 
the culturalist approach and the structural approach.71 The legalistic-
bureaucratic approach, simply speaking, is based on the belief that “law is the 
major determinant of police activity and that police institutions conform to an 
 
67 See eg John Long, n 10 
68 Andrew Sanders, “Can Coercive Powers be Effectively Controlled or Regulated?: The Case 
for Anchored Pluralism” in Cape and Young, n 9, p 69 
69 Davies et al, n 8, p 178 
70 Ibid, p 181 
71 Dixon, n 67, pp 1 – 48  
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efficient bureaucratic model, in which senior officers are able to direct the 
activities of their subordinates by means of training, policy statements, and 
internal regulation…. in order to understand policing, we need only or 
primarily to look at the laws governing it.”72 The culturalist approach is based 
on the assumption that procedural rules on their own are ineffective in 
controlling police behaviour; choosing instead to see the policeman as “a 
craftsman rather than as a legal actor… a skilled worker rather than as a civil 
servant obliged to subscribe to the rule of law.”73 Thus, a culturalist would 
focus more on the sociological nature of police culture rather than the rules 
creating and governing police powers. Reiner, for example, replaces the 
assumption of the legalistic-bureaucratic model that law enforcement is the 
sole function of policing with a ‘realisation’ that the priority of police work is 
service-provision and order-maintenance, and that these are usually achieved 
by methods other than law enforcement.”74 The structural approach is an 
apparent ‘middle of the road’ approach, which takes on the assumption that 
controlling the police should take into consideration both legal rules and 
situational factors.75 
Having examined the three approaches highlighted by Dixon, it is opined that 
one’s approach or conception of the relationship between law and policing 
determines one’s view concerning the tipping of the adversarial scales of 
balance with particular regard, for the purposes of this thesis, to the balance 
between powers of the police vis a vis the rights of accused persons. It is 







of the other legislative instruments regulating the police, the recognition of the 
tripartite form of regulation ensures that laws would be amended to keep in 
trend with the changing needs of society. 
In spite of the criticisms of PACE, the Act has arguably achieved the first 
requirement of the tripartite form – there is a clear statement of the goals it 
sets out to achieve. The provisions contained therein are remarkably detailed 
and prescribe a regulatory framework for the exercise of power by the police 
while laying down provisions to also prevent the infringement of the accused 
person’s rights and liberties.  
In addition to the provisions of PACE, there are eight (8) Codes of Practice, 
which set out the minimum standards for the exercise of police powers. For 
purposes of this thesis, however, we are only concerned with four of these 
codes: Codes C, E, F and G. 
In chronological order (in the order in which they become relevant if one were 
to create a timeline of the criminal process), Code G of PACE is the Code of 
Practice primarily concerned with the exercise of the statutory power of arrest, 
whilst Code C is primarily concerned with detention and detention practices of 
the police. Codes E and F are concerned with the audio and visual recording of 
interviews of accused persons, respectively. 
Of these, Code C is the most detailed, and arguably the most important. It 
establishes policy by stating in clear, categorical terms the minimum 
requirements for the detention, questioning and general treatment of persons in 
police custody. The Code of Practice is subject to regular review, with the 
most recent version being published by the Home Office in July 2018. The 
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Code of Practice is a public document, to be made readily available for use 
and consultation by police officers, police staff, detained persons and members 
of the public.76 
Paragraph 2 of the Code of Practice C prescribes the need for a separate 
custody record to be created for every person detained at the station. 
Paragraph 3 prescribes concisely, the procedure that everyone who is detained 
at the police station is to be subjected to; including those who have attended 
the station voluntarily, and not been brought there after arrest. It provides 
detailed provisions for the interrogation and overall treatment of all persons, 
including ‘normal’ detainees,77 juveniles and other persons requiring the 
presence of an appropriate adult,78 persons who require an interpreter,79 and 
detainees who are of foreign nationality, etc.80 The prescriptions for detention 
as provided by Code of Practice C extend as far as providing minimum 
standards for the physical conditions of detention, i.e., the physical nature of 
the detention cells in the police stations, and the number of detainees per 
cell.81 Also, Code of Practice C provides the caution to be issued to a detainee, 
and has detailed provisions describing the rights available to the accused, 
which shall be dealt with in Section 2.3, below. It should be noted, that a 
failure to act within the provisions of Code of Practice C does not make a 
police officer criminally liable, but any evidence gathered outside the 
 
76 Paragraph 1.2, PACE Code C 
77 Paragraph 3(a), PACE Code of Practice C 
78 Paragraph 1.5 
79 Paragraph 13 
80 Ibid 
81 Paragraph 8 
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constraints of the provisions contained therein may be declared inadmissible, 
thereby weakening the prosecution’s case at trial.82 
As far as the legal and institutional framework for the prosecution at the pre-
trial stage is concerned, the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, which is the 
primary statutory instrument in England vis-à-vis prosecution, established the 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), which is the body responsible for the 
prosecution of offences. The responsibilities of the CPS, working through the 
various barristers and solicitors under its employ, are making charging 
decisions, i.e., deciding whether or not to charge a person for an alleged 
offence; and the conduct of prosecutions in both the Magistrate and the Crown 
Court. The decision to prosecute is usually made in accordance with the 
guidelines contained in the Code for Crown Prosecutors, issued by the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), in accordance with Section 10 of the 
Prosecution of Offences Act; the most recent version of this Code was 
published in January 2013.83 
As a result of the need for the police and the CPS to liaise at such a crucial 
stage of pre-trial proceedings, the CPS is structured, or was structured at a 
point in time, in a similar pattern to the police forces in England. From 1999, 
until the recent spending review by HM Treasury in 2010, the CPS area of 
operation was divided into forty-two (42) different areas, mirroring the 
delineation of the operational areas of the police forces in England, with each 
 
82 See “Confessions, Unlawfully Obtained Evidence and Breaches of PACE”, available at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/confession_and_breaches_of_police_and_criminal_evide
nce_act/, last accessed on 20-09-2014 
83 See Section 3 of CPS Code for Crown Prosecutors, available at 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/code_2013_accessible_english.pdf, last accessed on 
20-09-2014 
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CPS area responsible for performing its responsibilities in relation to a 
particular police area. The only exception to this was London, where CPS 
London covered the operational area of both the Metropolitan Police and the 
City of London Police. However, after the spending review, the operational 
areas of the CPS were reduced to thirteen (13),84 but the current thirteen (13) 
geographical areas are still responsible for the forty-two (42) police areas, with 
each CPS area covering a clearly delineated number of police areas,85 and 
their primary functions continue to be making charging decisions and 
conducting prosecutions.86 
As the power to conduct prosecutions is a power that is exercised in an 
altogether different stage of proceedings, i.e., the trial, only the power of the 
CPS to make charging decisions is considered here. According to Section 4 of 
the Code (for Crown Prosecutors), the decision to prosecute must be made by 
subjecting the facts before the Crown Prosecutor to two tests: the evidentiary 
test and the public interest test,87 and every prospective case must be subjected 
to these tests. Generally speaking, if the facts surrounding any case for which 
a person is detained or under investigation were to pass these two tests, the 
CPS would normally prepare documents to have the detainee arraigned at the 
appropriate court of first instance; thereby moving the matter beyond the pre-
 
84 See “Area Restructure”, a press release by the CPS, available at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/wessex/cps_wessex_news/press_release_on_area_restructure__dorset_
/, last accessed on 20-09-2014. See also, “Crown Prosecution Service Restructure”, available 
at http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wms/?id=2011-01-31a.25WS.1, last accessed on 21-09-
2014 
85 For a map of these CPS areas and the police areas delineated within, see “Your Local CPS”, 
available at http://cps.gov.uk/your_cps/our_organisation/the_cps_areas.html, last accessed on 
20-09-14 
86 See “Facts About the CPS”, available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/about/facts.html, last 
accessed on 20-09-2014 
87 For more on what these tests entail, see Section 4, Code for Crown Prosecutors, n 84 
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trial stage, and into the next stage of the process: the trial. However, if the set 
of facts before the crown prosecutor fails either or both tests, then he is usually 
encouraged to refrain from any further action, and the detainee is usually 
released, often without charge.  
Given the crucial nature of the role of the CPS in making charging decisions 
as well as the need to make this decision within the prescribed detention 
limits, the CPS, in addition to the 13 existing areas, introduced a telephone 
advisory service in every police station known as CPS Direct.88 CPS Direct 
exists, quite simply, to offer charging and prosecution advice to the police 
around the clock, every day of the year. The introduction of CPS Direct 
offered an opportunity for the police to, theoretically at least, consult with the 
prosecution at all hours of the day, and transfer information on a suspect 
and/or results of an interrogation electronically and via the telephone, to 
ensure that charging decisions were made as soon as possible, in line with the 
detention limits prescribed by PACE. 
It should be noted that, as mentioned previously, PACE and the Prosecution of 
Offences Act are not the only legislative instruments dealing with the pre-trial 
stage and the powers available to the police and prosecution. There are other 
numerous statutory instruments that have amended some of the provisions and 
powers established by both Acts, such as the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act (CJPOA), which has had deleterious effects on the Right to 
Silence.89  
 
88 CPS Direct. http://www.cps.gov.uk/direct/about/, last accessed on 24-09-2014 
89 These deleterious effects are considered in detail in Chapter 2.3.3 below. 
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Additionally, the courts also play a role in the development of the legal 
framework. It should come as no surprise that the decisions of the courts in 
England, and in most common law countries, are one of the sources of law, 
and have the effect of changing the legal landscape. The decisions of judges in 
England in criminal matters have affected the legal and institutional 
framework in recent years by increasing the scope of application of human 
rights, thereby altering the adversarial scales of balance. Also, as England 
signed and ratified the European Convention of Human Rights, the European 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg forms part of the court structure and 
hierarchy of England, and its decisions also have an effect on the legal 
framework of the pre-trial stage.90 
2.2.1.2 The Suspect and Preparing His Defence 
The statutory provisions which make up the framework of the final puzzle 
piece of the pre-trial system, the defence, are found in sections of PACE, and 
additional legislative instruments such as the Access to Justice Act 1999 and 
the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. 
In balancing the adversarial scale, the legal framework concerning the suspect 
and preparing his defence has, at its core, the provision of rights to the suspect 
to protect his liberties and uphold the presumption of his innocence. These 
rights include the right to legal advice, the right to silence, and a few other 
rights, which are discussed in great detail in Chapter 2.3, below. In analysing 
 
90 Notable cases include Cadder v HM Advocate, for example, and Ambrose v Harris [2011] 
UKSC 43; wherein the UK Supreme Court applied the ruling in Salduz to English and Scottish 
law 
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the institutional framework, however, the Legal Aid Scheme and the process 
of providing interpreters to detainees and suspects should be seen as essential. 
The Legal Aid Scheme provides legal assistance and support to indigent 
persons,91 or persons who are otherwise unable to procure the services of a 
solicitor to assist in preparing their defence. The body primarily tasked with 
the provision of legal aid in England is the Legal Services Commission, 
comprising the Criminal Defence Service (CDS), established by Section 1 of 
the Access to Justice Act 1999, which is responsible for the provision of legal 
assistance to persons involved in criminal matters and the Community Legal 
Service. Again, for purposes of this thesis, we are only concerned with the 
former and the provision of services in criminal and related matters. 
 According to Section 1 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2012, the provision of Legal Aid is one of the functions of the 
Lord Chancellor. He is charged with the responsibility of ensuring that Legal 
aid is made available in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the 
appointment of a Director of Legal Aid Casework. Also, a juxtaposition of the 
provisions of Section 12(2) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 and Section 1 of 
the 3rd Schedule thereto indicates that any person, charged with any criminal 
offence before any court in England is entitled to legal advice and legal 
representation. This entitlement to legal assistance also extends, and may be 
provisionally granted where “… the individual is involved in an investigation 
which may result in criminal proceedings, and the right is so granted for the 
 
91 In England, the inability to afford legal assistance, as a condition to be eligible to Legal aid, 
is only applicable in relation to civil matters. Every person arrested on suspicion of 
committing a criminal offence in England is entitled to free legal assistance at the police 
station. (see: https://www.gov.uk/legal-aid/eligibility, last accessed on 23-02-2018). This is 
not the case in Nigeria, however, as Legal Aid is only available to persons earning below the 
minimum wage, regardless of the nature of the action. See section 10, Legal Aid Act 2011. 
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purposes of criminal proceedings that may result from the investigation.”92 
This is also echoed by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders 
Act 2012, which, in Section 13 thereto, provides that the provision of legal aid 
in criminal matters extends to the advice and assistance of persons in police 
custody. 
In 2005, the Legal Services Commission introduced two pilot schemes to 
streamline the provision of legal advice to detainees, namely CDS Direct and 
the Defence Solicitor Call Centre (DSCC). The aim of these schemes was to 
provide further regulation to the already existing ‘phone-in’ systems for 
obtaining legal advice from solicitors by detained persons. Prior to the 
introduction of these schemes, there were already schemes in place to provide 
for the dispensing of legal advice via telephone; in certain classes of offences, 
as a matter of fact, legal advice could only be obtained by telephone.93  
After the establishment of these schemes, any request for legal advice made at 
the police station is typically followed by a phone call to the DSCC who, after 
considering the facts, determine whether to send a solicitor in person, or to 
forward the call to CDS Direct. This process applies even when the detainee 
nominates his own solicitor: the request is passed through the DSCC and CDS 
Direct. There are criticisms which have been raised against the concept of 
‘phone-in’ legal advice at the police station, and whilst these criticisms shall 
be considered in detail in the next chapter; it is worth noting that while the 
schemes were introduced to improve access to legal advice, particularly when 
persons were arrested in remote areas and also to provide around the clock 
 
92 Section 1A, 3rd Schedule, Access to Justice Act 1999 
93 General Criminal Contract 2004 
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assistance, the need to pass all requests for legal advice through the lengthy 
process arguably defeats the very purpose for which these schemes were 
introduced.94 
The other important aspect of the institutional framework on this side of the 
adversarial scale is that which relates to the provision of interpreters and the 
translation of documents. As shall be discussed below,95 one of the rights 
which accused persons in England have is the right to be informed of the 
reason for their arrest and to be informed in a language that they understand.96 
When it has been determined that an accused person requires the services of 
an interpreter, it is the responsibility of the Chief Constable of the force area, 
acting through the custody officer, to procure the services of an interpreter.97 
In August 2011, the Ministry of Justice entered into a framework agreement 
(FWA) for the provision of interpretation services. This agreement came into 
force on the 30th of January 2012. Prior to the coming into force of this 
agreement, when the need for an interpreter arose, one would usually be 
selected from the National Register of Public Sector Interpreters (NRPSI) and, 
occasionally, other local arrangements were made for the procurement of 
interpreters. However, as a result of these multiple arrangements, there would 
frequently be a failure to successfully provide interpretation services, or on 
occasion, an interpreter might be appointed without his credentials being 
accredited;98 so it became necessary to regularise the vetting and accreditation 
 
94 This is further discussed in Section 2.3.2 of this chapter, as well as Section 3.2.1.2 of 
Chapter 3, Infra 
95 Section 2.3.1, below 
96 See Article 6 of the ECHR and Section 28 of PACE, as well as Paragraph 13 of PACE Code 
C 
97 Paragraph 13.1 of PACE Code C 
98 Para 1.4, Ministry of Justice FWA 
 51 
policies of the Ministry of Justice, according to an internal report submitted by 
the Office of Criminal Justice Reform (OCJR). Following on from this, the 
Ministry of Justice began the procurement process that resulted in the coming 
into force of the Framework Agreement. 
The new framework agreement is not without its shortcomings, which shall be 
discussed in the next chapter; however, it must be noted that as with the other 
elements of the legal and institutional framework for pre-trial processes in 
England, the provision of interpreters is subject to the same tripartite 
regulatory mechanism; i.e., a clear statement of the goal, a scheme to monitor 
the adherence to the objectives stated in the goal, and an attempt to realign the 
realities in practice to the goal. It is opined, briefly, that the frequent 
legislative activity, as well as the introduction of new schemes across the 
entirety of the pre-trial process speaks volumes of a desire to successfully 
regulate the framework; and while societal growth and development will 
always create the need for change in legislation and practice, applying the 
tripartite regulatory method might seem like the best way to stay abreast of the 
changing demands of society. 
 
2.2.2 Nigeria 
In Nigeria, just as in England, there are numerous statutory instruments, local 
and international, which form the legal framework of the pre-trial stage, and 
also establish the institutions that are parties to the process. These instruments 
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include the Constitution,99 the CPA, the CPC, the Police Act 2004,100 the 
Administration of Criminal Justice Law of Lagos State 2007, the United 
Nations Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.  
On the 28th of May 2015, the outgoing president of Nigeria, Goodluck 
Jonathan signed into law the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, which by 
virtue of Section 493 thereto, seeks to repeal the CPA and CPC and unify the 
criminal procedure across the length and breadth of Nigeria. However, to be 
enforceable across every state of the federation, the different state Houses of 
Assembly shall enact a law establishing the jurisdiction of the Act within the 
respective state. At the time of writing this thesis, this had not yet occurred, 
and the provisions of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act had also not 
been applied in any case before any court. As a result, the relevant provisions 
of the new Act shall, in this chapter, be highlighted where relevant. 
Nevertheless, the provisions of the CPA and CPC shall be discussed as 
remaining prevalent and un-repealed. In Section 2.3.6 of this chapter, 
however, the nuances introduced by this new legislation shall be examined, 
and the prospects for change and the potential impact to be made on the legal 
and institutional framework of Nigeria taken into account. 
As in the previous section, these instruments and the parties that make up the 
institutional framework shall be examined by looking at them from either end 
of the adversarial balance, within the context of the pre-trial stage. 
 
99 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. Cap C23, LFN 2004 Hereinafter 
“CFRN 1999” 
100 Cap P19, LFN 2004 
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2.2.2.1 The Police and Prosecution – Powers, Policies and Practices 
The Police in Nigeria is established by Section 214 of CFRN 1999, which 
establishes a single police force known as the Nigeria Police Force. The Police 
Act 2004, as well as the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act and 
Criminal Procedure Code 2004, in accordance with the provisions of Section 
214(2) of the CFRN 1999, governs the operational powers of the Nigeria 
Police Force.101 According to Section 215(2) of the CFRN 1999, the head of 
the Nigeria Police Force is the Inspector-General of Police; officers stationed 
in each of the thirty-six (36) states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) are 
under the authority of the Commissioner of Police of that state; the 
Commissioner in turn subject to the authority of the Inspector-General. Police 
officers stationed in a given state form part of that state’s command, with the 
thirty-seven (37) state commands further divided into twelve (12) Zonal 
commands.102 
Section 4 of the Police Act 2004 provides for the general duties of the police 
which include “…the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of 
offenders, the preservation of law and order, the protection of life and property 
and the due enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are 
directly charged….”103 In the pursuit of the fulfilment of its duties, the police 
 
101 The Nigeria Police Force has actually operated in its current incarnation since 1945. The 
reference to the 1999 CFRN and the Police Act 2004 as the establishment provisions are 
merely because these are the extant laws, which repealed the previous laws upon their entering 
into force. A cursory look at the now-repealed laws will reveal that the Constitutional 
provisions and the provisions of the preceding versions of the Police Act are identical. In 
essence, the Nigeria Police Force has operated in its current structure since 1945, before 
Nigeria obtained its independence. 
102 For more on the structure of the Nigeria Police Force see Section 5 of the Police Act 2004 
and, generally, “The Structure of the Nigeria Police”, available at 
http://www.npf.gov.ng/force-structure/, last accessed on 27-10-2014 
103 Section 4, Police Act 2004 
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are granted several wide-ranging powers including the powers of stop and 
search; entry, search and seizure; arrest; interrogation; and detention of 
accused persons, and, by virtue of Section 23 of the Police Act, the power to 
prosecute offenders. This power is not absolute, and is subject to Sections 174 
and 211 of the CFRN 1999, which confer the power of prosecution on the 
Attorneys-General of the Federation and the thirty-six (36) states, respectively. 
Also, this power to prosecute is limited. The police may only institute 
proceedings at the Magistrate Court, in misdemeanour or minor offences.104 
There has been debate about whether the police may conduct prosecutions in 
the High Courts and other superior courts, as some laws provide for this,105 
and others fail so to do.106 In Osahon v Federal Republic of Nigeria the Court 
of Appeal held that this was dependent on jurisdiction.107 In practice, however, 
the police are restricted to instituting and conducting criminal proceedings in 
the Magistrate Court alone; the prosecution at the High Court is the exclusive 
and constitutionally-sanctioned responsibility of the Attorney-General of the 
Federation and the Attorneys-General of the States.108 
As is the case in England, and in a bid to maintain the adversarial balance 
upon which the criminal justice system was built, there are safeguards to 
 
104 Section 78, CPA 
105 Section 98(1) of the High Court of Abuja (FCT) 1990 lists “Police Officer” as one of the 
persons who may conduct a prosecution before it on behalf of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
106 Section 56(1) of the Federal High Court Act 1990, in listing those who may prosecute a 
matter before it does not include a police officer. 
107 Osahon v Federal Republic of Nigeria [2003] 16 NWLR (pt 845) 89, pp 124-125. 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Nigeria has ruled that police officers may institute 
proceedings in any court in Nigeria, provided the prosecuting officers are qualified legal 
practitioners duly enrolled at the Supreme Court. See FRN v Osahon [2006] 5 NWLR (pt 973) 
361. 
108 Sections 174 and 211 of the CFRN 1999. For a detailed discussion on the power to institute 
and conduct proceedings in Nigeria, see Bob Osamor, Fundamentals of Criminal Procedure 
Law in Nigeria (Dee-Sage, 2004), pp 110 – 132. 
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prevent the abuse of the wide-ranging powers of the police in Nigeria, at least 
on paper. A detailed discussion of these rights and safeguards occurs in 
Section 2.3, below, but it ought to be noted that even the legal framework 
providing for these rights and safeguards in Nigeria, even on a purely 
theoretical level, tilts the balance in favour of the police and the prosecution. 
The constitutional and statutory provisions empowering the police to make 
arrests, conduct searches, etc., are more detailed than those providing for the 
rights of the accused. 
The other body primarily responsible for the prosecution of offences in 
Nigeria, as has been mentioned several times in previous sections of this 
chapter, is the Attorney-General, either of the Federation or of the State. The 
Attorney-General, acting personally or through an officer of his department, is 
in actuality the primary prosecuting body in Nigeria. There are other 
prosecuting bodies in Nigeria, which exist to prosecute special offences.109 In 
theory, the police as the primary investigative body, are supposed to conduct 
investigations, build a case file, and upon determination that an offence has 
been committed which is beyond the scope of its prosecution, i.e., a felony, 
not a misdemeanour, remit the said file to the office of the Attorney-General 
for advice and subsequent prosecution of the offence, where necessary. 
However, in practice, there is room for gross violations of these provisions. 
These violations shall be discussed and analysed in the next chapter, but it 
would appear that some of these violations are due in part to the institutional 
structures of the police and the prosecution. There is, as mentioned earlier, one 
 
109 For example, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Establishment Act, Cap E1, 
LFN 2004, establishes the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), which has 
the power to investigate and prosecute economic and financial crimes. 
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police force serving across all of Nigeria, operating on a federal level; while 
the different legislative instruments and the offices of the Attorneys-General 
are operate on a state structure. With a crucial working relationship existing 
between the two bodies, i.e., the transfer of case files, and no provision clearly 
regulating the relationship between the two, there could potentially be a 
breakdown of communication between the two. Hypothetically, a police 
officer charged with investigating an offence could be transferred to a 
different state command before completion of his investigation or before the 
file is passed on to the relevant prosecuting body. 
Also, in respect of the different legislative instruments and the territorial limits 
to their scope of application, the multiplicity of laws means that a police 
officer in the south of Nigeria, for example, is trained and learns to perform 
his duties within the ambit of the CPA, whilst one stationed in the North is 
trained under the provisions of the CPC. This could potentially pose a 
problem, albeit one that is not insurmountable, when an officer from a CPA 
state is transferred to another state where the CPC is in operation. 
If the regulatory framework of Nigeria were to be juxtaposed with the English 
framework, and with the tripartite form that has been agreed to as ideal, then 
Nigeria has arguably failed to provide a good regulatory framework. 
In respect of the first element, i.e., the goal, although this becomes more 
apparent when discussing the rights available to accused persons below, even 
the most cursory reading of the provisions of the different statutory 
instruments shows that the law is not always clearly stated. For example, 
Section 9 of the CPA, which provides that a person who is arrested “… with or 
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without a warrant, shall be taken with all reasonable dispatch to a police 
station, or other place for the reception of arrested persons…”110, but does not 
go further to describe the conditions of detention such as those prescribed in 
Section 8 of Code of Practice C of PACE. Without a clear set of guidelines or 
minimum standards, this could leave room open for interpretation of the rules 
or the provision of facilities in a variety of ways. As a result, the station, or 
other place for receiving arrested persons could be set up in a different manner 
in each of the different police stations, in each of the police areas, in each of 
the different states across the country. 
To buttress this point, it might be important to note the following comment by 
John Coppen: 
“The police service of England and Wales is very good at taking 
national strategies and directives and turning them into 43 different 
versions of that one thing. Anything that is not codified strictly in law 
can be subject to local misinterpretation and subsequent misuse. This 
is important to grasp if you are to understand how police detention 
operated prior to PACE. There was no one way of dealing with people 
who had been arrested. Each police force had its own Force Orders 
which dictated how and where a suspect would be detained, but these 
Orders were largely concerned with the physical practicalities of the 
task rather than strict compliance with legal obligation.”111 
 
110 Section 9, CPA 
111 John Coppen, “PACE: A View from the Custody Suite”, in Cape and Young, Regulating 
Policing, n 9, p 75, at 76. 
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Coppen’s assertion, when interpreted in the Nigerian situation, gives credence 
to the hypothesis made that the provisions of the laws in Nigeria are open to 
misinterpretation. If a provision is open to interpretation in several ways, then 
surely the second aspect of the tripartite regulatory form, i.e., monitoring is 
also set to fail. 
If there is no minimum standard for interpretation of the law or provision of 
facilities, then certainly, there would be no easy way to monitor the operation 
of the law and to determine its success, or lack thereof, in practice. 
Consequent to this, then the third aspect, i.e., realignment shall fail also. 
This is evident in Nigeria when one considers the age of the statutory 
instruments. Admittedly, there may be other factors responsible for this, such 
as the long periods of military rule, for example; but a situation wherein a law 
is not reviewed and/or amended is also indicative of an absence of realignment 
methods. 
On this point, one may be misled by the dates of the relevant laws: the current 
Constitution was adopted in 1999, and the CPA, CPC and Police Act are all 
barely a decade old. However, a look at previous versions of the different laws 
would reveal that, for instance, the provisions of the previous Constitutions 
that were in operation are in pari materia with the provisions of the 1999 
CFRN, with no substantial amendments thereto. In addition, the other three 
key instruments have maintained the same form and content of provisions 
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since the introduction of their predecessors around the time of the first 
republic in 1960.112 
On the one hand, this is arguably down to gross legislative inactivity, which 
may be due to the absence of any reports by a monitoring agency, which is in 
turn a result of the openness of the provisions to a multiplicity of 
interpretations. On the other hand, one might be tempted to excuse the age of 
the provisions as an effect of the long periods of military rule. Every military 
government that seized power in Nigeria would, via the promulgation of a 
Basic Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree,113 suspend the 
provisions of the Constitution and some other crucial statutory instruments. 
Upon a subsequent return to civilian or democratic rule, the new legislature 
would reinstate the previously suspended laws. This is why one might tend to 
argue that the military had its role to play in the age or non-amendment of the 
statutory provisions relating to the regulatory framework of the pre-trial stage 
in Nigeria. 
In any event, the failure to amend a provision of law would most certainly 
pose a difficulty as the needs of a society undoubtedly change often. Whatever 
the case though, it is obvious that the regulatory framework governing the 
police and the prosecution in Nigeria fails to conform to the tripartite form of 
regulation. 
 
112 Comfort Ani also buttresses this fact of the age of the legislative instruments in Nigeria, 
Comfort Chinyere Ani, “Reforms in the Nigerian Criminal Procedure Laws” (2011) NIALS 
Journal on Criminal Law and Justice (Vol 1) 52, at 52-53 
113 This Decree was passed by the military regimes which overthrew the civilian governments 
in 1966 and 1984. 
 60 
As a disclaimer, it is herein submitted that the foregoing argument does not 
suggest that laws must be amended frequently, or that a law not being 
reviewed is a sign of failure, simply speaking. The foregoing is an argument 
which envisions and supports the scenario described by Ashworth and 
Redmayne.114 As they contend, although it would be wrong to suggest that 
there is a simple causal process whereby a failing in the system leads to 
reform, procedural reform often occurs in response to particular problems in 
the criminal process, or to a miscarriage of justice of some sort. In extending 
this argument, it is common knowledge to Nigerians and to anyone who has 
studied the Nigerian criminal justice system that the system is in a general 
state of disrepair, and has so been for a number of years.115 Nevertheless, there 
is no attempt at monitoring or realignment. There is also arguably no goal, as 
the provisions of the statutory instruments that constitute the legislative 
framework are not clearly or succinctly stated. It is contended that in situations 
where the legislative framework or “the goal” is clearly stated, is monitored 
and found to be working and addressing the relevant issues, and there was no 
viable need for realignment found, it would not be viewed as a failed attempt 
to regulate using the tripartite form. 
2.2.2.2 The Suspect and Preparing His Defence 
Again, in a bid to avoid any repetition in looking at the framework governing 
the suspect and preparing his defence, a detailed analysis of the legal 
framework of this side of the adversarial balance is reserved for the following 
section, 2.3, below. However, for comparative purposes, there is the need to 
 
114 Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process, n 22, pp 9 and 17. 
115 Editorial, “Criminal Justice Sector: Canvassing for a Change”, Nigerian Law Times (July 
2011) 
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compare the two main elements of the institutional framework on this end of 
the scale, i.e., the provision of Legal Aid and the provision of interpreters. 
The current statutory instrument governing the provision of Legal Aid in 
Nigeria is the Legal Aid Act 2011, which establishes the Legal Aid Council of 
Nigeria. A combined reading of Section 8(2) and the second schedule to the 
Act establishes a Criminal Defence Service for the purpose of assisting 
indigent persons involved in criminal investigations or proceedings, albeit 
only in cases or charges dealing with only nine (9) different offences, namely: 
Murder,116 Manslaughter,117 Maliciously or wilfully grievous hurt,118 Assault 
occasioning actual bodily harm,119 Common assault, Affray, Stealing, Rape 
and Armed Robbery.120 Also, Section 10(1) states that Legal Aid shall only be 
granted to persons whose income does not exceed the national minimum 
wage.121 
There is a dearth of literature to confirm or deny this, but it has often been 
asserted amongst practitioners and academics in Nigeria that the Legal Aid 
Council of Nigeria is grossly understaffed, and as such, lacks the manpower 
 
116 The offence defined as Murder in the Criminal Code, which is applicable to Southern 
Nigeria is also defined as Culpable Homicide punishable with Death in the Penal Code, which 
is applicable in Northern Nigeria. Persons charged under the relevant provisions of the Penal 
Code are also entitled to legal aid in Nigeria. 
117 Defined as “Culpable Homicide not punishable with Death” in the Penal Code. 
118 Defined as “Wounding or inflicting grievous Bodily Harm” in the Penal Code. 
119 Defined as “Criminal Force occasioning actual Bodily harm” in the Penal Code. 
120 Legal Aid is also provided for in cases involving inchoate offences relating to the nine (9) 
that are expressly stated in the Act. 
121 The current minimum wage in Nigeria stands at 18,000 NGN (approx. 38 GBP as at 
August, 2018) per calendar month. There are exceptions to this rule, as provided for by 
Sections 10 (2) and (3), but these are considered exceptional circumstances and require the 
approval of the governing board. 
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required to provide the services it has been tasked to provide.122 Also, in 
subjecting the Legal Aid Act to the test that is tripartite form of regulation; it, 
like the other Nigerian statutory instruments, fails the test of realignment. The 
only nuance introduced by the 2011 Act is the provision of Legal aid for 
proceedings involving armed robbery charges. Previous versions of the Act 
contain identical provisions, save for the inclusion of this provision in the 
second schedule to the Act. 
The other piece in the institutional framework for the suspect and the 
preparation of his defence is the provision of interpreters. As any 
anthropological study of Nigeria would probably reveal, Nigeria is home to a 
diverse variety of tribes and cultures, and a combination of these different 
tribes and cultures gives rise to the existence of over five hundred (500) 
different languages.123 Despite the fact that the lingua franca of the country is 
English,124 it ought to come as no surprise that there would be persons arrested 
and detained who cannot communicate fluently in English. The law, 
recognising this, provides in the various applicable provisions, for a person 
who is arrested, interrogated or arraigned, to be informed of the reasons for 
 
122 There is a general acceptance of the Legal Aid Council’s understaffing, but there is no 
official figure to suggest how many lawyers are actually under the employ of the Council, 
although Ayorinde estimates this number to be about two hundred and eighty (280). See 




news, last accessed on 31-01-2015 
123 Ethnologue page on Nigeria, available at http://www.ethnologue.com/country/NG, last 
accessed 21-10-2014. See also, BBC News: “Nigeria: Local Languages Fight for Survival”, 




said arrest or arraignment, and to have his interrogation conducted in a 
language he understands.125 
Despite these provisions, and the multiplicity of languages in existence within 
the geographical terrain of Nigeria, there is no formal scheme that exists for 
the provision of interpreters and translation services. This, in alluding to 
Coppen’s statement above, leaves the provisions of the laws open to 
interpretation in various ways; and very often, it is assumed, open to instances 
of non-observance. 
2.2.3 Observations 
In both England and Nigeria, there have been commendable attempts to 
uphold the adversarial balance in the provisions of the various statutory 
instruments and in the establishment of the institutional bodies who play a role 
in the pre-trial stage of both jurisdictions. However, if both were subjected to 
the test of the tripartite regulatory form, the legal and institutional framework 
of Nigeria is found wanting. This is not to suggest that the framework in 
England is not without its shortcomings, as shall be elucidated in the next 
section, but as opined earlier, it is indicative that the monitoring and 
realignment mechanisms of the English regulatory framework are designed to 
strive towards maintaining the adversarial balance in the best possible way. 
There is the need for Nigeria to improve on its frameworks, as there is the 
need to always maintain the adversarial balance, and the best way to do this, it 
 
125 Sections 5, 38 and 6 of the CPA, CPC and Administration of Justice Act 2015 all provide 
that a person should be informed of the reasons of for his arrest, despite failing to expressly 
require that this be done in a language that the accused understands. This is however a 
requirement in Section 35(3) of the 1999 CFRN, as a result of which it is an established 
requirement in Nigerian law. 
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is opined, is by clearly stating the goal, by way of clear and unambiguous 
statutory provisions which delineate the powers of the police and the 
prosecution, and also provide minimum standards of interpretation, as obtains 
in England by virtue of PACE and its Codes of Practice; this would almost 
certainly prevent a misinterpretation of the law or, as contended by extending 
Coppen’s assertion towards the Nigerian position,126 the possibility of the 
provisions of the relevant statutory instruments being interpreted in a plethora 
of ways across the different police stations across the length and breadth of 
Nigeria. 
 
2.3 RIGHTS AVAILABLE TO AN ARRESTED PERSON 
As highlighted in the previous section, there are provisions which exist to 
provide certain liberties to accused persons and to provide safeguards against 
the abuse of powers by actors of the state involved in pre-trial proceedings, 
particularly the police and the prosecution. The rights, which prevail at this 
stage of the criminal process in England and Nigeria, are: 
2.3.1 Right to be Informed of Reasons for Arrest 
In any general study of human rights, one of the fundamental rights afforded 
to a person is the right to freedom of liberty and the right against unlawful 
detention.127 The power of arrest by the police is one exception generally 
accepted in respect of this right. However, in both jurisdictions under 
 
126 n 89(?) 
127 This right is provided for in the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, for 
example. 
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consideration, any person who is arrested has the right to be informed of the 
reason for his arrest. This is provided for by Section 28(1) of PACE, 
Paragraph 3.1 (b) of PACE Code C, Section 35 (3) of the CFRN 1999, Section 
5 of the CPA and Section 38 of the CPC, respectively, as well as Section 6 of 
the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015. The aforementioned 
provisions essentially all provide that a person who has been arrested is to be 
informed, in a language that he understands, and as soon as is practicable, of 
the reasons of his arrest. Under the PACE regime, the right to be informed is 
required regardless of whether the fact of the arrest is obvious,128 and must be 
included in the custody report;129 although this is not a requirement in Nigeria 
if the accused is arrested whilst committing the offence.130 Also, there is a 
further requirement in Nigeria, according to the provisions of Sections 35(3) 
and 36(6)(a) of the CFRN 1999, that the accused is to be informed in writing.  
 Failure by the police (or other arresting body) to inform the accused of the 
reasons for his arrest would ordinarily render the arrest unlawful. This 
information, according to Cape and Hodgson, need only provide an indication 
of the offence and when and where it is committed, and the police are not 
required to disclose the basis for their suspicion.131  
 
128 Section 28(2), PACE 
129 Section 3.4, PACE Code C 
130 Sections 5 and 38 of the CPA and CPC, respectively. However, the provisions of the 
Administration of Justice Act 2015, particularly Section 6 thereto, make it a requirement that a 
person be informed of the reasons for his arrest, even when he is arrested in the cause of 
committing an offence. 
131 Ed Cape and Jacqueline Hodgson, “The Investigative Stage of the Criminal Process in 
England and Wales”, in Ed Cape, Jacqueline Hodgson, Ties Prakken and Taru Spronken 
(Eds.), Suspects in Europe: Procedural Rights at the Investigative Stage of the Criminal 
Process in the European Union (Intersentia Antwerpen – Oxford, 2007) 59, 71 
 66 
There are, as expected, a number of exceptions to this rule. Section 28(5) of 
PACE provides that where it is not possible to inform the accused as soon as is 
practicable, as a result of the accused escaping, that a non-information of this 
right does not render the arrest unlawful. Also, Osamor contends that, in 
Nigeria, informing the accused of the reasons of arrest at any time after arrest 
and before arraignment is lawful.132 Further, it has been held on more than one 
occassion, in cases such as Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573, Adler v 
Crown Prosecution Service [2014] Crim. L. R. 224 and State v Osler [1991] 6 
NWLR (Part 199) 576, that in the interest of justice, it would usually suffice 
that the accused was informed that he was under arrest, even if the reasons for 
said arrest are not made known at the time of arrest. 
The different provisions dealing with a detainee’s right to be informed of the 
reasons for, in both all prescribe that he be informed in a language that he 
understands. Thus it would seem that in order to comply with this requirement, 
and for effective communication during interrogation, the need for an 
interpreter is an essential one. 
As highlighted above, there is a Framework agreement entered into by the 
Ministry of Justice for the purpose of providing interpretation and translation 
services in England. Curiously, despite the requirement that a person be 
informed of the reasons for his arrest in a language that he understands in 
Nigeria, there is no mechanism for the delivery of this right. It therefore begs 
the question, one to which an answer shall be attempted in the next chapter, 
how is this right to be to be exercised? How is an accused person to be 
informed in a language he understands in Nigeria? 
 
132 Osamor, n 99, p 236 
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Generally, the right to be informed of the reasons for the arrest, unlike the 
right to legal assistance and the right to silence, is not usually the subject of 
much academic debate. As such, there is a dearth of substantive literature 
debating the merits of this right.  
2.3.2 Right to Legal Assistance 
In attempting to maintain the adversarial balance, the right to effective legal 
assistance cannot be understated or overemphasised. Given that the police are 
the primary investigatory body in the adversarial system, and given the weight 
that is usually attached to a confessional statement, an arrested person who is 
being interrogated may unwittingly offset the adversarial balance without 
realising the implications of his actions. It is as a result of the need to maintain 
this balance, and protect the detainee from making a confessional statement 
unwittingly or against his will that the right to legal assistance at the police 
station is viewed as a fundamental right of an arrested person. 
Prior to the coming into force of PACE, the Judges’ Rules provided for the 
need for suspects to be informed of their right to legal advice.133 However, as 
Skinns pointed out, the discretionary nature of the Judges’ Rules meant that a 
few suspects were informed of their right to legal advice, and the police would 
often use this to delay or prevent access to custodial legal advice.134 As she 
further noted,135 this situation was criticised by the Royal Commission on 
Criminal Procedure 1981 (RCCP) as being disadvantageous to suspects, 
stating that it was insufficient to merely inform suspects of the right if there 
 
133 Practice Note (Judge's Rules) [1964] 1 WLR 152 
134 Layla Skinns, “The Right to Legal Advice in the Police Station: Past, Present and Future”, 
(2011) Crim L R 19, 19 
135 Ibid 
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was no one to act on subsequent requests for legal advice. Subsequent to this, 
the RCCP put forward the recommendations, which resulted in the provisions 
contained in Section 58 of PACE and Paragraph 6 of Code C of PACE. 
The right to legal advice in England is available to every person arrested and 
detained on suspicion of committing an offence, whether or not the accused is 
a British national.136 The legal advice is to be provided at no cost to the 
accused, however it is not an absolute right, as it may be waived.137 Generally 
speaking, every person who has been arrested should be informed of his right 
to legal assistance, and may make a request for advice from a solicitor of his 
choosing, in writing, in person, or over the telephone. The consultation with 
the solicitor is to be private and confidential, and there is to be no limit to the 
frequency or duration of the consultation with his solicitor. 
Recent decisions in Salduz and Cadder138 have recognised the importance of 
this right to the preservation of the adversarial balance and the overall 
presumption of innocence. Both cases established that the accused person 
must be informed of his right to legal advice as soon as possible after arrest, 
and that the solicitor could be present at all times, including during the 
interrogation of the accused. As was noted in Salduz; 
“... as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first 
interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the 
 
136 Cape and Hodgson, n 121, 71. 
137 Section 58, PACE 
138 n 38 and n 39, Ibid, respectively 
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light of the particular circumstances of each case that there are 
compelling reasons to restrict this right.”139  
As mentioned in the section 2.2.1.2 above, the provision of legal assistance is 
a service performed by the Legal Services Commission. After the 
establishment of the CDS Direct and the DSCC, as well as the coming into 
force of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, all 
requests for legal assistance must be directed to the DSCC, even where the 
accused opts for his own solicitor. After a person requests legal advice, all 
interviews are suspended until he has had the opportunity to consult with his 
solicitor. This consultation may take place in person or over the telephone. 
Guidance Note 6B of Code C of PACE and the General Criminal Contract 
2004 stipulate that in certain offences, the advice to be given is to be given by 
telephone only. 
As stated earlier, this right to custodial legal advice may be waived. According 
to the provisions of Section 6.6(d) of PACE Code of Practice C, this waiver 
must be clearly made, and the fact that the detainee has waived his right 
should be included in the custody record. In Saunders v R,140 it was held that 
for a waiver to be valid, it ought to be informed, voluntary and unequivocal.  
An issue which becomes apparent from an analysis of the various provisions 
dealing with the right to legal assistance is that the right to legal assistance, 
going by a literal interpretation of the words in the provision, is only available 
to persons who have been arrested and detained. As van de Laar and de Graaff 
 
139 Salduz v Turkey, n 38, at para 55 
140 Saunders v R [2012] EWCA Crim 1380 
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ask, what happens to persons who have merely been invited to the station for 
questioning, but have not actually been placed under arrest or detained?141  
In contrast to the detailed nature of the sections providing for this right in 
England, the right to legal advice in Nigeria is provided for by Sections 35(2) 
and 36(6)(c) of the 1999 CFRN, which simply state that “any person who is 
arrested or detained shall have the right to remain silent or avoid answering 
any question until after consultation with a legal practitioner or any other 
person of his own choice”142 and that “every person who is charged with a 
criminal offence shall be entitled to… defend himself in person or by legal 
practitioners of his own choice.”143 There is nothing in either section, or 
indeed in any other provision under Nigerian law requiring that the accused be 
informed of this right, nor are there any provisions which stipulate the 
frequency of consultation and whether the legal practitioner is permitted to be 
present during the interrogation of the accused, nor whether the right may be 
waived;144 issues which have been debated in ECHR jurisprudence and which 
could affect the quality of legal assistance given to an accused person.145 Also, 
the right to legal assistance in Nigeria is not one given at no cost to the 
 
141 T.A.H.M. van de Laar and R. L. de Graaff, “Salduz and Miranda: Is the US Supreme Court 
Pointing the Way?” (2011) EHRLR 304. This issue, and other issues that affect the exercise of 
the right in practice shall be addressed in the next chapter. 
142 Section 35(2), 1999 CFRN 
143 Section 36(6)(c), 1999 CFRN 
144 It is important to note that despite the apparent silence of the law on the ability of an 
accused to waive his right to legal assistance in Nigeria, by virtue of Sections 352 and 186 of 
the CPA and CPC, respectively; as well as the ruling in Josiah v The State [1985] 1 SC 406, 
that legal representation in court is mandatory for a person charged with the commission of a 
capital offence. 
145 See, for example, Pischalnikov v Russia, ECtHR judgment of 24 September, 2009 
(unreported) 
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accused, unless he is indigent, or earns less than the national minimum 
wage.146  
In light of the paucity of the provisions of Section 35(2) and Section 36(6)(c) 
of the 1999 CFRN, it is opined that merely stating that a person is entitled to 
legal assistance, without necessarily stating the conditions and requirements 
for the provision of this right equates to the provision of the right without any 
minimum standard for its provision. This, in light of Coppen’s assertion 
above,147 leaves the right to subject to diverse applications across the different 
force commands in Nigeria. The failure to provide a minimum standard 
potentially leaves the right open to gross abuse. Hypothetically speaking, an 
accused could be allowed to see his lawyer for five (5) minutes before his 
interrogation, in the presence of police officers and other third parties, and be 
refused the opportunity to consult with him after this. Could the accused 
person in this hypothesis claim to have exercised his right to legal 
assistance?148 
In the absence of any academic opinion on this issue, one might expect to find 
answers in decisions of the courts. As is the case in England, judicial decisions 
in Nigeria are subject to the principle of judicial precedent, and form part of 
the sources of law. However, the courts have failed to address this issue 
effectively. 
 
146 Section 10, Legal Aid Act 2011 
147 Coppen, n 113 
148 While it is conceded that Section 211 (2) of the CPA allows a defendant in custody or on 
remand access to his legal practitioner “at all reasonable” times, it should be noted that the 
provision refers to a person whose trial has commenced, and there is an absence of literature 
or jurisprudence to suggest that this right may apply before he is arraigned. 
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As a disclaimer, it ought to be noted that the assertion is not to be 
misconstrued as suggesting that the courts in Nigeria have yet to rule on the 
existence of the right to legal advice; it merely suggests that, as evidenced by 
an extensive search of several reported cases, the courts seem satisfied to 
declare the right as being in existence, without actually ruling on any of the 
issues which arise such as frequency of consultation or whether the 
consultation ought to be in private; issues which if addressed might help to 
establish a minimum standard for the application of the right. 
For example, in Amanchukwu v Federal Republic of Nigeria,149 Udom-Azogu, 
JCA merely stated that “[o]n the issue of counsel of accused choice… where 
he is denied bail and access to counsel of his choice, therefore making it 
difficult for him to prepare for his defence, it constitutes a complete violation 
of his right of fair hearing…”150  
2.3.3 Right to Silence 
Also important to maintaining the adversarial balance is the right to silence. 
Often misconstrued as the right against self-incrimination, both terms are used 
interchangeably, and are to the general effect that a person is not to be 
compelled to make any statements or divulge any information that may serve 
to incriminate him or establish his guilt in the alleged offence for which he has 
been charged. As Lord Mustill once stated about the right to silence: 
“In truth it does not denote any single right, but rather refers to a 
disparate group of immunities, which differ in nature, origin, incidence 
 
149 [2007] 6 NWLR (part 1029) 1 
150 Ibid, at p 18 
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and importance, and also as to the extent to which they have already 
been encroached upon by statute. Amongst these may be identified: 
(1) A general immunity, possessed by all persons and bodies, from 
being compelled on pain of punishment to answer questions posed 
by other persons or bodies. 
(2) A general immunity, possessed by all persons and bodies, from 
being compelled on pain of punishment to answer questions the 
answers to which may incriminate them. 
(3) A specific immunity, possessed by all persons under suspicion of 
criminal responsibility whilst being interviewed by police officers or 
others in similar positions of authority, from being compelled on 
pain of punishment to answer questions of any kind. 
(4) A specific immunity, possessed by accused persons undergoing 
trial, from being compelled to give evidence, and from being 
compelled to answer questions put to them in the dock. 
(5) A specific immunity, possessed by persons who have been 
charged with a criminal offence, from having questions material to 
the offence addressed to them by police officers or persons in a 
similar position of authority. 
(6) A specific immunity (at least in certain circumstances . . .), 
possessed by accused persons undergoing trial, from having 
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adverse comment made on any failure (a) to answer questions 
before the trial, or (b) to give evidence at the trial.”151 
The right was first codified in English Law by virtue of the Judges’ Rules 
1912, and is currently provided for by Code of Practice C of PACE, which 
instructs police officers to inform the accused of his right to silence when 
administering the caution prior to his interrogation.152 It should be noted, that 
the European Convention of Human Rights does not expressly provide for the 
right to silence, but its existence has been recognised in a few notable 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.153 
The right to silence is not an absolute right. A suspect is not obliged to answer 
any questions during his interrogation, but in English law, adverse inferences 
may be drawn from his silence. According to Section 34 of the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994, adverse inferences may be drawn from an 
accused’s decision to remain silent where he fails to mention any fact which 
he later relies upon and which in the circumstances at the time the accused 
could reasonably be expected to mention; fails to give evidence at trial or 
answer any question; fails to account on arrest for objects, substances or marks 
on his person, clothing or footwear, in his possession, or in the place where he 
is arrested; or fails to account on arrest for his presence at a place.154 It should 
 
151 Lord Mustill, R v Director of Serious Fraud Office, ex parte Smith [1993] AC 1 (HL) 30–
31, cited in Andrew L-T Choo, The Privilege Against Self-incrimination and Criminal Justice 
(Hart, 2013), 11. For a more detailed analysis and examination of the right to silence, see, 
generally, Pat McInerney, “The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination from Early Origins to 
Judges’ Rules: Challenging the “Orthodox View””, (2014) E & P, 18(2), 101 
152 Paragraph 3.1, PACE Code C 
153 For example, Funke v France (A/256-A) [1993] 1 C.M.L.R. 897 (ECHR) and Saunders v 
United Kingdom (19187/91) [1997] B.C.C. 872 (ECHR) 
154 The curtailing of the right to silence by the coming into force of Section 34 of the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994 was a very significant change in the rights terrain in 
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be noted, however, that it is impossible to convict a suspect wholly on his 
decision to remain silent.155 
In Nigeria, Section 35(2) of the 1999 CFRN states that a person who has been 
arrested or detained shall have the right to remain silent or avoid answering 
any question until after consultation with a legal practitioner or any other 
person of his own choice. This is the only section in the CFRN, and indeed in 
any other legislative instrument, which provides for the right to silence at the 
pre-trial stage.156 
The choice of words used in the drafting of the provision of Section 35(2) of 
the CFRN 1999 is a curious one. A literal interpretation seems to suggest that 
the right to remain silent expires after consultation with a legal practitioner or 
other chosen person. Could an accused person possibly be compelled to 
answer questions posed to him after he has consulted with a legal practitioner? 
If he consults with a person of his choice, not a legal practitioner, but insists 
on speaking to a legal practitioner afterwards, does he continue to enjoy the 
right to silence pending consultation with his legal practitioner? Also, the 
provision is silent about whether adverse inferences may be drawn from the 
silence of the accused. 
 
England. Quirk has written extensively on this. See Hannah Quirk, “Twenty years on, the 
right of silence and legal advice: the spiralling costs of an unfair exchange” (2013) 64(4) 
NILQ 465. 
155 As basic rules of evidence suggest, the burden of proof in criminal trials lies on the 
prosecution. As a result, they must build a case beyond reasonable doubt. In a situation where 
a case is only built on a balance of probabilities, it would be impossible to convict an accused 
wholly on his decision to remain silent. 
156 Section 236 of the CPC recognizes the right to silence during his trial, but does not provide 
for the right to silence before trial commences. 
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The courts have not done much to offer redress of the issues. Admittedly, the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria has frequently upheld the right to silence, and have 
also declared that adverse inferences may be drawn from the defendant’s 
exercise of his right. Perhaps the most notable decision in this area is the case 
of Daniel Sugh v The State.157 In this case, the court held that by virtue of 
Section 33(11) of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,158 
the accused was under no compulsion to make a statement in defence of any 
allegations raised by the complainant or the police, thereby upholding the 
existence of the right to silence. The Supreme Court also went further to state 
that Section 33(11) of the 1979 Constitution did not prohibit a trial judge from 
drawing any unfavourable inference against an accused having regard to the 
evidence adduced in the case. As the presiding judge, Obaseki, JSC expressed: 
“It is natural and in the ordinary course of events for a person accused 
of a serious offence, spontaneously and instinctively to deny the 
accusation and give such explanation as was capable of exonerating or 
consistent with innocence, than to remain silent and wait for such a 
time as a rational explanation of evidence offers itself. The court 
confronted with such a predicament… may draw such inferences from 
the reaction of the person so accused consistent with the ordinary 
reaction of human beings in such situations.”159 
This power of the courts to draw adverse inferences from the defendant’s 
exercise of his right to silence has been upheld in subsequent cases such as 
 
157 Daniel Sugh v The State [1988] 2 NWLR (Part 77) 475 
158 Hereinafter referred to as the “1979 Constitution”. This provision is now Section 35(2) of 
the 1999 CFRN 
159 Daniel Sugh v State, n 159, at 494 
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Utteh v State,160 Ubanatu v Commissioner of Police,161 and Mbele v State.162 
However, in Gira v State,163 the presiding judge, Adio, JSC, in upholding the 
power of trial courts to make adverse inferences, went on to state that a failure 
to make a statement by an accused amounted to an “admission of guilt by 
conduct.” As he put it:  
“A person who is accused of committing a crime is, by virtue of the 
provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1979,164 entitled to remain silent either during investigation or when 
he is being tried in court. However, there is, in law, a legal principle 
commonly referred to as admission by conduct. The law is that when a 
clear and direct accusation is made against a person, in his presence, 
in circumstances which should warrant instant denial, refutation, or 
protest from him and he does not deny, refute or protest against the 
making of the accusation, evidence of such could be given against him 
as evidence of admission by conduct.”165 
 This position, it is submitted, might need to be revisited, as it seemingly 
vitiates the right to silence, and indeed the tenets of the adversarial system, 
which establish the presumption of innocence and also the evidentiary rule 
which places the burden of proof on the person who makes an allegation.166 
 
160 [1992] 2 NWLR (Part 223) 257 
161 [1999] 7 NWLR (Part 611) 512 
162 [1990] 4 NWLR (Part 145) 484 
163 [1996] 4 NWLR (Part 443) 375 
164 These provisions now appear in the 1999 CFRN 
165 Ibid, at p 386 
166 Section 131, Evidence Act (Nigeria), 2011 
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Most interestingly, a Nigerian academic, A. A. Adeyemi, has argued that the 
right to silence is “contra-cultural” to African societies, especially within the 
Nigerian context.167 Adeyemi also seems to support the notion that the right to 
silence only exists, or ought to exist up to the point of consultation with a legal 
practitioner, after which said right must expire.168 At the time of writing, the 
courts in Nigeria are yet to rule on whether the right to silence should expire, 
or may subsist beyond the initial consultation of the accused with his legal 
practitioner. 
It is opined, however, that the recognition of the right to silence, and the right 
to refuse to testify in court by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases 
establishes the existence of this right beyond the police station, and by 
extension, beyond the initial consultation with the legal practitioner. Also, it is 
humbly submitted that Adeyemi’s position about the contra-cultural nature of 
the right to silence in the Nigerian context is an erroneous one. Admittedly, 
the argument in itself may be true and would stand if one were to argue same 
in the context of the different customary methods of adjudication that existed 
in pre-colonial Nigeria. However, as is trite knowledge, Nigeria has, since 
independence, adopted the adversarial system of justice; and the right to be 
presumed innocent, extending to the freedom from self-incrimination, is as a 
matter of fact, an integral part of the adversarial “culture”. As a result, it might 
be contraindicative to assess a right against a cultural system which is no 
longer the relevant mode of adjudication for criminal offences. 
 
167 A. A. Adeyemi, “Criminal Justice Administration in Nigeria in the Context of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights”, in A. Kalu and Y. Osinbajo (Eds.), Perspectives on 
Human Rights (Federal Ministry of Justice, 192), 121, at 122 
168 Ibid, at 123 
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2.3.4 Right to Speedy Arraignment 
The right to speedy arraignment is perhaps better recognised as a freedom 
from undue and unnecessary detention. As mentioned earlier, in Section 2.3.1 
above, the power of arrest is one which contravenes a person’s right to liberty, 
albeit in a manner recognised by law. In a bid to preserve the adversarial 
balance, all arrested persons have the right to be arraigned before a court of 
competent jurisdiction within a specific time or released on bail. Alternatively, 
if upon the collation of the relevant evidence, there is no offence, on a balance 
of probabilities, which the arrested person could be charged with committing, 
he is to be released without charge. 
In England, by virtue of Section 40(3) of PACE, and Section 15 of Code C 
thereto, a person is not to be detained for more than six (6) hours, although 
this may be extended by further nine (9) hour increments up to a maximum of 
thirty-six (36) hours, upon review of the detention by the custody officer.169 
Any reasons for granting an extension to the detention of an accused are to be 
included in the custody report.170 
Essentially, the right to speedy arraignment exists as a safeguard to prevent the 
undue exercise of the power of arrest by the police, and to protect an accused 
person’s right to liberty. The provisions of PACE in this regard are clear, and 
are not usually an issue of contention in England. In Nigeria, however, the 
right to speedy arraignment or a freedom from unnecessary detention is one 
that is subject to immense academic scrutiny. 
 
169 Section 42(9), PACE. This is in respect of ‘regular’ offences. The maximum period of 
detention in terrorism and terror-related offences is twenty-eight (28) days, by virtue of 
Schedule 8 of the Terrorism Act 2000. 
170Section 42(9)(iii), PACE 
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Sections 35(4) of the 1999 CFRN, 17 of the CPA, 129 of the CPC and 27 of 
the Police Act, all deal with this right, and all three provide that a person who 
has been detained cannot remain in detention for a period exceeding twenty-
four (24) or forty-eight (48) hours without being arraigned or being released 
on bail, except in matters relating to capital offences. For a plethora of reasons 
however, which shall be analysed in the next chapter, this right is routinely 
violated; with the resultant effect being the creation of a category offenders 
known colloquially as “Awaiting Trial Inmates” or (ATMs).171 These are 
persons who are being detained or have been detained for extremely long 
periods of time without formally being charged before a court of competent 
jurisdiction.172 
The creation of the ATM category, or the increased frequency of persons 
detained for long periods of time without charge is due to the proliferation of a 
remand application colloquially known as the “holding charge”. The holding 
charge is an application brought before a court, usually one lacking the 
jurisdiction to try the substantive offence for which the application is based, 
purportedly for the purpose of obtaining a remand order pending the 
completion of investigation and/or obtaining advice from the office of the 
Attorney-General, either of the Federation or of a State. If the application 
succeeds, the police are permitted to detain the accused for a period longer 
than the forty-eight (48) hours that are constitutionally provided.  
 
171 A term used frequently by various academics, with no credit for coining same attributed to 
any specific source. See, for example, Frank Agbedo, Rights of Suspects and Accused Persons 




The Supreme Court has ruled on more than one occasion, that the 
phenomenon known as the holding charge is unconstitutional,173 yet it 
continues to be proliferated, and sometimes, upon a successful application, the 
accused can be detained without actually being tried for months, and even 
years. 
Even though, it is conceded, and as shall be discussed in the next chapter, that 
the holding charge could arguably be deemed a necessary evil, its continued 
use exposes the ineptitude of the Nigeria Police Force,174 and is a clear 
flouting of the provisions of the 1999 CFRN, and a total disregard to an 
arrested person’s right to liberty. 
2.3.5 Other Rights 
There are other rights available to a person in detention that are not directly 
connected with the adversarial balance or the presumption of innocence which 
nevertheless are important and have an overall effect on proceedings. These 
rights include: 
2.3.5.1 The Right to be Informed of the Rights Available during Detention 
Paragraph 3 of PACE Code of Practice C states clearly that any person who is 
arrested and brought to the station should be informed clearly of all the rights 
available to them during their detention. This is a fairly straightforward 
provision, which is not the subject of any academic debate. It is however 
important to note that this provision is missing from Nigerian law. Despite the 
 
173 Cases where the holding charge has been deemed unconstitutional include Olawoye v COP 
[2006] 2 NWLR (part 965) 427, Enwere v COP [1993] 6 NWLR (part 299) 333 and Anaekwe 
v COP [1996] 3 NWLR (part 436) 330 
174 See Dele Peters, “The Place of the Holding Charge in Nigeria’s Criminal Jurisprudence”, 5 
Nigerian Current Legal Problems (1996-98) p. 252, at 257 
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number of rights available to an accused, the police are not bound by any rule 
or legal provision to inform an accused of his rights. 
It is hypothesised that given the absence of this right in Nigeria, there is no 
redress for any police officer that fails to inform the accused of his rights, 
willingly or by omission. Thus there is room for gross violation of a detainee’s 
rights as, essentially, only persons who might have prior knowledge of the 
rights available to them might be able to seek the application of said rights. 
2.3.5.2 Right to Have Someone Informed of a Detainee’s Arrest 
This right is provided for in both jurisdictions, by virtue of Section 56 of 
PACE and Section 35(2) of the 1999 CFRN. This right, it is opined, is related 
to the right to be given adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence, 
which is also an attempt to maintain the adversarial balance. 
2.3.5.3 Conditions of Detention 
Paragraph 8 of PACE Code of Practice C contains detailed provisions relating 
to the conditions of detention, including the contents of the cell, the provision 
of toilets and washing facilities, etc. There are, however, no such provisions 
that specify the conditions of the detention cells in Nigeria. 
The provisions regulating the conditions of detention are not related to the 
presumption of innocence as much as they relate to the right to dignity. 
Although not expressly provided for by the laws of either jurisdiction, Article 
1 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which both England and 




On a purely theoretical level, one might be tempted to conclude that the legal 
frameworks of England and Nigeria are identical, particularly in the realm of 
protection of human rights, especially because, at face value, they seem to 
provide for the same rights for arrested persons. 
This is not the case, however. A common theme across the rights analysed in 
this section is the lack of detail in the rights available to an accused person in 
Nigeria. The different statutory instruments, particularly the 1999 CFRN 
outline what the rights available are, but fail to create a minimum standard for 
their delivery and protection. Failing to create a minimum standard would 
suggest ambiguities and a certain level of uncertainty as to what the law seeks 
to provide. 
As was referenced early in the chapter, it is a commonly accepted view that 
regulation ideally takes a tripartite form: the goal, monitoring and alignment. 
The fact that the rights provisions are open to interpretation in a variety of 
ways across the different states of Nigeria, in the different police commands is 
a clear indication that the first part of the regulatory framework, i.e., the goal, 
is not clearly or expressly stated. This begs the question; if the goal is not 
clearly or expressly stated, how does one effectively monitor and evaluate 
what happens in reality? 
If one were to revisit some of the themes and concepts of jurisprudence, it is 
often taught that for a society to survive under the rule of law, there must be 
an element of certainty about the laws of the land. As Veitch, Christodoulidis 
and Farmer put it:  
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“Where the rule of law is observed, people can have reasonable 
certainty, in advance, concerning the rules and standards by which 
their conduct will be judged, and the requirements they must satisfy to 
give legal validity to their transactions…. This is possible, it is often 
said, provided there is a legal system composed principally of quite 
clearly enunciated rules that normally operate only in a prospective 
manner, that are expressed in terms of general categories, not 
particular, indexical, commands to individuals or small groups singled 
out for special attention. The rules should set realistically achievable 
requirements for conduct, and should form overall some coherent 
pattern, not a chaos of arbitrarily conflicting demands.”175 
It is contended, that by virtue of the lack of a clear goal or minimum standard 
established by the legal framework in Nigeria, that the rights are not properly 
provided for, which leaves them open to the possibility of gross violations in 
practice. 
The signing into force of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, while it 
can be said to have taken some commendable steps towards better protection 
of custodial rights of accused persons, has still failed to provide a minimum 
standard, or improve the framework for delivery of the rights in practice. The 
nuances introduced by the Act are: 
Perhaps the most important development introduced by the new Act is the 
inclusion of the requirement to inform an accused of the rights available 
 
175 S. Veitch, E. Christodoulidis and L. Farmer, Jurisprudence: Themes and Concepts 
(Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), pp 18 - 19 
 85 
during detention. To wit, section 6(2) of the Administration of Criminal 
Justice Act provides that: 
“The police officer or the person making the arrest or the police 
officer in charge of a police station shall inform the suspect of his 
rights to: 
(a) remain silent or avoid answering any question until after 
consultation with a legal practitioner or any other person of his 
own choice; 
(b) consult a legal practitioner of his choice before making, 
endorsing or writing any statement or answering any question put 
to him after arrest; and 
(c) free legal representation by the Legal Aid Council of Nigeria 
where applicable” 
In respect of the specific right to silence, the new Act does not address the 
ambiguity created by the provisions of Section 35(2) of the 1999 CFRN: does 
the right to silence expire after consultation? It is conceded that Section 17(1), 
in providing for the recording of the accused’s statement, provides that the 
statement shall be taken “if he so wishes to make a statement.”176  
The Administration of Criminal Justice Act changes the terrain of custodial 
legal assistance both in a slightly favourable, and equally problematic fashion. 
On the one hand, Section 17(2) seemingly improves on the nature of the right 
to custodial legal assistance, as it provides that the statement of the accused 
may be taken in the presence of a legal practitioner of his choice, or other 
 
176 Section 17(1), Administration of Criminal Justice Act 
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qualified person, although it contains a proviso which would suggest that the 
role of the legal practitioner is intended to be passive: “Provided that the Legal 
Practitioner or any other person mentioned in this subsection shall not 
interfere while the suspect is making his statement, except for the purpose of 
discharging his role as a legal practitioner.” (Emphasis added) 
On the other side of the coin, Section 14(2) and (3) place a requirement on the 
arresting officer to afford the suspect with the necessary facilities to obtain 
legal advice after he has been arrested, although it curiously stipulates that 
“any such communication or legal advice shall be done in the presence of an 
officer who has custody of the arrested suspect.”177 This is a clear 
contravention of the requirement of confidentiality or privileged 
communication as stipulated by Rules 8 and 22 of the UN Basic Principles on 
the Role of Lawyers,178 and Section 192 of the Evidence Act 2011. 
Another important development initiated by the Administration of Criminal 
Justice Act is the provision, in Section 17(3) that where a suspect does not 
understand, speak or write English, that he is to be entitled to the assistance of 
an interpreter in recording his statement. Curiously, however, the provision 
fails to state on whom the burden of providing the interpreter lies, the suspect 
or the police. This absence of an express provision to that effect, it is 
contended, only serves to lend further ambiguities regarding the provision of 
rights at the custodial stage of proceedings. 
 
177 Section 14(3), Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 
178 UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers 1990, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RoleOfLawyers.aspx, last accessed on 
24-10-2014 
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The enactment of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act appears to have 
taken favourable steps towards a better protection of custodial rights in 
Nigeria, but it might also have created the possibilities for further imbroglio 
with two notable provisions contained therein. 
The first of these is found in the provisions of Part 30 (sections 293 to 299), 
which deals with detention time limits. This is discussed in detail in the next 
chapter,179 but the combined interpretation of the provisions therein is to the 
effect that under this new Act, suspects and accused persons could potentially 
be held in detention, without being formally charged, for a period of up to 
fifty-eight (58) days. This is a severe departure from the CPA and CPC regime 
that required a person be arraigned within a maximum of forty-eight (48) 
hours.180 It is conceded, however, that this might ultimately be in a bid to curb 
the scourge of the Awaiting-Trial inmate.181 For the moment, however, in the 
absence of any jurisprudence from the courts, it remains a speculative concern. 
The second possibility for a greater imbroglio is found in the provisions of 
Section 106 of the Act, which relates to powers of prosecution. According to 
the Act, the only persons who can institute criminal proceedings in any court 
are: 
“(a) the Attorney-General of the Federation or a Law Officer in his 
Ministry or Department; 
(b) a legal practitioner authorised by the Attorney-General of the 
Federation; or 
 
179 See Section 3.2.2.1, Chapter 3, Infra 
180 See Section 2.3.4, Supra 
181 Ibid 
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(c) a legal practitioner authorised to prosecute by this Act or any other 
Act of the National Assembly” 
The Attorney-General of the State and the Police are conspicuously absent 
from this list. It is opined that by virtue of the supremacy of the 1999 CFRN 
over this Act, the provisions of Section 106 do not nullify the powers of the 
Attorney-General of a State, or members of his department to prosecute 
offences, as conferred on him by Section 211 of the 1999 CFRN. Also it is 
further contended that, when the Administration of Criminal Justice Act is 
adopted at state levels, it would probably then confer the powers of 
prosecution on the Attorneys-General of the thirty-six (36) states. 
The more controversial omission is perhaps the removal of the power of 
prosecution from the police. It is opined that, in light of the provisions of 
Section 23 of the Police Act and the ruling in FRN v Osahon [2006]182, which 
confers the power of prosecution on the police, there is an inconsistency that 
would require interpretation by the courts. It is submitted that the removal of 
powers of prosecution would be a welcome development, as it would further 
serve to better balance the adversarial scales.183 However, it remains presently 
undetermined whether Section 23 of the Police Act is repealed by virtue 
Section 106 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, or whether the 
former nullifies the latter. The attempt to remove the powers of prosecution 
from the police is not, it is herein contended, done in a wholesale, or a truly 
unambiguous manner. Despite omitting the police from the list of persons who 
 
182 n 109 
183 The issues emanating from the power of the police to prosecute is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3.2.2.3, Infra 
 89 
may institute criminal proceedings, the ACJA goes on to state, in Section 
268(2), that: 
“where proceedings in respect of an offence are instituted by a police 
officer, it shall be in the name of the Inspector-General of Police or 
Commissioner of Police, as the case may be.”184 
 As a result, the controversial nature of the provisions of Section 106 of the 
Act is, at best, only speculative, and only time, and interpretation by the 
courts, may resolve the potential controversy created by the provisions thereof. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter concludes, by way of a summary, by restating the importance of 
human rights, particularly those pertaining to and available to persons detained 
in custody, as a key element in maintaining the adversarial balance. In this 
chapter, we have been able to answer successfully the first research question 
that this thesis sought to answer, i.e., What rights do suspects have in England 
and Nigeria during detention before a formal charge and detention pending the 
determination of the case brought against them? The third research question is 
also answered in part, to wit, what is the effect of detailed and clearly stated 
legislative instruments in attempting to improve compliance with due process? 
In answering these questions, it would appear as though the rights sought to be 
protected in both jurisdictions are similar. However, the failure, in Nigeria, to 
provide for a minimum standard of protecting these rights, or of any attempt to 
remove the ambiguities which abound have resulted in a poor machinery for 
 
184 Section 268(2), ACJA 
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the delivery of these rights in practice, which is arguably tantamount to a non-
protection of rights within the jurisdiction. 
In the next chapter, we shall proceed to attempt to answer the second and third 
research questions, which relate to understanding the reason for, and bridging, 





THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS IN PRACTICE 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
Even the most liberal definition of law or the concept of laws recognises that a 
law or set of rules exist to regulate a society’s conduct. Society exists, not just 
on a theoretical level, but also in reality. There is therefore the need for any 
law to exist on a theoretical, as well as a practical level. Laws, as studies of 
jurisprudence have taught us, need to be clearly stated and easily understood, 
and should therefore be written.1 However, it would not suffice for laws 
merely to exist in theory, and there should be mechanisms that ought to exist 
to assist in the effective delivery of laws from a merely theoretical or written 
platform to the practical realm of society. This is where the creation of a 
functional institutional framework becomes necessary. 
In the previous chapter, we analysed the legal and institutional frameworks 
that exist in England and Nigeria,2 and how they attempt to protect the 
detention rights of accused persons in both jurisdictions. However, the 
analysis and subsequent comparison was done on a purely theoretical basis, 
and only analysed the content of the legislative instruments that created and 
provided for these rights, as well as the instruments that established the 
institutional mechanisms for the delivery of these rights in practice. It is 
 
1 See, for example, Scott Veitch, Emilios Christodoulidis and Lindsay Farmer, Jurisprudence: 
Themes and Concepts (2nd Edition, Routledge, 2012), p20, and Juha Raitio, The Principle of 
Certainty in EC Law (Kluwer, 2010), pp125 - 132. In both publications, it is generally 
accepted that written, clearly enunciated laws form part of the legal framework of any society 
or jurisdiction. 
2 As in the previous chapter, any reference to “England” includes both England and Wales. 
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therefore imperative that the next step becomes a comparison of these rights 
and the framework for their delivery in practice. 
In addition to the foregoing, and as highlighted in the previous chapter, it is 
important to note that the second part of the generally accepted tripartite form 
of regulation is the monitoring stage;3 i.e., analysing the effectiveness of any 
law or regulation as it operates in practice. Thus, having looked at the legal 
and institutional framework of both jurisdictions, i.e., the goal, in the previous 
chapter, the next step, logically, would be an assessment of the ‘monitoring’ 
devices available in the said jurisdictions. 
  
3.1 THE CURRENT STATE OF THE RIGHTS IN PRACTICE 
In assessing the rights framework in the previous chapter, and having looked 
at the tripartite form of regulation, it became apparent that the goal needed to 
be clearly stated. It is opined that even the mere application of basic logic 
would suggest that if there is to be the need to monitor the goal and evaluate 
what happens in reality, there must first be a clear understanding of what the 
rule or standard is; i.e., the rights must be clearly stated, and a clear 
appreciation of what the minimum standard is, or ought to be, for the 
protection of the rights of the accused. 
In England, as we have discovered, considerable success has been achieved in 
this regard. The provisions in the relevant sections of PACE, primarily, as well 
as the paragraphs of the different Codes of Practice thereto are well written 
 
3 For more on the tripartite form of regulation see, generally, Ed Cape and Richard Young 
(eds), Regulating Policing: The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Past, Present and 
Future (Oxford, 2008) 
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and clearly delineated, thereby giving rise to a clear appreciation of what the 
rights available to accused persons are at the police station, as well as a clear 
appreciation of the minimum standard for the provision and protection of these 
rights. 
In Nigeria, however, there is a different story to be told. On the one hand, the 
different provisions of the relevant legislative instruments provide rights for 
persons who have been detained.4 However, the paucity of said provisions 
cause the unfortunate absence of a minimum standard for the provision of the 
rights which create an avenue for a multiplicity of interpretation across the 
jurisdiction or, as we shall subsequently discover,5 the eventual non-protection 
of rights in practice. 
It is perhaps conventional knowledge that in every aspect of societal life and 
interaction, there would be an apparent impossibility to completely transition a 
theory to practical application one hundred per cent of the time. The detention 
rights of accused persons, as an aspect of societal life and interaction, are no 
different. There is a discrepancy between the rights as they exist in theory and 
as they operate in practice. In both jurisdictions, even in England with a 
clearly delineated minimum standard, there is a difficulty in transitioning the 
rights from theory to practice, and the rights are not always observed or 
protected. It is thus hypothesised that the discrepancy between the rights in 
theory and practice could only stand to be amplified if there is no clearly 
 
4 As discussed in the previous chapter, the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, the Criminal Procedure Act, the Criminal Procedure Code, the 
Administration of Criminal Justice Law (Lagos) and the Administration of Criminal Justice 
Act, all attempt to provide rights for the protection of accused persons at the pre-trial stage in 
Nigeria. 
5 See the findings of an empirical study conducted by the researcher, in Section 3.4, below. 
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delineated minimum standard or in a developing country, such as what obtains 
in Nigeria. 
3.1.1 Rates of Observation 
In England, there have been several empirical studies carried out to monitor 
the application of the detention rights of accused persons at the police station, 
in a bid to ascertain the scope of their application in practice. Some of these 
empirical studies were conducted pre-PACE, but the majority have been 
conducted in the PACE era, although there was a period of twelve (12) years 
within which no large-scale studies were conducted.6 After the study by Bucke 
and Brown in 1997, there were no studies of the rights at the police station 
until the study by Skinns in 2009.7 
Of the different studies that have been conducted, however, the two most 
recent studies, one conducted by Skinns and the other by Kemp, Balmer and 
Pleasance, have arguably been the most in-depth and detailed studies of police 
station activities.8 
 
6 See Table 1, “Access to Legal Advice 1978 – 2007” in Layla Skinns, ““The Right to Legal 
Advice in the Police Station: Past, Present and Future” (2011) Crim. L. R. 19, at 22, and Table 
1, “Main Studies indicating Advice Request Rates and Solicitor Consultations, by Date” in 
Pascoe Pleasance, Vicky Kemp and Nigel J. Balmer, “The Justice Lottery? Police Station 
Advice 25 Years on from PACE” (2011) Crim. L. R. 3, at 5 
7 Skinns conducted a study of two (2) police stations in two (2) different police areas, which 
have formed the basis of several articles and publications, but first documented in Layla 
Skinns, “"I'm a detainee; get me out of here": predictors of access to custodial legal advice in 
public and privatized police custody areas in England and Wales” (2009) Brit. J. C. 399 
8 Skinns, Ibid. The study by Pleasance, Kemp and Balmer is one of the largest-scale studies of 
legal advice at the Police Station to be conducted in England, examining more than thirty 
thousand (30,000) custody records in forty-four (44) police stations in four (4) police areas. 
This study has also formed the basis of several articles and publications, but was first 
documented in the first instance in Pleasance, Kemp and Balmer, “The Justice Lottery?”, n 6, 
and V. Kemp, P. Pleasance and N. J. Balmer, “Children, Young People and Requests for 
Police Station Legal Advice: 25 Years on from PACE”, (2011) 11(1) Youth Justice 28 
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It must be noted that both of these studies focused primarily on the take up of 
legal advice whilst in custody and the factors which affected it; however, as 
the methodology in both studies required the examination and analysis of 
custody records, which ordinarily contains information about detention 
periods, interview records, and essentially all relevant information pertaining 
to a suspect’s time in custody,9 it also shed light on the provision and 
protection of rights in practice. 
Both studies, and previous studies as a matter of fact, established the apparent 
impossibility of transitioning the rights from theory to practice at a one 
hundred per cent (100%) rate.10 Both studies did however establish that the 
request rates had risen, and were on a steady incline, since the coming into 
force of PACE. The fact however remains that there is yet to be a study or a 
police station which, upon consultation of its custody records, would yield a 
100% application of the rights in practice. 
In Nigeria, there is a dearth of any literature that documents the transition of 
the detention rights from theory to practice. In addition to this, there has been 
only one empirical study of note that was conducted to examine the protection 
of rights in practice, and this was reported in 1991, over twenty-five (25) ago. 
This study was conducted by Ajomo and Okagbue,11 and was a thorough study 
 
9 See Paragraph 2 of PACE Code of Practice C, which deals extensively with custody records, 
and the contents thereof. 
10 Skinns in her study, for instance, discovered that the right to legal advice, for instance, was 
requested for by 60% of all detainees, with only 80% of these requests being met. Kemp, et al, 
in their study, found that the request rate was 44.9%, with 81.3% of these being met. 
11 M. Ayo Ajomo and Isabella Okagbue (Eds.), Human Rights and the Administration of 
Criminal Justice in Nigeria (NIALS Research Series No. 1, NIALS, 1991), pp99 - 132. Their 
study involved the interviewing of three hundred and sixty-three (363) policemen and women 
and eight hundred and ninety-seven (897) accused persons, suspects and detainees, in thirty-
nine (39) police stations in rural, semi-urban and urban areas of seven (7) states in Nigeria. 
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of urban and rural police stations in a number of locations across Nigeria, and 
established that for a number of reasons, including some infrastructure-related 
factors and some attitudinal factors,12 the rates of observance were 
exceptionally low and, in some stations, there was in actuality a gross failure 
to protect any of an accused person’s rights in practice. 
This, unfortunately, was the last empirical study of note on police practices 
and human rights in Nigeria. Although the findings of Ajomo and Okagbue’s 
study are revelatory and have remained prevalent until today, there has been 
no follow-up to this study, by the authors or any other researcher; and it 
becomes increasingly difficult to rely on a nearly thirty (30) year old study. 
Thus, in a bid to further understand the process that facilitates the practical 
application of detention rights within the Nigerian jurisdiction, and to 
determine the continued relevancy or otherwise of the study, this researcher 
conducted an empirical study on the subject in January 2013. The results of 
this empirical study are discussed below, in Section 3.4.  
It would appear, from the examination of the different empirical studies that 
have been conducted in both jurisdictions, that the basic, indisputable fact is 
that it is impossible to transition the rights entirely from theory to practice. 
There is an inevitable chasm between the rights as they exist in theory, i.e., as 
provided for by the relevant laws and statutory instruments; and as they exist 
in practice. The rates of observation as shown in the various studies conducted 
would suggest that the rights are seemingly better protected in England than 
they are in Nigeria. 
 
12 These factors shall be identified and discussed in the relevant sections below. 
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Having examined the rates of observation of detention rights in practice, and 
determined that the rights are better observed in practice in England, it would 
not be sufficient to merely rest on metaphorical oars and declare an 
impossibility to completely transition the protection of rights from theory to 
practice in both jurisdictions.  A closer examination of the practices in both 
jurisdictions seems to suggest that there are several factors that affect the take-
up of rights at police stations. Some of these factors are axiomatic and intrinsic 
as a result of the operations within the legislative and institutional frameworks, 
whilst some are attitudinal factors, which are as a result of the attitudes of the 
different parties to the criminal process who are involved in the pre-trial stage. 
These factors are analysed in the following sections, in a bid to better 
understand the reasons for the chasm between theory and practice and, perhaps 
rather ambitiously, suggest recommendations for bridging the gap between 
theory and practice which are not based on abstract legal theories, but on a 
thorough understanding of the different affecting factors. 
 
3.2 SHORTCOMINGS OF THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK IN PRACTICE 
As stated, some of the factors affecting the observation rates of the detention 
rights in both jurisdictions are intrinsic, and are directly related to the structure 
of the legal and institutional frameworks. Some of the criticisms by certain 
academics and professionals, which have been raised against certain aspects of 
the different frameworks in both jurisdictions, seem to suggest that by their 
very nature, these elements pose a difficulty in the smooth transition from 
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theory to practice. These criticisms, and the alleged shortcomings of the 
framework are considered in this section. 
3.2.1 England 
As was argued in the previous chapter,13 despite some of the criticisms raised 
against it in the initial period following its coming into force, PACE has 
managed to create a clear and well-stated minimum standard of rights. The 
rights available to arrested persons are clearly stated and easily 
understandable. The law is dynamic and subject to change, but England, acting 
through the legislative functions of Parliament, has demonstrated its 
willingness and ability to stay abreast of the change in the dynamics of the 
law; as evidenced by its frequent and necessary amendments of the provisions 
of the Codes of Practice of PACE.14 
There are three shortcomings of the institutional framework in England that 
should be mentioned, which have the potential to affect the delivery of the 
rights in practice. These shortcomings, admittedly, are not necessarily 
detrimental to the delivery and protection of the rights in practice; however, 
they have shown to have an effect on the smooth transition from theory to 
practice. 
3.2.1.1 Self-Regulation 
The first of these shortcomings is the role of the custody officer, and its 
apparent reliance on self-regulation. One of the duties of the custody officer, 
as required by PACE, is the regular periodic review of detention times of 
 
13 See Section 2.2.1.1, in Chapter 2, infra. 
14 Code of Practice C, for example, was most recently amended in July 2018. 
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arrested persons,15 to ensure that a person is not detained longer than 
necessary. However, as reported by Sanders, this function of the custody 
officer is a perfunctory one, as they rarely deny the requests for continued 
detention.16 In addition to the study cited by Sanders, there have been other 
studies which suggest that detention reviews by custody officers have been 
found to be tokenistic and routinized.17 As Skinns describes it, “The review 
system is conducted in a way which provides records apparently complying 
with the letter of PACE, but that its spirit is largely dissipated.”18 She also 
revealed that, in her study of two police areas, the reviewing officer went 
through the motions, merely rubber-stamping the decision to prolong 
detention.19 
This elucidates the difference between the legalistic-bureaucratic and the 
culturalist approaches to law-making in policing, which were highlighted in 
the previous chapter.20 If it were possible to effectively regulate the activities 
of the custody officers via the legalistic-bureaucratic approach, then it is 
hypothesised that the review of detention would perhaps be a function 
performed a little more pro-actively. However, as seen from Dixon’s 
argument, the legalistic-bureaucratic approach suggests a limited view of 
 
15 See Sections 36-38 of PACE for the establishment and description of the duties of the 
custody officer. 
16 Andrew Sanders, “Can Coercive Powers be Effectively Controlled or Regulated? The Case 
for Anchored Pluralism”, in Cape and Young, Regulating Policing, n3, pp 53 - 54 
17 See David Dixon, Law in Policing: Legal Regulation and Police Practices (Clarendon, 
1997), p, and Layla Skinns Police Custody: Governance, Legitimacy and Reform in the 
Criminal Justice Process (Routledge, 2011), p 124. See also, generally, Emmanouela 
Mylonaki and Tim Burton, “A Critique of the Deficiencies in the Regulation of Contemporary 
Police Powers of Detention and Questioning in England and Wales” (2010) 83(1) Pol. J. 61 
18 Skinns, Ibid, at p 125 
19 Ibid, at 126 
20 See Section 2.2.1.1, Chapter 2, Supra 
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regulatory practices amongst the police, and is not an absolute form of 
regulation.21 
As already stated, this is not wholly detrimental to the transition of the rights 
from theory to practice. As a matter of fact, the only effect of this shortcoming 
borne out of the reliance on self-regulation by the police working through the 
custody officer is that the review of detention periods becomes a purely 
academic exercise. There is no evidence to suggest anything to the contrary; 
so, on pure conjecture alone, it is not apparent that there is any violation of the 
maximum detention period, despite any evidence to suggest that the role of the 
custody officer has effect in reality of keeping detention periods down to a 
minimum. 
3.2.1.2 Legal Advice by Telephone 
Another resultant shortcoming of the institutional framework for the 
protection of rights at the pre-trial stage is made manifest in the provision of 
legal assistance, particularly through the Criminal Defence Service Direct 
(CDS Direct) scheme. 
Bridges and Cape were vociferous critics of the introduction of the CDS 
Direct and Defence Solicitor Call Centre (DSCC) schemes.22  The authors 
have levied several criticisms against the introduction of these schemes, and 
its overall effect on the provision of legal assistance for detainees at the police 
station. The first criticism levied against the schemes calls into question the 
removal of the power to initiate contact with the suspect’s solicitor of choice 
 
21 David Dixon, n 17, pp 1 – 8. 
22 Lee Bridges and Ed Cape, “CDS Direct: Flying in the Face of the Evidence”, (2008) Centre 
for Crime and Justice Studies 
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from the suspect, and indeed the police, and vesting same in the DSCC.23 
Though not expressly stated by the authors, their arguments against vesting the 
responsibility of making contact with the DSCC seem to suggest that it is an 
arguably unnecessary extra step that extends the amount of time that elapses 
before a suspect can consult with his solicitor. 
They also criticised the overreliance of the DSCC on telephone-only advice. 
The provisions of PACE Code C recommend that consultation with the 
solicitor should be by telephone only in a number of offences, mainly minor, 
non-indictable offences. Bridges and Cape are vociferous in their criticism of 
this provision and suggest that the high-reliance on telephone-only advice has 
a negative impact on the provision of legal advice. This is because, as studies 
have revealed, telephones at the police station are not always answered.24 The 
effect of this being that even when the request for legal advice has been 
properly routed to the duty solicitor via CDS Direct, the solicitor is unable to 
make contact with the suspect as a result of something ordinarily insignificant 
as an unanswered telephone. 
Also highlighted by Bridges and Cape, there was a Home Office study which 
found that the offer of Telephone-only custodial advice would usually result in 
abandonment of request by suspect.25 Needless to say, that is an obvious effect 
on the right to legal advice borne out of a shortcoming of the framework. 
 
23 Ibid, at pp 25 – 26 
24 Ibid, at p29 
25 Brown, D., Ellis, T. and Larcombe, K., Changing the Code: Police Detention under the 
Revised PACE Codes of Practice (Home Office Research Study 129, London: Home Office, 
1992) , cited in Bridges and Cape, Ibid 
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By far the greatest criticism raised against the DSCC scheme by Bridges and 
Cape, however, is the fact that the scheme was not properly evaluated before it 
was launched nationwide.26 As they report, if the scheme had been properly 
evaluated, then the evidence that has since come to light of the scheme causing 
long communication lines and delay, and the occasional breakdown of 
communication, in the process of obtaining custodial advice could have been 
avoided. Instead, as they point out, the evaluation was not properly conducted, 
with focus on the amount of time it took CDS Direct to respond to phone calls, 
for example, rather than the time it took to deliver legal advice.27 
An additional criticism that may be raised revolves around the protection of 
the confidentiality of communication between solicitor and suspect. Section 58 
of PACE provides the right to legal advice to a suspect, and the provision 
categorically states that the consultation between solicitor and client is to be 
private. Indeed, in studying the right to legal advice generally, it is commonly 
regarded as privileged communication, which is deemed confidential. Bridges 
and Cape referred to a study conducted in 1998, which established the 
insufficiency of facilities to ensure that the right to legal advice was delivered 
privately.28 They suggested that that had continued to be the case, and that 
there were still a number of stations with insufficient facilities to guarantee 
privacy and confidentiality of consultation between solicitor and suspect. 
Pattenden and Skinns also found that in many police stations, the telephones 
 
26 Bridges and Cape, n 22, at p19 
27 Ibid, at p3 
28 Phillips, C. and Brown, D., Entry into the Criminal Justice System: A Survey of Police 
Arrests and their Outcomes, (1998) Home Office Research Study 185, London: Home Office, 
cited in Bridges and Cape, Ibid.  
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are usually located in the custody area, resulting in many phone calls not being 
made in private, thus violating the confidentiality requirement.29 
In light of the foregoing criticisms, it is perhaps safe to say that the right to 
legal assistance is not being delivered smoothly as a result of the shortcomings 
of the DSCC and CDS Direct schemes, as highlighted; however, it is 
contended that the right is being delivered nonetheless and, from a 
comparative perspective, the situation is better than what pertains in Nigeria, 
as we shall examine in Section 3.2.2, below.  
3.2.1.3 Interpreters’ Framework 
Interpretation and translation services pose another challenge to the effective 
implementation of suspects’ rights, especially from the viewpoint of the right 
to be informed of the reasons for arrest in a language which the detainee 
understands, as provided for by Articles 5 and 6 of the ECHR. 
The Ministry of Justice (MoJ), in 2011, entered into a four-year framework 
agreement with CapitaTI for the provision of interpretation and translation 
services, which entered into force in January 2012.30 Prior to the establishment 
of this framework agreement, any request for interpretation or translation was 
made through the National Register of Public Sector Interpreters (NRPSI), 
which maintains a list of all the different interpreter associations and bodies, 
and a register of accredited members of these associations and bodies.31 These 
 
29 R. Pattenden and L. Skinns, “Choice, Privacy and Publicly-Funded Legal Advice at the 
Police Station” (2010) 73 M.L.R. 349, cited in Layla Skinns, n 6, at p 20 
30 The original framework agreement was entered into with ALS, which was subsequently 
purchased by Capita. 
31 NRPSI – National Register of Public Service Interpreters. “About Us”, available at 
http://www.nrpsi.org.uk/about-us.html, last accessed 27-03-2015 
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requests were usually made by the court or police station with the need for 
interpretation, and were made direct to the relevant interpreter. The 
negotiations to enter into the framework were necessitated by the MoJ’s desire 
to streamline the request process as well as the delivery of services. 
The framework agreement, however, has been implemented rather 
unsuccessfully. Relevant studies have shown a general dissatisfaction with it.32 
These studies demonstrated that, despite the establishment of the Framework 
Agreement, a huge number of interpretation requests continued to be made to 
the interpreters directly, or via the NRPSI, rather than through Capita.33 
Furthermore, a number of interpreters expressed their displeasure at working 
under the new framework agreement, citing displeasure with issues relating to 
remuneration,34 the booking process,35 and the working conditions36 among 
other reasons.37 
Despite an express desire to terminate their working relationship with 
Capita,38 some interpreters, including NRPSI and Capita-accredited 
 
32 See, for example, National Audit Office, “The Ministry of Justice’s Language Services 
Contract: Progress Update”, January 2014, available at https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/The-Ministry-of-Justices-language-services-contract-Progress-
update.pdf, last accessed 13-05-2015; and Professional Interpreters for Justice, “The Ministry 
of Justice Framework for Language Services… One Year On”, available at 
http://www.unitetheunion.org/uploaded/documents/mojframeworkagreement4languageservice
s1yearon11-10956.pdf, last accessed 13-05-2015 
33 According to the report by the Professional Interpreters for Justice (Ibid), for example, four 
in five interpreters reportedly refused to sign up for the framework agreement, and bookings 







interpreters, remained willing to continue to provide their services in the 
interests of justice.39  
Similarly problematic is the probability that the same interpreter might be used 
at various stages of the criminal process, for the same matter; for example, the 
same interpreter might be used both during consultation with the solicitor and 
also during interrogation by the police, although, this issue is one based on 
conjecture, as there is no evidence to suggest that this is a matter of frequent 
occurrence, or indeed any great concern. Serious questions around impartiality 
and confidentiality could be raised here, and the confidentiality of 
communications could be put in doubt if there is an interpreter present, and if 
the same interpreter is present in the subsequent interrogation of the suspect. 
One may reasonably argue that there is a risk that the interpreter may be 
influenced by information he might have been privy to during consultation 
with the solicitor.  
Despite the various failings of the current framework agreement, it is apparent 
that the original intent, from the structure of the framework agreement, is to 
ensure a smooth delivery of interpretation services. It would seem to be in the 
interest of this to establish a central booking system via which any and every 
need for interpretation can be dealt with by the different parties to the criminal 
process, at every stage; offer a unified accreditation process for every person 
desirous of offering interpretation services, and maintain a current register of 
all accredited interpreters, and the languages they interpret. 
 
39 Ibid, p 16 
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It is suggested that the NRPSI might be a sufficient framework for the 
provision of interpretation services, as evidenced by its continued usage by the 
police and courts as and when the need for interpretation arises. As a result, it 
is contended that, in the event that the framework agreement with Capita is not 
renewed, steps be taken to streamline the NRPSI and its services, for 
optimised interpretation and translation services. 
The three shortcomings analysed above are problematic, but not overly 
detrimental to the process or the transition of the rights from theory to 
practice. They affect the smooth delivery of the rights from theory to practice, 
or in the case of the self-regulation of the police, reduce a safeguard against an 
abuse of an accused person’s rights to a mere academic activity. However, it is 
contended that the legislative and institutional framework in England is not as 
severely plagued with the sort of intrinsic shortcomings that negatively affect 
their transition to practice, or overly so, as the case may be. However, as shall 
be discussed in subsequent sections, there are other factors, mostly attitudinal 
factors, which also pose difficulties with regards to the smooth transition of 
the rights from theory to practice. Additionally, and as we shall discuss in the 
next chapter, the third part of the tripartite form of regulation, the realignment, 
is the mechanism via which a smoother transition of rights from theory to 






There are six (6) major intrinsic shortcomings of the legal and institutional 
framework in Nigeria which negatively affect the delivery of rights in practice, 
which are considered below. 
3.2.2.1 The Laws Establishing the Framework 
The first obvious shortcoming of the framework in Nigeria revolves primarily 
around the laws themselves that establish the legal and institutional 
framework, particularly, as highlighted in the previous chapter,40 the brevity of 
the laws creating the different frameworks, including the rights framework, 
and the resultant lack of clarity therefrom. 
The laws, as previously discussed, are only surface-level statements 
establishing the rights available, but no serious efforts have been made to 
remove any ambiguities regarding their interpretation, even with the 
subsequent enactment of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015,41 
thus leaving them open to the possibility of a multiplicity of interpretation 
across the length and breadth of the federation. This would create an imbroglio 
in terms of understanding what exactly the mechanisms for delivering the 
rights in practice are. 
To add to this imbroglio, there is a multiplicity of laws dealing with the 
provision of rights. There are several statutory instruments which provide the 
rights and/or limit the powers of the parties across Nigeria, some with limited 
 
40 Section 2.2.2, Chapter 2, Supra. 
41 Hereinafter, “ACJA” 
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jurisdiction.42 This is not an assertion that a multiplicity of legislation 
necessarily creates an imbroglio when it comes to establishing a rights 
framework, especially in a federation, like Nigeria is; however, it is suggested 
that in cases where none of these laws are detailed enough as to eliminate 
ambiguities, it can only cause further confusion. 
Also, as considered in greater detail below, when assessed in combination 
with the current structure of the Nigeria Police Force, it might be detrimental 
to have a multiplicity of legislation governing the same rights framework. 
There is only one police force serving the entirety of Nigeria, operating under 
a centralised organisational structure. Again, the argument used is essentially 
based on conjecture, but in a situation where there is one police force, with 
officers susceptible to being transferred between state commands that operate 
under different legislation,43 it would seem that that would complicate training 
of the officers, and would also create a lack of certainty amongst the officers 
of what their powers are, as well as the rights available to persons detained in 
their custody. 
At this juncture, it is further conceded that there is not a huge difference 
between the substantive rights provided for in the different legislative 
instruments that operate across Nigeria, so perhaps the shortcoming potentially 
posed by the multiplicity of legislation is yet to fully manifest itself. As such, 
the only real concern at present is whether this amounts to an act of over-
legislation, despite the laws themselves being clouded with ambiguities. 
 
42 The Criminal Procedure Act and Criminal Procedure Code, for example, are applicable only 
in the Southern and Northern states of Nigeria, respectively, and the of the Administration of 
Criminal Justice Law of Lagos is only applicable in Lagos State. 
43 See Section 3.2.2.2, Infra 
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Fortunately, with the subsequent enactment of the ACJA, the issue of 
multiplicity of legislation has been partly resolved.44 However, there is still 
some notable brevity in the provisions of the ACJA, which still leaves room 
for the negative effects that stem from a multiplicity of interpretation as a 
result of ambiguities.45 
3.2.2.2 Structure of the Nigeria Police Force  
The Nigeria Police Force is established by Section 214 of the Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999,46 and by Section 3 of the Police Act 
1945, both of which provide that there shall be only one police force in 
operation in Nigeria. 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, the command structure of the Nigeria 
Police Force is centralised, and is under the control of the Inspector-General of 
Police.47 
In considering the structure of the Nigeria Police Force as a shortcoming in the 
transition of rights from theory to practice, it ought to be pointed out that the 
structure of the force has remained relatively unchanged since it was 
established in 1945.48 In the years since then, other factions of government, 
 
44 See generally, Section 2.3.6, Chapter 2, Supra, for a detailed discussion of the ACJA and its 
effect on the legislative framework of Nigeria. 
45 See Section 2.3.6, Chapter 2, Supra 
46 Hereinafter “CFRN” 
47 See Section 2.2.2.1, Chapter 2, Supra 
48 For a detailed discussion of the history of the police in Nigeria, see, generally, T. N. 
Tamuno, The Police in Modern Nigeria 1861 – 1965 (Ibadan, 1970); T. O. Elias, Nigeria: The 
Development of its Laws and Constitution (Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1967); D. F. Atidoga “The 
Nigeria Police, Human Right Violation and Corruption: The Need for Re-Orientation” (2009) 
Vol. 8 (2), UJLJ, 130; and O. C. Arisukwu, “Policing Trends in Nigeria since Independence 
(1960-2012)” (2012) Pol. J. 151 
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indeed, the entire nation, has been restructured and Nigeria now operates a 
federal system of government. 
Looking specifically at the parties to the criminal process in Nigeria, including 
the courts system and the Ministries of Justice, there is a federal system in 
place: the courts in Nigeria are divided into state courts and federal courts, and 
there is a clearly delineated hierarchy and working relationship between the 
different state and federal courts. There is also a clearly delineated hierarchy 
and working relationship between the Ministries of Justice of the thirty-six 
states and the Federal Ministry of Justice. Also, with the exception of the 
criminal offences specifically listed under Section 251(3) of the 1999 CFRN, 
as falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, an 
overwhelming majority of cases involving criminal matters are instituted and 
adjudicated upon at the different State High Courts. 
The only party to the criminal process in Nigeria that continues to operate 
under a centralised or unitary system is the police. Indeed, a cursory 
comparison with other notable, well-known, federations across the world 
would seem to suggest that Nigeria is the only federation which currently 
exists with one centralised police force in operation;49 a point buttressed 
severally by Sekoni, Ekweremadu and Ogbodo.50 
 
49 Well known federations such as India, the United States of America, Germany, Australia, 
Brazil, the United Arab Emirates, for example, all have more than one police force operating 
within their jurisdiction. 
50 Ropo Sekoni, “Unitary Police System: Beyond First-Line Charge”, available at 
http://thenationonlineng.net/unitary-police-system-beyond-first-line-charge/, last accessed 20-
05-2015; Senator Ike Ekweremadu, “Policing and National Security in Nigeria: the Choices 
Available Before Us”, available at http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/policing-and-national-
security-in-nigeria-the-choices-before-us/143666, last accessed 20-05-2015; and Dele 
Ogbodo, “Arguments against State Police Absurd”, available at 
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It is not herewith suggested that the operation of a federal police structure, or 
multiple police forces is axiomatic within federal states. On the contrary, it is 
only humbly submitted that, regardless of the command structure of the police, 
the only thing required for effective governance and crime control, is a 
properly delineated working relationship with the other arms of government 
and parties to the criminal process. However, this has not been found to be the 
case in Nigeria. The relevant provisions of the CFRN and the Police Act 
clearly state the command structure of the Nigeria Police Force, but there are 
no provisions governing the relationship of the NPF with any of the other 
parties involved in the criminal justice sector. Additionally, there have been 
other problems and shortcomings that have arisen out of the attempt to operate 
a unitary, centralised police force within a federal state. As Dambazau notes, 
in its current organisation, the Nigeria Police Force is “over-centralized.”51 He 
explains the use of the term by explaining, “There is too much control of 
resources at the centre without adequate system of distribution. This is why no 
matter the amount of money spent on the acquisition of resources that would 
enable the organisation function effectively, not much is felt at the level of the 
Divisional Headquarters.”52 
Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of operating a single, centralised police force 
that directly affects the pre-trial stage of proceedings and the smooth transition 
of rights to practice is the probability of an officer being transferred from one 
state command to another, an occurrence with a very high incidence rate in 
 
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/arguments-against-state-police-absurd/123602/, last 
accessed on 20-05-2015 
51 A. B. Dambazau, Law and Criminality in Nigeria: An Analytical Discourse (University 
Press, 1994), pp 155 - 156 
52 Ibid 
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Nigeria.53 Usually, when an officer is transferred from one command to 
another, the cases being investigated by this officer are transferred to another 
officer who may not be familiar with the case; occasionally too, the case may 
be abandoned, and this usually results in an accused person being detained 
well beyond the constitutionally-sanctioned maximum detention period, as a 
result of the Nigeria Police Force’s oft-reliance on an arrest-first policy when 
investigating crimes.54 This is an automatic violation of the right to liberty and 
a freedom from unlawful detention, as provided for by Section 35 of the 1999 
CFRN, because contrary to the provisions thereto, persons are very often 
arrested without being informed of the reasons for their arrest, as was also 
reported by Ajomo and Okagbue.55 
3.2.2.3 Power of the Nigeria Police Force to Prosecute Offences 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, Section 23 of the Police Act gives the 
Nigeria Police Force (hereinafter “NPF”) the power to prosecute offences, 
subject to the constitutional provisions in Sections 174 and 211 of the 1999 
CFRN, which enshrine the power of prosecution generally in the Attorneys-
General of the Federation and of the thirty-six (36) states, and members of 
their office. 
 
53 A point raised by Frank Agbedo in Frank Agbedo, Rights of Suspects and Accused Persons 
under Nigerian Criminal Law (Crown Law Publications, 2009), p215. See also, the findings 
of the empirical study conducted by the researcher, in Section 3.4, below. 
54 Amnesty International has reported this arrest-first mentality in two country reports on 
Nigeria. See Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Prisoners’ Rights Systematically Flouted" 
(2008) AFR 44/001/2008, p7; and Amnesty International, “’Welcome to Hell Fire’: Torture 
and other Ill-Treatment in Nigeria” (2014) AFR 44/011/2014, p7. Also, for more on the arrest-
first mentality adopted by the NPF, see Section 3.3.4.1 below 
55 Ajomo and Okagbue, n11, p 106. According to the findings of their study, suspects were 
very rarely informed of the reasons of their arrest at the appropriate time stipulated by law. 
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This provision has been subject to judicial debate, and while the power to 
institute or continue already-instituted proceedings at the High Court is 
seemingly dependent on jurisdiction, in practice, the NPF are responsible for 
the institution and prosecution of the majority of criminal proceedings at the 
magistrate court.56 
The first intrinsic shortcoming of this provision is one which has the potential 
to upset the balance of the trial-centred approach of adversarialism and thwart 
the need for of fairness and equality in the presentation of their respective 
cases by opposing parties, which is the bedrock of the adversarial system. 
Vesting the power to prosecute in the police creates an unfortunate situation 
wherein the power to investigate offences and gather evidence is vested in the 
same body that has the power to prosecute the majority of offences. 
This is an argument that, in the absence of any data coming out of Nigeria to 
corroborate same, but by juxtaposing the devolution of the role of review of 
the custody officer in England to a merely academic role, and extrapolating 
same to the Nigerian situation, the vesting of both the powers of investigation 
and prosecution in the same body would most likely result in a situation 
wherein the police would fail to thoroughly investigate an offence on the 
merits, and would only strive to generate only enough evidence to secure a 
conviction.57 It is difficult for this writer to see a situation where an 
investigating officer would not want to be viewed as playing on the same side 
as his fellow officer who has been tasked with prosecuting the offence. 
 
56 See Section 2.2.2.1, Chapter 2, Supra. 
57 Nmerole very briefly highlights this possibility, but does not evaluate the argument 
thoroughly. See Celestine I. Nmerole, Police Interrogation in Criminal Investigation 
(Historical, Legal & Comparative Analysis) (Halygraph, 2008), pp 32 - 34 
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Again, there are possibilities for the accused’s rights to be infringed upon by 
the transfer of an officer from one state command to another, before the 
conclusion of prosecution. In light of the frequency of transfer of officers from 
one state command to another, it is contended that a transfer of an officer 
before the conclusion of prosecution results in the continued and prolonged 
detention of an accused person who has not yet been convicted of the offence 
he is alleged to have committed, especially as the case would be required to 
commence de novo.  
The majority of prosecution-related issues, it is conceded, admittedly fall 
outside the ambit of this thesis, by basis of the fact that it concerns the next 
stage of the criminal process, the trial, and not the pre-trial stage. 
There is, however, a shortcoming that stems from the power of the police to 
prosecute offences that affects the delivery of rights from theory to practice at 
the pre-trial stage, and this is a phenomenon colloquially referred to in 
Nigerian jurisprudence as the “holding charge”. Although not specifically 
defined in the Constitution or any statutory instrument, it refers to an 
application, similar to a remand order, brought by the police before the 
magistrates’ court alleging that, although the court may lack the jurisdiction to 
entertain the substantive suit for the offence the accused is alleged to have 
committed, in the event that it is an indictable offence, that they (the police) 
have yet to conclude their investigation, and are therefore seeking an order to 
remand the accused person in continued detention until such a time as they are 
able to conclude their investigation, and transfer the file to the Director of 
Public Prosecutions, or a member of the Attorney-General’s office. 
Alternatively, the police would arraign a person frivolously, it is opined, 
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before the magistrate’s court on suspicion of having committed an indictable 
offence, which would result in the court suo motu declaring that it lacked 
jurisdiction to deliberate on the matter, but would consequently order the 
accused to remain in detention until he can be arraigned before a court of 
competent jurisdiction. 
Although this phenomenon of the holding charge is not expressly provided for 
by any statutory instrument in Nigeria, and has been the subject of judicial 
debate, albeit an inconclusive one,58 the use of the application has continued to 
be proliferated.59 Interestingly enough, oftentimes when the holding charge is 
granted to the police, there is no review of the detention period, and the 
accused person could wind up being detained for unconscionably long periods 
of time, sometimes even longer than the maximum detention period if they 
would have been convicted of having committed the offence in the substantive 
suit. 
As pointed out in a report by Amnesty International, this proliferated use of 
the holding charge tends to be abused, and has resulted in a situation where the 
police, desirous of being seen as doing their job of controlling crime, would 
opt for what is seemingly the ‘easier’ route of gathering only enough evidence 
to make an application for the holding charge and abandon a suspect in 
custody indefinitely, rather than to properly investigate and gather enough 
evidence as to have the case tried on its merits and potentially have an accused 
acquitted.60 It is contended that if prosecution and the interest in securing a 
 
58 Dele Peters, “The Place of The Holding Charge in Nigeria’s Criminal Jurisprudence”, 
(2004) Nigerian Current Legal Problems, vol. 4 & 5, p. 252 
59 Ibid 
60 Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Prisoners’ Rights Systematically Flouted", n54, p 8 
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conviction were not vested in the police, there would be a separation of 
interests, and the police could potentially approach investigation of offences 
from a more impartial standpoint. 
This point seems to be buttressed by an examination of the phenomenon of 
police prosecution as once obtained in England. A brief historical jaunt would 
reveal that four decades ago, in England, the issue of separating the powers of 
prosecution and investigation was the subject of academic debate. Prior to the 
coming into force of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, and the 
subsequent establishment of the Crown Prosecution Service, the Police were 
responsible for the prosecution of offences in England; police officers would 
appear by themselves in Magistrates courts, and would employ barristers and 
solicitors to represent them at the Crown court. 
In its report The Prosecution Process in England and Wales (1970), JUSTICE 
recommended that the powers of investigation and prosecution be separated, 
and called for the establishment of an independent prosecution body. It was 
the recommendations contained in this 1970 report that ultimately led to the 
promulgation of the Prosecution of Offences Act. The main reasons for the 
Committee’s recommendations were as follows: 
(a) The honest, zealous and conscientious police officer who has satisfied 
himself that the suspect is guilty becomes psychologically committed to 
prosecution and thus to successful prosecution. 
(b) The decision to prosecute does not and should not always fall to be 
determined solely by the likelihood of a conviction. Public policy and 
individual circumstances are rightly to be taken into account. 
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(c) The English system is the only one in Europe where the interrogation 
of suspects, the interviewing of witnesses, the gathering and testing of 
scientific evidence, the selection of evidence to be laid before the court, 
the decision as to what charges shall be brought and the conduct of the 
prosecution are in the majority of cases effectively under the control of 
the police. 
(d) The question of whether to prosecute partakes of the nature of a 
judicial decision, since, although the accused may eventually be 
acquitted, the bringing of a charge on insufficient evidence can have 
disastrous consequences on a man’s domestic life and career, 
particularly if he is held in custody pending trial. It is difficult for 
investigators to achieve the necessary detachment and unfair to expect 
them to do so 
(e) Once a prosecution is commenced the extent of police involvement – in 
terms of prestige, fear of public criticism, particularly if there is a risk 
of an award of costs against the prosecution, and the possibility of an 
action for malicious prosecution – may, perhaps unconsciously, 
influence the decision as to whether the prosecution ought to be 
dropped. 
(f) The dominance of the police in the prosecution process exposes them 
to temptation. They make [sic] seek or be prepared to bargain with a 
suspect, promising to refrain from prosecuting: or to “let him down 
lightly” or to “put in a good word with the court”: or to grant him bail 
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(or not to oppose it) or not to prosecute his wife. The risk of abuse, 
however well-intentioned the motive, is manifest in such a situation. 
(g) Cases do occur in which pressure is brought on counsel to take a hard 
line against his better judgment. 
(h) Sometimes the police do not disclose relevant information which may 
on occasion be of material assistance to the accused. The possibility of 
deliberate non-disclosure to try and ensure a conviction cannot be 
ignored. We would refer in this connection to the JUSTICE report, 
“The availability of Prosecution Evidence to the Defence”. 
(i) It is impossible for the police to be adequately trained as lawyers and 
advocates, nor should the attempt be made, especially as there is a 
grave shortage of police for proper police duties. Lawyers, by reason 
of their training and experience, are much better qualified for these 
tasks.61 
These recommendations were met with some initial criticism,62 but ultimately, 
the powers of investigation and prosecution were separated, and the CPS was 
established to oversee prosecutions in England. It is thus reiterated that if the 
powers of prosecution and investigation were separated in Nigeria, there 
would be a less blatant denial of an accused’s rights to a fair trial, particularly 
those that exist at the detention stage. 
 
61 These reasons were reiterated in the 1979 JUSTICE report, Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure: 
Police Powers and the Prosecution Process, paragraph 65. 
62 See, for example, the arguments raised in White, R. “A Public Prosecution Service for 
England and Wales” and West, R. “Police Superintendents and the Prosecution of Offences” 
in Benyon, J. and Bourn, C. (Eds.), The Police: Powers, Procedures and Proprieties, 
Pergamon Press, 1986, pp. 196 – 210 and 224 – 229. 
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The recent enactment of the ACJA has offered the debate on the power of the 
police to prosecute no favours, as it has now, by virtue of the provisions of 
Sections 293 to 299 thereto, seemingly legitimised the phenomenon of the 
holding charge in Nigerian law. 
According to the provisions of the ACJA, an application may be brought 
before a magistrate court seeking the continued remand of a person, pending 
legal advice from the office of the Attorney-General, or requisite prosecution 
body,63 even if the substantive offence for which the suspect is alleged to have 
committed is ultra vires the jurisdiction of the magistrate court.64 This 
application is to be made ex parte,65 and if successful, may be remanded for a 
period not exceeding fourteen (14) days,66 although this remand period is 
renewable for a second period also not exceeding fourteen (14) days.67 At the 
expiration of this remand period, where the suspect has still not been charged 
at the appropriate court, the magistrate court shall issue a hearing notice on the 
Inspector-General of Police or the Attorney-General of the Federation so as to 
inquire as to the position of the case, and also to “show cause why the suspect 
remanded should not be unconditionally released”, and thereafter adjourn the 
matter for a subsequent period not exceeding fourteen (14) days, with the 
accused remaining in detention.68 
 
63 Section 294, ACJA 
64 Section 293(1), ACJA 
65 Section 293(2). This is arguably an axiomatic violation of the principle of equality of arms, 
as the accused’s counsel, assuming he has one, cannot protest the continued detention of his 
client. 
66 Section 296(1), ACJA 
67 Section 296(2), ACJA 
68 Section 296(4) 
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Where good cause is shown, the magistrate court may extend the remand 
period for a final period not exceeding fourteen (14) days to allow for the 
arraignment of the accused before the appropriate court vested with competent 
jurisdiction to try the suspect.69 At the end of this final period, where the trial 
of the accused has still not commenced, the magistrate court shall discharge 
the suspect and order him to be released immediately from custody.70 The 
overall effect of the provisions of the ACJA highlighted hitherto is that failing 
to arraign a person in court within the constitutionally sanctioned period of 
forty-eight (48) hours, it is now possible, by law, to detain a person in Nigeria 
for an additional fifty-six (56) days without filing a formal charge against the 
person, which means that it is possible to detain a person for a maximum of 
fifty-eight (58) days without formally charging him with the commission of an 
offence. 
Without launching into a tirade on a subject which is probably well understood 
by any person who has studied human rights and liberties, even on a 
perfunctory level, it is suggested that a detention period of fifty-eight (58) 
days without charge is most certainly a violation of an accused person’s right 
to liberty. At present, there is no data to suggest how this provision of the 
ACJA will be delivered in practice, but it seems that, even on a purely 
theoretical basis, it does not make for adequate protection of the right to 
liberty as guaranteed by Section 35 of the 1999 CFRN, although it is conceded 
that if managed effectively, this provision might serve to decongest the 
 
69 Section 296(5)(a), ACJA 
70 Section 296(6), ACJA 
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prisons, because it vests in the magistrate court the power to review the 
remand order. 
Previously, before the enactment of the ACJA, when a remand order was 
issued on a successful application of the holding charge, the suspect is in a 
limbo of sorts, because no court is properly seised of his matter, and there was 
no statutory obligation to have the order reviewed.71 
Thus, as it stands, although the provisions of the ACJA concerning remand 
orders poses a threat to the right to liberty, it might very well prove, in time, to 
be a necessary evil with greater potential to improve the system than bring it to 
deterioration. 
3.2.2.4 Infrastructural Insufficiencies 
There are several other intrinsic shortcomings of the Nigerian framework that 
are not directly related to the legal framework, but are shortcomings of the 
infrastructural insufficiencies of the institutional framework which affect the 
delivery of the rights in practice. 
In their study, Ajomo and Okagbue found, for example, that there were a 
series of infrastructural shortcomings which prevented the police from 
effectively performing their duties and responsibilities.72 Of the thirty-nine 
(39) stations in the study, for example, only 60.5 per cent of police 
respondents claimed that their stations were fitted with telephones, and only 
67.6 per cent had the requisite transportation services to enable them perform 
 
71 Open Society Justice Initiative, “Lawyer at the Police Station Door: How REPLACE 
Provides Legal Aid in Nigeria” (2015), available at 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/briefing-papers/lawyer-police-station-door-how-
replace-provides-legal-aid-nigeria, last accessed on 04-08-2015 
72 Ajomo and Okagbue, n11, Supra 
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adequately perform their duties.73 These figures, according to the authors, 
were viewed as exaggerated figures upon observation, with the realities being 
a lot worse.74 Admittedly, this study is over twenty-five (25) years old, and as 
such becomes ever more unreliable in terms of painting an accurate picture of 
the infrastructural shortcomings, but there is a general consensus that there are 
several infrastructural insufficiencies which plague the police stations across 
Nigeria and affect the smooth delivery of rights in practice.75 
The most significant shortcoming, which occurs as a result of the 
infrastructural insufficiencies of the institutional framework in Nigeria, is an 
apparent over-reliance on confessional statements by the police in order to 
secure a conviction. This is due mostly to the fact that the Nigeria Police Force 
are not equipped with the proper technological tools and skills to gather the 
relevant evidence. This might be due in part to the general understaffing of the 
police force,76 and also as a result of the fact that there is only one forensic 
laboratory on record as belonging to the Nigeria Police across the length and 
breadth of the nation; another side-effect of the centralised nature of the 
Nigeria Police Force.77 This fact, quite simply, means that there is a lot of time 
lost between collecting physical and/or ballistic samples, transporting same to 
and from the forensic laboratory, and testing said samples to arrive at a 
conclusion. It is also assumed that, with one forensic laboratory providing its 
 
73 Ibid, at pp 101 - 102 
74 Ibid 
75 See Mark Amaza, “The Unending State Police Debate”, available at 
http://nigerianstalk.org/2012/11/27/the-unending-state-police-debate-mark-amaza/, last 
accessed on 20-05-2015. Also see the discussions by Sekoni, Ekweremadu and Ogbodo, n 50, 
Supra 
76 Ibid 
77 A. B. Dambazau, Law and Criminality in Nigeria, n 51. The fact that there is only one 
forensic laboratory belonging to the NPF was also ascertained during the empirical study 
conducted by the researcher. 
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services to the police force, there must be a backlog of samples waiting to be 
tested which, for time-sensitive materials, might affect the veracity of the 
findings; and also carry the implication that suspects spend protracted periods 
of time in detention awaiting the conclusion of testing, especially in light of 
the arrest-first mentality displayed by the Nigeria Police Force, as shall be 
discussed below.78 
Further to this, there was the mode of recording statements of suspects, and 
the issues surrounding this action. Prior to the passing of the ACJA 2015 into 
law, and with no express provisions to the contrary in the CPA and the CPC, 
the general practice was for all statements of accused persons to be recorded in 
writing, in English language. This is partly attributable to the fact that, prior to 
the amendment of the Evidence Act in Nigeria, in 2011, audio and video 
recordings were not admissible in court.79 In situations where the accused can 
neither speak nor write in English language, his statement is to be taken by an 
interpreter, translated and written down in English language, and the statement 
form signed by the accused person and countersigned by the interpreter. 
There are some obvious risks to recording interrogations and interviews in 
writing only, or relying solely on confessional statements. As Shepherd 
contends: “…a written statement is a heavily, selectively edited version of 
 
78 See Section 3.3.4.1, Infra 
79 Section 84 of the Evidence Act stipulates that electronic evidence is admissible, and this 
was defined as including video evidence in Prince Edward Eweka & Ors v. Asonmwonriri 
Rawson (alias AAU Eweka) & Ors [2000] 10 NWLR (pt. 722) 723 
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what the witness [or accused] said, expressed in the formal language of 
written text….”80  
He goes further to highlight that, in the absence of a recording, it is impossible 
to know 
• whether the officer interviewed inappropriately, influenced, 
shaped or contaminated the witness’s account; 
• whether the interview was an exercise in confirmation rather 
than being truly investigative; 
• whether the officer failed to register, or dismissed potentially 
relevant detail; 
• whether there were anomalies in what the witness said, or 
didn’t say; 
• whether the officer’s compression of detail into a written 
statement has omitted detail that now or later could prove vital 
to the investigation81 
Also, rather interestingly, in the absence of any formal requirement for 
arrested persons to be informed of their rights verbally in Nigeria, the standard 
form for recording confessional statements is supposed to contain a cautionary 
statement reminding and advising accused persons that they are not under any 
obligation to make any statements, but are only to do so voluntarily. However, 
 
80 Eric Shepherd, Investigative Interviewing: The Conversation Management Approach 
(Oxford, 2007), p13. 
81 Ibid. For more on interviewing methods, and the associated advantages and disadvantages 
also see, generally, Don Rabon, Investigative Discourse Analysis (Carolina 1994); Don Rabon 
and Tanya Chapman, Interviewing and Interrogation (2nd Edition, Carolina, 2009); and Stan 
B. Walters, The Truth About Lying: How to Spot a Lie and Protect Yourself from Deception 
(Sourcebooks, 2000) 
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in practice, the words forming the caution statement are very often 
inconsistent from form to form, even within the same police station.82  
In contrast with the current practice in Nigeria, interviews in England are 
recorded with the use of audio, and where necessary, audio-visual recording 
devices, and the procedure for the recording of interviews is clearly delineated 
in Codes C, E and F of PACE,83 which stipulates that interviews are generally 
to be conducted following the cautioning of the suspect, and provides a 
detailed recording procedure, which leaves very little room for ambiguities. As 
it were, this appears to buttress the importance of a clearly delineated and 
detailed framework. 
In extending the comparison beyond the current practices and analysing the 
pre-PACE era, it would appear that there are lessons to be learned from the 
developmental process from Nigeria. 
As is common knowledge, before the coming into force of PACE, the rights of 
accused persons and suspects, as well as the rules regulating the questioning of 
suspects, were provided for by the Judges’ Rules, which were laid down by 
judges, not Parliament, and as such lacked the force of law. The Judges’ Rules 
were generally ineffective in protecting suspects’ rights, and there was a 
proliferation of corruption which manifested itself in the development of 
 
82 Appendices 5 and 6 to this thesis, at pp 242 – 245, Infra, are sample confessional statement 
forms obtained at the same police station. The cautionary statement on the more detailed form 
in Appendix 5 can hardly be said to constitute a valid act of informing an accused of his 
rights, but is very often the most information a person might receive before his interrogation 
commences. It poses the yet unanswered question as to what happens to a person who cannot 
read or understand English language. How does he understand the words of the caution 
printed at the top of the page?  
83 See paragraphs 10 – 12 (inclusive) of PACE Code C. 
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unscrupulous or inadequate interviewing practices, which resulted in the 
reduction of public confidence in the police as a result of these bad practices. 
Following the establishment of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 
(RCCP), the starting point of the RCCP’s discussion was the concept of a 
fundamental balance in society between the “interests of the community in 
bringing offenders to justice and the rights and liberties of persons suspected 
or accused of crime.”84 The RCCP believed it was “essential that the public 
should have confidence in the way the police go about the process of 
investigation so that ordinary citizens will continue to co-operate in the 
process.”85 
The extant laws in the pre-PACE era held that any statement made by a 
suspect had to be voluntary, but the research studies for the RCCP had shown 
that custody was inherently coercive and that legal and psychological concepts 
of voluntariness did not match.  
The following were the seven main proposals expressed by the RCCP for 
regulating custodial questioning: 
i. All aspects of treatment of a suspect in custody, including the 
conduct of interviews, should be regulated by statute, to update and 
extend the scope of the current provisions; 
ii. There would be no alteration to the suspect's right to remain silent; 
iii. Steps were to be taken to improve the note-taking skills of officers 
and in addition they recommended the gradual introduction of tape 
recording; 
 
84 Report of the RCCP, p 4 
85 Report of the RCCP, p 20, para 2.18 
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iv. The right of access to legal advice should be made effective 
through the introduction of duty solicitor schemes; 
v. All suspects should have the right to have someone notified of their 
arrest; 
vi. Juveniles and other special groups such as the mentally 
handicapped would be interviewed only in the presence of an 
appropriate adult; and 
vii. A Code of Practice for the regulation of interviews should be 
included in the statute regulating the treatment of suspects in 
custody.86 
The foregoing proposals of the RCCP were subsumed into the provisions of 
PACE, but it is noteworthy that both the CPA and CPC are conspicuously 
bereft of any provisions relating to the proposals above, and corruption 
continues to thrive at the custodial stage in Nigeria.87 
Fortunately, with the enactment of the ACJA 2015, the risks involved with 
reducing a confessional statement to writing have been dispensed with, as 
Section 15(4) thereto now requires that all interviews and interrogations of 
arrested persons at the police station must be recorded with the aid of audio-
visual equipment. This would indeed be a welcome development in not just 
the quest to better protect the rights of accused persons at the pre-trial stage, 
but the entire criminal justice system in Nigeria. However, given the fact that 
 
86 For more on the foregoing, see “The Psychological and Legal Principles of Investigative 
Interviewing: A History – Unethical behaviour by Interrogators: Judges' Rules and the 
Development of PACE”, available at http://compass.port.ac.uk/UoP/file/523ed20e-e5f7-4eef-
b813-
b70374334711/1/The%20Psychological%20and%20Legal%20Principles%20of%20Investigat
ive%20Interviewing%20A%20History_IMSLRN.zip/page_02.htm, last accessed on 16-08-
2018 
87 See Chapter 3.3.4.2 below 
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the age of the act, and the lack of the required audio-visual equipment in every 
police station across the state, coupled with a scepticism borne out of the 
bureaucracy and red tape present in operating a centralised police force, a 
sentiment shared by Dambazau and Adediji,88 it is opined that this new 
provision is perhaps a long way away from full implementation. It may take a 
few years to have every police station, in every nook and cranny, of every 
state command in Nigeria, outfitted with the necessary equipment to properly 
record interviews and interrogations in the proper manner, as stipulated by 
Section 15(4) of the ACJA 2015. 
To further compound the situation, another intrinsic shortcoming is the 
absence of a properly delineated framework for the provision of interpretation 
and translation services. As has been made abundantly clear in this thesis, all 
the relevant legislation and statutory instruments governing the pre-trial stage 
and the rights accruing to an accused person in Nigeria all expressly provide 
that the entire process to determine a person’s innocence or guilt be performed 
in a language that he understands. At all stages of the criminal process, 
particularly at the pre-trial stage, for the purposes of this thesis, no attempt is 
made to deny the existence of an accused person’s right to interpretation. It is 
therefore shocking that there is no framework for the provision of these 
interpretation services in Nigeria. 
In England, there is a framework agreement in operation for the provision of 
interpretation services, albeit a much maligned one that has its shortcomings. 
In Nigeria, on the other hand, there is no register of accredited interpreters or a 
 
88 A. B. Dambazau, n 51, Supra; and Banji Oyeniran Adedeji, “Management Paradox of 
Nigeria’s Diversities: Oscillation Between Centralization and Decentralization”, in B. O. 
Adedeji (Ed.), Deeper Insight into Nigeria’s Public Administration (AuthorHouse, 2013) 
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recognised body that provides interpretation services for that matter. This 
negatively affects not just the delivery of an accused person’s rights in 
practice, but indeed the overall fairness of the criminal process. Issues arise in 
relation to the availability of interpreters and whether they are as adept in 
reading and writing as they are in communicating verbally as well as in 
relation to having the ability to verify the authenticity of the language being 
interpreted or translated?  
The last intrinsic infrastructural insufficiency that poses a shortcoming to the 
delivery of the rights in practice is in relation to detention conditions of 
arrested persons. Prior to the enactment of the ACJA, there were no express 
provisions concerning the conditions of detention, although Section 34 of the 
1999 CFRN establishes the right of every man to be treated with dignity. The 
subsequent enactment of the ACJA still fails to expressly provide for 
conditions of detention, although Section 8 thereto provides that a person who 
is arrested on suspicion of committing an offence should be accorded humane 
treatment. However, a direct consequence of the proliferation of the Holding 
Charge is an overcrowding of the detention cells in the police stations.89 
Occasionally, in applying for the holding charge, the police officers may apply 
that the accused be remanded in prison custody, in an attempt to create space 
in the detention cells at the prison.90 With the enactment of the ACJA, and the 
apparent legitimisation of the holding charge therein, it is now a stipulation of 
the law that all persons who are remanded under a holding charge order be 
 
89 See Dele Peters, n58, Supra; and E. I. Alemika, “Pre-Trial Detention and Prison Congestion 
in Nigeria” (1986-1990) Vol. 3 UJLJ, 120 
90 See Section 3.4.4 and Appendix 2 to this thesis, for a detailed discussion of this. 
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remanded in prison custody.91 Prisons in Nigeria are already overcrowded and 
heavily congested as a result of this,92 with the conditions of detention being 
anything but humane;93 in this environment the ability of suspects to exercise 
their rights in an effective way becomes highly dubious. 
It derives from the above that the exercise of suspects’ rights in Nigeria is 
fraught with complexity, particularly as a result of the police force being 
vested with a significant level of discretion as a result of the lack of precision 
concerning most rights, and as a result of the lack of appropriate mechanisms 
to ensure police accountability. 
3.2.2.5 Legal Aid Scheme 
Perhaps the most important shortcoming to the framework is the limited nature 
of the legal aid scheme. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the current 
framework establishing the legal aid scheme axiomatically creates a right that 
is not generally acceptable to all persons. According to the provisions of the 
Legal Aid Act 2011, legal aid in Nigeria is only available to persons who earn 
less than the minimum wage,94 and legal representation is only available to a 
suspect in cases where he is alleged to have committed any of a mere nine (9) 
 
91 Sections 294(1) and 299, ACJA 
92 According to the International Centre for Prison Studies, there are a total number of 57,121 
inmates in Nigerian prisons, which, according to official population capacity figures (as at 31-
10-2014), is 113.9% of the prisons. Of these, 69.3% are pre-trial/remand inmates who have 
yet to be tried, let alone convicted of any offence. See, “ICPS: Nigeria”, available at 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/nigeria, last accessed on 13-06-2015 
93 United Nations Economic and Social Council, “Civil and Political Rights, Including the 
Question of Disappearances and Summary Executions: Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions”, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Philip Alston, Mission to Nigeria. (2006) 
E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.4, pp. 18-19, 23. See also, the Amnesty International reports on Nigeria, 
n54, Supra 
94 Section 10(1), Legal Aid Act 2011 
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offences.95 Thus, in situations where the suspect is arrested for the alleged 
commission of an offence which is not among those listed in the Legal Aid 
Act as falling under the purvey of the Legal Aid Council, or where a person 
earns above the minimum wage, he cannot seek free legal representation from 
the Legal Aid Council. 
Even where it is deemed that a person is eligible for assistance from the Legal 
Aid Council, the Legal Aid Council of Nigeria has been grossly underfunded 
and understaffed since its inception. There are currently only six (6) Local 
Government offices, thirty-seven (37) State offices (including the FCT) and 
the Head Office.96 In a report published by the Human Rights Watch in 2004, 
it was reported that there was only one legal aid officer per state office.97 This 
number has since increased, but as of 2013, there are only two hundred and 
eighty (280) lawyers under the employ of the Legal Aid Council.98 From a 
purely logistical standpoint, it seems highly unfeasible that 280 lawyers would 
be able to adequately traverse the length and breadth of the expansive 
geographical terrain that is Nigeria. 
In a bid to combat the effects of such gross understaffing on the provision of 
legal representation to the indigent, the Legal Aid Council, in conjunction with 
 
95 Second Schedule to the Legal Aid Act 2011. Inchoate offences in respect of the nine 
substantive offences listed are also entitled to legal aid. 
96 See “Legal Aid Council of Nigeria: Organisation Structure”, available at 
http://www.legalaidcouncil.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=54&Ite
mid=141, last accessed on 18-10-2014 
97 http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/nigeria0904/6.htm, last accesed on 22-03-2015 




news, last accessed on 31-01-2015; and “Legal Aid Council seeks 1,000 Lawyers from SURE-
P”, available at http://nationalmirroronline.net/new/legal-aid-council-seeks-1000-lawyers-
from-sure-p/. last accessed on 30-09-2014 
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the Nigerian Bar Association, encourages legal practitioners in private practice 
to regularly take up cases pro bono. Additionally, members of the National 
Youth Service Corps (NYSC) who have trained and qualified as legal 
practitioners are often required to assist the Legal Aid Council in the provision 
of pro bono services as part of their one-year long mandatory national 
service.99 Despite these commendable steps being taken, the provision of legal 
representation remains at an unsatisfactory level; especially because, with 
regards to NYSC members on mandatory national service, the average 
throughput of criminal matters in Nigeria, from arraignment to judgment, 
often takes a lot longer than a year. Additionally, the operation of the Legal 
Aid Council at the pre-trial stage is greatly hampered by the absence of a duty 
solicitor scheme, or its equivalent, as is the case in England. 
In 2004, the Legal Aid Council, in partnership with a handful of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), created a framework for a schematic 
rolling-out of a public defender/duty solicitor scheme, involving four (4) 
lawyers per state on national service to provide legal advice to detained 
persons at the police stations.100 The initial arrangement sought to roll this 
duty solicitor scheme out in four (4) initial states at the time, but was recently 
expanded, in 2010, to six (6) states. Whilst the scheme has been mostly 
successful, and has secured the release and discharge of over ten thousand 
(10,000) persons from police and prison custody,101 it is again subject to the 
same logistical issues and problems that the Legal Aid Council itself faces: a 
 
99 David McQuoid-Mason, “Legal Aid in Nigeria: Using National Youth Service Corps Public 
Defenders to Expand the Services of the Legal Aid Council”, (2003) 47(1) JAL 107 
100 Open Society Justice Initiative, “Lawyer at the Police Station Door: How REPLACE 
Provides Legal Aid in Nigeria” (2015), n 71, Supra 
101 Ibid 
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total of four legal practitioners per state is anything but adequate to effectively 
offer legal advice at the police station. 
This state of affairs severely hampers the delivery of rights in practice. The 
legal and institutional framework in England is not sacrosanct, and has its own 
shortcomings, but they are not enough as to stifle the delivery of rights in 
practice.  
There are other factors which affect the transition of the detention rights from 
theory to practice in both jurisdictions, and these are factors which are related 
to the attitudes and cultures of the different parties to the pre-trial process. 
 
3.3 ATTITUDINAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROTECTION OF 
RIGHTS IN PRACTICE 
In light of the foregoing sections, it is important to begin this section by noting 
that the attitudes of the parties to the pre-trial process has the greatest effect on 
the proceedings and the transition of rights from theory to practice. 
As a result of laws being subject to interpretation, and the fact that the 
different frameworks exist to regulate interaction between the different parties 
to the process, it is perhaps an axiomatic assumption that the attitudes of the 
different parties involved would have an effect on the provision of the rights in 
practice. It is hypothesised that whether or not the frameworks are plagued 
with shortcomings, in a utopic world, if the parties involved in the process are 
determined to deliver the rights in practice, then the rights shall be delivered in 
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practice. However, as this is no utopia, and as has been discovered,102 there are 
a few attitudinal factors which also affect the transition of the pre-trial rights 
in both jurisdictions from theory to practice, in addition to the shortcomings of 
the framework themselves, as identified above.  
Before proceeding to assess these attitudinal factors, it is important to note 
that, in all the available literature on this issue, essentially, the attitudinal 
factors considered are done so primarily in relation to the provision of, or 
access to legal advice at the police station. It is however contended that these 
attitudinal factors can be juxtaposed against the other rights, to similar effect. 
Without belabouring this point much further, these attitudinal factors are: 
3.3.1 Ploys Employed to Ensure the Non-Observance of Rights 
Despite PACE, and Code of Practice C, prohibiting police officers from doing 
or saying anything to dissuade a person from seeking to uphold their rights, 
particularly the right to legal advice,103 empirical research undertaken in 
England has demonstrated that the police continue to seek to overcome the 
relevant prohibitions, particularly through persuading suspects to waive their 
rights and through the use of other ploys. 
One such ploy, as highlighted by Kemp, Balmer and Pleasance, involves the 
reading of their rights incompletely and/or incomprehensibly.104 Another ploy 
 
102 See Dixon’s Culturalist theory of law in policing, in David Dixon, Law in Policing, n17, pp 
9 – 20. The culturalist theory, as discussed in Chapter 2 above, is based on the assumption that 
procedural rules on their own are ineffective in controlling police behaviour; choosing instead 
to see the policeman as “a craftsman rather than as a legal actor… a skilled worker rather than 
as a civil servant obliged to subscribe to the rule of law.” 
103 See Paragraphs 3.26 and 6.4 of PACE Code of Practice C 
104 Vicky Kemp, Nigel J. Balmer, and Pascoe Pleasance, “Whose Time is it Anyway? Factors 
Associated with Duration in Police Custody” (2012) Crim. L. R. 736, at 746; and Vicky 
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that is sometimes employed, as pointed out by Skinns, is the police attempting 
to convince the detainee, via informal conversations, that given the severity of 
the alleged offence they were arrested for, the time spent waiting to receive 
legal advice, for example, might be unnecessary, and would only prolong the 
amount of time spent in detention, in a bid to stir up impatience at having their 
liberty withheld, and possibly waive their rights in an attempt to “get it over 
with”.105  
There have been recent developments, however, which are viewed as welcome 
steps towards discouraging police officers from engaging in such ploys, such 
as installing CCTV cameras and microphones within custody suites to monitor 
the activities therein.106 This requirement for activity to be monitored ought to 
dissuade officers and custody sergeants from the incomplete and 
incomprehensible reading of the detainee’s rights, and also to be impartial in 
their information of a detainee’s rights.107 
The study by Kemp also suggests that the arrangements for providing legal 
advice in the police station also had an effect on the take up of legal advice by 
detainees.108 In some of the stations, as Kemp discovered, lawyers were not 
allowed into the custody suite which, as she noted, meant that they were not 
visible to suspects whilst they were being booked, thereby reinforcing the 
perception or belief that waiting for the solicitors to arrive would pose a 
further delay, thereby prolonging their detention. Additionally, in some 
 
Kemp, “”No Time for a Solicitor”: Implications for Delays on the Take-Up of Legal Advice” 
(2013) Crim. L. R. 184, at 192 
105 Layla Skinns, n 6, at 24. See Also, Layla Skinns, n17, p116 
106 Vicky Kemp, n104, p192 
107 Ibid 
108 Ibid, pp195 – 196 
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stations, the custody sergeant would occasionally fail to inform the detainee 
that he could obtain legal advice over the telephone, which would also have 
the effect of reducing the rates of requests for legal advice.109 Some other 
ploys that are employed by the police include minimising the seriousness of 
the offence; manipulating the suspect's self-esteem; pretending to be in 
possession of more evidence than they actually have; pointing out the futility 
of denial; and telling the suspect that it was in his/her best interest to 
confess.110 
Despite the observance of these ploys in practice, it has frequently been 
conceded that given the existence of other factors and the cumulative effect on 
the take-up of legal advice, it is currently impossible to calculate the exact 
effect of the ploys employed by police officers in isolation from the other 
factors.111 However, it remains noteworthy that these ploys have the potential 
to affect the rates of request for legal advice, and indeed the provision of every 
other pre-trial right in practice. 
The attitudinal factors attributable to the police in Nigeria, by comparison, are 
potentially a lot worse than what obtains in England. The available literature 
on Nigeria makes no reference to, or contains any information that sheds light 
on, the use of ploys or lack thereof by the Nigeria Police Force. However, in a 
plethora of literature, ranging from reports from UN Special Rapporteurs and 
Amnesty International, to academic work and news publications, the Nigeria 
Police Force have allegedly shown utter disregard for human rights, and 
 
109 Ibid. See also, Layla Skinns, Police Custody, n 17, pp114-115 
110 See “The Psychological and Legal Principles of Investigative Interviewing: A History – 
Unethical behaviour by Interrogators: Judges' Rules and the Development of PACE”, n 86. 
111 Kemp, n 104 
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display a culture of widespread corruption and impunity.112 There have been 
reports of extra-judicial killings, acts of torture performed in a bid to extract 
confessions, and reports of people being detained in less than favourable 
conditions, and a host of other unspeakable acts. 
The implication of these different reports of these deplorable acts by the police 
are arguably attributable to a host of factors including, in addition to the 
infrastructural insufficiencies considered in previous sections, issues of the 
training process and training policies, corruption, and a general culture of 
disrespect and disregard for human rights. These are all factors which are 
indicative of attitudinal issues, and which coagulate to cause a breakdown of 
rights from theory to practice, and shall be discussed in Section 3.4, below. 
3.3.2 Suspects’ Attitudes 
In addition to the ploys employed by the police, there are attitudinal factors 
which affect the delivery of rights in practice which are attributable to the 
suspects themselves. 
 
112 See, generally, for example, Amnesty International reports, n54; United Nations Economic 
and Social Council, “Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Disappearances and 
Summary Executions: Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions”, n93; United Nations 
Human Rights Council, “Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development”, Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Manfred Nowak, Mission to Nigeria. (2007) A/HRC/7/3/Add.4; “Law 
Enforcement and Human Rights in Nigeria”, Proceedings of a Workshop for Investigating 
Police Officers in Nigeria, Organised by the Civil Liberties Organisation in Conjunction with 
the Nigeria Police Force (Innocent, C. and Ibidapo-Obe, A. (Eds.), Civil Liberties 
Organisation, 1994); Editorial, “Criminal Justice Sector: Canvassing for a Change”, Nigerian 
Law Times (July 2011); “The Nigerian Police Force: A Culture of Impunity”, a report by 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1992; and Atidoga, D. F., “The Nigeria Police, 
Human Right Violation and Corruption: The Need for Re-Orientation” (2009) Vol. 8 (2), 
UJLJ, 130 
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Skinns has written extensively on this subject,113 although, as highlighted 
earlier, her work centred on the take-up of legal advice at the station, and did 
not include the other pre-trial rights. However, as she pointed out, there are 
several suspect-related factors that could affect the take up of advice. Not all 
factors were deemed to be attitudinal, as certain socio-demographic factors 
such as age, sex and ethnicity were found to have an effect on the rates of 
request, albeit not significant effects.114 
There are a few other suspect-related factors with effect on the take-up of legal 
advice such as, for example, whether the suspects are intoxicated;115 however, 
there are four (4) major factors attributable to suspects’ attitudes that have an 
effect on the rate of request. 
The first of these attitudinal factors concerns the suspects’ perception of the 
severity of the offence they are alleged of committing. Skinns reports from her 
study that suspects arraigned on suspicion of committing misdemeanours were 
less likely to request, and receive legal advice.116 
Another factor was the suspects’ belief that requesting legal advice would 
amount to a silent confirmation of their guilt. Thus, in a bid to ‘maintain their 
innocence’, a lot of detainees would prefer to refrain from requesting legal 
advice. According to Skinns, it also worked the other way around.117 Some 
detainees, knowing they were guilty, would prefer to confess their 
wrongdoing; rather than cause ‘delay’ by requesting legal advice. 
 






Additionally, prior custodial experience of suspects has been shown to have a 
significant effect on a suspect’s take-up of his right to a solicitor. The effect, 
however is complex in nature. Perhaps conflictingly, Skinns reports that 
suspects with prior experience of custody and/or previous convictions 
generally express a belief that they know enough to get by without a solicitor, 
and are thus less likely to request advice.118 Phillips and Brown, on the other 
hand, found that those with prior custodial experience were in fact one and a 
half (1.5) times more likely to request pre-trial legal advice than those 
without.119 Skinns also suggests that inexperienced suspects, in terms of 
previous detention, would often request legal advice because they were scared. 
The fourth attitudinal factor is impatience and a desire to be released from 
detention. Several studies have found that suspects would occasionally refuse 
to request legal advice if they perceived that doing so would prolong their 
detention. Skinns refers to this factor as the “Let’s get it over with” 
mentality.120 The findings of her study seem to suggest that this impatience to 
wait for a solicitor to arrive is displayed by suspects regardless of prior 
custodial experience. Her findings also suggest that this mentality arises “…in 
part, because the police tell suspects that it takes longer if they have a legal 
adviser”, thereby establishing that some of the ploys employed by the police 
have some effect on the take up of legal advice by suspects. 
 
118 Ibid 
119 C. Phillips and D. Brown, Entry into the Criminal Justice System: A Survey of Police 
Arrests and their Outcomes (London: HMSO, 1998), cited in Layla Skinns, “The Right to 
Legal Advice in the Police Station: Past, Present and Future”, n6 
120 Skinns, n7. This term is coined from the words of one suspect under observation during her 
study, in response to being informed of his right to legal advice. 
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In light of these attitudinal factors, it ought to be noted that, even though the 
right to a fair trial, and by extension, the rights and safeguards available at the 
police station, is in itself an absolute right, it is possible for a suspect to waive 
his rights or to refrain from seeking to enforce them. The requirement for a 
valid waiver of one’s rights under ECHR jurisprudence is that it must be made 
voluntarily, and must constitute “a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of a 
right”.121 As a result, if suspects refrain from exercising their rights for any of 
the reasons highlighted above, but in the absence of any external influence or 
as a result of any ploys employed by the police, then it is deemed to be a valid 
waiver of the rights. However, whether or not the right is being waived in a 
valid way, a waiver of one’s rights has an effect on the overall transition of 
these rights from theory to practice. 
As hitherto mentioned above, there is a dearth of literature exploring the 
delivery of rights in practice in Nigeria, as a result of which it is impossible to 
compare the effect of the attitude of arrested persons in Nigeria and its effect 
on the delivery of the rights in practice. 
3.3.3 Relationships of the parties 
As has been expressed frequently throughout this thesis, the pre-trial process, 
and indeed the entire criminal justice system in both jurisdictions is of an 
adversarial nature. Naturally, this would mean that the different parties to the 
process on either side of the adversarial scale are prone to antagonising the 
parties on the other side. 
 
121 Pischalnikov v Russia, ECtHR judgment of 24 September, 2009 (unreported) 
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The relationship between parties on either side of the adversarial scale as a 
hindering factor in the delivery of rights in practice is perhaps not as pervasive 
in England as it is in Nigeria. 
There is little evidence to suggest that the relationship between the parties is of 
any effect in England. However, in Nigeria, there are widespread reports of 
open discord and distrust between the police and legal practitioners seeking to 
offer their services to detainees and arrested persons.122 Lawyers are 
frequently banned from the interrogation room, or denied time to consult in 
private with their clients. Generally, this is because the police and legal 
practitioners in Nigeria tend to view the other party as antithetical to the 
performance of their functions in the criminal process, as opposed to operating 
under a well-delineated adversarial system intent on uncovering the truth.123  
The relationship between the parties is not one that is expressly covered by 
any statutory provision, but it is argued that a clearly stated provision which 
does not expressly forbid lawyers from gaining access to the interrogation 
room, or being a part of the interrogation process would guarantee that an 
accused person could have his lawyer present, and therefore not axiomatically 
deny him access to his solicitor. In Nigeria, prior to the enactment of the 
ACJA, there was no express statutory provision permitting a lawyer to be 
present in the interrogation room, and legal practitioners could not 
successfully argue against being barred from the interrogation process. 
However, Section 17(2) of the ACJA now provides for the presence of a legal 
practitioner during interrogation.  
 
122 See Section 3.4, Infra 
123 Ibid 
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The provisions of Section 17(2), it is opined, are not sacrosanct, because 
despite providing and permitting for lawyers to be present during 
interrogation, the section, and indeed the entire Act, fail to establish a 
framework for the provision of the services of the legal practitioner. The 
provision, for example, fails to state on whom the onus to contact the lawyer 
rests. Despite this shortcoming, it is hoped that, in time, the provisions of 
Section 17(2) might be properly implemented. 
3.3.4 Other Attitudinal Factors 
There are two other attitudinal factors that have an effect on the delivery of the 
rights in practice in Nigeria. These factors are considered “other” factors 
because, it is contended that, although these factors affect the delivery of an 
accused’s rights in practice, these factors are not directly attributable to the 
parties involved in the process or the current legislative framework; there are 
other elements in play which are merely being manifested in the pre-trial stage 
and have an effect on the delivery of the rights in practice. It is perhaps worthy 
of note that there is no similar or comparable attitudinal factor in existence in 
England, and these factors are unique to the Nigerian pre-trial process. 
3.3.4.1 Arrest-first mentality 
The arrest-first mentality often displayed by the Nigeria Police Force presents 
additional challenges for the exercise of suspects’ rights in practice, 
particularly through a practice of making arrests without concluding 
investigations. In fact, arrests sometimes occur before any investigation has 
commenced; a simple complaint by a member of the public triggers the arrest. 
Persons may thus be arrested on account of breaching their civil duties, not for 
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committing an offence.124 Of equal concern is the practice of arresting a 
relative or close contact of the alleged offender, in lieu of the offender, where 
the police are unable to ascertain the whereabouts of the latter. 
Additionally, rather controversially, persons may be arrested without an 
offence having occurred, by virtue of a controversial provision in the CPA and 
CPC. Section 10(1)(i) and Section 26(g) of the CPA and CPC, respectively, 
give the police the power to arrest “any person who has no ostensible means of 
subsistence and who cannot give a satisfactory account of himself.” Thus, it is 
possible for the police to arrest persons without any reasonable belief of an 
offence being committed, simply because the arresting officer has made a 
determination that a person cannot give a satisfactory account of himself. 
The deleterious effects of this arrest-first mentality are manifold. The 
overcrowding of the already-limited detention cells at the police stations is an 
inevitable consequence. An additional implication is that the police are 
allowing themselves a maximum of forty-eight (48) hours to conduct and 
conclude investigations without running foul of the constitutionally sanctioned 
right to liberty.125 Save for the simplest of offences, it seems herculean to 
assume that it would be possible to thoroughly investigate the commission of 
an offence and gather enough evidence to arraign a person in court; or in the 
case of indictable offences, conduct investigations and transfer the file to the 
office of the Attorney-General of the relevant state to enable them to make a 
charging decision and arraign the suspect before a court of competent 
jurisdiction, all within the space of forty-eight (48) hours.  
 
124 Amnesty International report, n 54, p 8 
125 Section 35 of the 1999 CFRN 
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This exercise becomes further complicated where there is the need for forensic 
or ballistic testing, especially in view of the fact that there is only one forensic 
laboratory which serves the entire Nigeria Police Force.126 
Of course, it must be said that the ACJA has taken positive steps towards 
curbing this arrest-first mentality. It has repealed the power to arrest on the 
grounds of Section 10(1)(i) and 26(g) of the CPA and CPC, respectively, by 
omitting that provision from Sections 3, 4 and 18, which are the relevant 
provisions dealing with powers of arrest. Additionally, Section 7 of the ACJA 
expressly prohibits the arrest of a person in lieu of another. However, given 
that the ACJA has only recently been enacted, it is not yet determinable 
whether these provisions have had, or will have an effect on the arrest-first 
mentality displayed by police officers. 
So far, the reliance on this arrest-first mentality has only been attributed to 
shortcomings ordinarily contained in the legal and institutional framework, but 
there is an additional factor at play. Although this mentality leads to 
congestion of detention cells and prisons, as well as a violation of the 
requirement that all persons be arraigned within the constitutionally 
sanctioned period, it is claimed by the Nigeria Police Force that this is as a 
result of the absence, in Nigeria, of the relevant technology and information 
databases to maintain awareness of a person’s location at all times.127 It is 
contended that, if a person is arrested and detained, and released before he is 
 
126 See Section 3.2.2.4, Supra 
127 See Section 3.4, Infra 
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arraigned, it is very possible for the person to abscond if released on bail.128 
Thus, the arrest-first mentality is, allegedly, a policy borne out of necessity. 
Very often, admittedly, in most states in Nigeria, there is no properly 
delineated address system outside of the urban areas and/or capital cities. 
There is a high propensity of discovering unnamed streets and houses with no 
numbers. Essentially, if one is unfamiliar with the locality, it is a challenging 
task to pinpoint a location, let alone a person. This non-CJS infrastructural 
insufficiency, it is conceded, gives credence to the claim that if a person were 
to be released on bail, he would abscond. 
Hypothetically speaking, if an officer who has been transferred to an 
unfamiliar region or state, and makes an arrest of a person caught in the act; 
despite the requirements of the law that the name and address of every arrested 
person be in the record of arrest,129 upon release, if the suspect does not report 
back to the station, it becomes a herculean task for the police officer who is 
unfamiliar with the terrain to track the person down in the absence of any 
discernible street demarcations and house numbers. Indeed, there is no means 
of verifying that the address given is the actual address of the suspect. 
It is however contended, that despite the difficulties the lack of a properly 
delineated address system pose, it does not validate the proliferation of the 
arrest-first mentality. On the contrary, it potentially buttresses the argument 
 
128 This is especially because in practice, and according to Sections 17 and 45 of the CPA and 
CPC, respectively, bail at the police station, theoretically, is to be granted for free, and without 
the need to furnish sureties. 
129 See Section 10(1) of the ACJA, Section 11 of the CPA, and Section 27 of the CPC which 
all place a requirement for an arresting police officer to ascertain the name and address of 
every suspect he places under arrest. 
 146 
for a decentralised police force or community policing.130 Unfortunately, 
however, the arrest-first mentality continues to thrive, and is a factor which 
hinders the delivery of rights, particularly the rights to liberty, prompt 
arraignment, and dignified treatment during detention.131 
3.3.4.2 Corruption 
The second “other” attitudinal factor that affects delivery of rights in practice 
is corruption. It is perhaps common knowledge that Nigeria is generally 
viewed as a corrupt country. There are well-documented instances of corrupt 
acts and a culture of corruption affecting many elements of government, and 
indeed life in general, across the length and breadth of the nation.132 
This culture of corruption, unsurprisingly, has permeated the criminal justice 
system, down to the police station and manifests in the daily operations of 
officers, at nearly every stage of the process. 
First, there are widespread reports of the police going out and making 
frivolous arrests on trumped-up charges, or relying on the provisions of 
Sections 10(1)(i) and 29(g) of the CPA and CPC, respectively.133 This is an 
extortion mechanism: the surest way to secure one’s freedom or release from 
custody would be to offer a bribe.134 
 
130 See Section 3.5, Infra, and Chapter 5.2.2.1 for a detailed argument in support of 
community policing and decentralized police forces. 
131 As provided for by the relevant aforementioned statutory provisions. 
132 These were highlighted in the reports by the UN Special Rapporteurs mentioned in n 93, 
Infra 
133 Ibid. The provisions of the CPA and CPC are to the effect that the police may arrest a 
person “who has no ostensible means of subsistence and who cannot give a satisfactory 
account of himself” 
134 UN Reports, n 93 
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After arrests have been made, a detainee, especially one deemed to be 
economically well off, may offer bribes to the police to ensure decent 
detention conditions. Also, if considered well off, a detainee’s family or 
relatives are, upon paying the requisite bribes, are allowed to provide for the 
detainee’s feeding and/or clothing.135 The effect of this being, more often than 
not, that the budget for feeding and taking care of detained persons is usually 
embezzled, and those who are unable to offer the requisite bribes are left to 
fend for themselves, in less than favourable conditions.136 
Furthermore, offering bribes can speed up case disposal, as the more well-off 
detainees are able to pay to have their files transferred to the relevant charging 
authority, and there are even documented instances of arrested persons paying 
to transport themselves and the police officers to the court premises for their 
arraignment hearings. 
For a country with a widespread culture of corruption, it is perhaps no surprise 
that corruption has permeated the criminal justice system, particularly, for 
purposes of this thesis, the pre-trial system and the police stations. It is further 
contended, that this factor is exacerbated by the ambiguities that are present in 
the legal framework. As there is no prescribed detention condition,137 for 
example, it gives room for those who can afford it to offer bribes to ensure 
decent detention conditions. 
Further, the provisions of Sections 10(1)(i) and 29(g) of the CPA and CPC 
create a loophole for the police to make frivolous arrests, and make same in a 
 
135 See B. A. Cole, “An Experience In A Nigerian Police Station”, (1990) 63 Police J. 312 
136 Ibid 
137 By contrast, Paragraph 8 of PACE Code of Conduct C stipulates the conditions of 
detention for arrested persons in England. 
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bid to extort the populace, and create a window of opportunity to be offered 
bribes. 
Fortunately, the enactment of the ACJA, as mentioned in the previous section, 
has repealed this provision in the CPA and CPC, but it has not yet been 
recorded just how effectively it would be in combatting corruption, 
particularly frivolous arrests, at the police station. As a result, at present, 
corruption remains a factor, which affects the activities of the police, and 
poses a threat to the effective delivery of the rights in practice.  
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3.4 DETENTION RIGHTS OF ACCUSED PERSONS IN NIGERIA: AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY 
3.4.1 Background 
Following the discovery of the dearth of readily-available secondary sources 
of information and literature, and in light of the age of the most recent 
empirical study of note into the administration of criminal justice and the 
protection of human rights in Nigeria,138 questions were formulated for the 
conduct of a limited qualitative empirical study, to be conducted by the 
researcher working alone. 
The intent behind which questions were formulated was to have the study be 
informational, illustrative and exploratory, and also to attempt to evaluate the 
working knowledge of the parties involved in the pre-trial criminal process in 
Nigeria. Questions ranged from the more general such as getting respondents 
to describe in their own words and understanding, the entire pre-trial process 
from arrest to arraignment; to the slightly more specific questions intended to 
illuminate the relationships between the parties involved in the process. The 
questionnaires and samples of actual responses received are appended to this 
thesis.139 




138 Ajomo and Okagbue, n11 
139 See Appendices 1-4, Infra, pp 219 – 241. 
 150 
3.4.2 Selection of Respondents 
The intended respondents to this study were members of the Nigeria Police 
Force, and members of the Legal Aid Council of Nigeria.  
As highlighted in the previous chapter,140 the Nigeria Police Force is divided 
into thirty-six (36) state commands and the FCT Command,141 and the thirty-
seven (37) state commands are grouped further into twelve (12) different zonal 
commands.142 In each state command, there is a Criminal Investigation 
Department (CID), which is the arm directly responsible for, inter alia, the 
investigation and prosecution of offences. There is, also, within every state 
CID, a legal department staffed by police officers that are also trained legal 
practitioners, who are primarily responsible for the prosecution of offences on 
behalf of the Nigeria Police Force. Given the limited resources and the 
severity of logistics that might have been necessary to conduct a thorough 
study of this nature on a grander scale, within a short time, the decision was 
made to interview the police officers in charge of the legal department 
(colloquially referred to as “OC Legal”) in one State CID in each zonal 
command, and in states governed by the CPA and CPC. The selection of 
particular states within each zonal command was done randomly, with no 
specific fact taken into consideration in selection. 
In a bid to balance the adversarial scale, and also to verify some of the claims 
made by the OCs Legal, answers to the same questions were sought from the 
 
140 Section 2.2.2.1, Chapter 2 
141 Federal Capital Territory, Abuja 
142  “The Structure of the Nigeria Police”, available at http://www.npf.gov.ng/force-structure/, 
last accessed on 27-10-2014 
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state coordinators of the Legal Aid Council in the corresponding states where 
the OCs Legal had been interviewed.  
There are, it is conceded, three (3) notable weaknesses in the methodology that 
could potentially affect the weight upon which the results can be relied: 
The first of these weaknesses is borne out of a lack of observation.  In 
conducting a qualitative study, it is usually ideal to observe the day-to-day 
activities of the actors in the environment, in addition to obtaining responses 
from the actors alone.  
The step taken to combat this weakness was by including responses from 
parties on the other side of the adversarial scale to balance out the quality of 
information being disseminated. However, that poses another methodological 
weakness in and of itself:  again, logistical issues meant that the respondents to 
the study were heads of their respective departments. Without casting 
aspersions on the authenticity of the information actually received, it was 
initially hypothesised that the responses from the police and the Legal Aid 
coordinators would be subjected to the usual public relations-inspired 
finishing coat that one has come to expect when speaking to persons in 
administrative positions. However, it was determined by the researcher that by 
pitting the responses of one party against the responses from the party on the 
other side of the adversarial scale would only serve to better illuminate the 
nature of the relationship between the parties. 
The third methodological weakness can be attributed to the method of data 
collection. For a study with a very limited number of respondents, it was first 
hypothesised that allowing for the data to be collected in one of three different 
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methods might affect the consistency of the information revealed. Ultimately, 
however, there was not found to be any overall difference in the quality of 
information obtained from the responses.  
3.4.3 Collation of Responses 
Responses to the questions were obtained under condition of anonymity and, 
for logistical reasons, responses were obtained in one of three ways: face to 
face interviews, on the spot or with time to prepare; or they were given the 
option of sending their responses back via email. The respondents were 
contacted, and after the debriefing and obtaining their signed consent, were 
allowed to have their responses collated in one of the three options deemed 
most convenient to them. 
A total of twenty (20) responses were collated from the twelve (12) zonal 
commands, comprising of fourteen (14) OCs Legal, and six state coordinators 
of the Legal Aid Council. There were fourteen (14) responses from the police 
because, rather anecdotally, in the month spent conducting the study, the OCs 
Legal in two different states were transferred, and their replacements 
appointed.143 Fortunately, in both states where this occurred, both the outgoing 
and incoming OCs Legal were willing to provide responses to the questions. 
Responses from the Legal Aid Council were not as forthcoming. Of the 
attempts made to contact the Council in the twelve corresponding states, only 
 
143 Especially in light of the fact that one of the criticisms levied against the centralized 
structure of the Nigeria Police Force, albeit one based on conjecture, was the high risk of 
officers being transferred from one command to another. See Section 3.2.2.2, Supra. The 
outgoing OCs Legal were transferred to other state commands, and their replacements 
appointed from within so, fortunately, they already had a working knowledge of the state 
being examined. 
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phone calls to the publicly-listed telephone numbers of ten (10) State 
Coordinators’ offices were answered.144 Of these, only eight (8) agreed to 
provide responses; however, two (2) State Coordinators failed to send back 
their responses, despite agreeing to do so, and after several reminders had been 
sent out. As a result, only half the intended number of responses from the 
Legal Aid Council with which to contrast with the responses from the Nigeria 
Police Force was actually obtained. It is submitted, however, that owing to the 
congruence in the answers obtained from the Legal Aid Coordinators who 
provided responses, that the lack of responses from the Legal Aid 
Coordinators in six states has no significant effect on the findings of the study, 
as detailed in the next section. 
3.4.4 Findings 
Despite the limited number of responses from the Legal Aid Council, the 
responses to the study achieved its initial aim. Additionally, given the small 
sample pool, and the total number of responses obtained, the data obtained 
was computed manually, without the use of any data analysis software. The 
results of the study are discussed under three main groupings, which are 
intended to reflect on the difficulties in translating the custodial rights in 
practice: 
3.4.4.1 Institutional Insufficiencies 
The first major revelation of the study was the corroboration by all the 
respondents of a breakdown of the constitutionally sanctioned right to be 
 
144 The relevant information is available at “State Offices” 
http://www.legalaidcouncil.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48&Ite
mid=92, last accessed on 14-05-2015. 
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arraigned within forty-eight (48) hours of arrest. This was attributable to a 
number of factors: 
All respondents alluded to the proliferation of the arrest-first mentality. In 
response to Q2 on the questionnaire, which asked respondents to describe the 
process from arrest to arraignment, every respondent (on both sides) indicated 
that investigation into the alleged offence commenced after arrest. 
In addition to this, a number of infrastructural and institutional insufficiencies 
were highlighted as exacerbating the effect of the arrest-first mentality, 
including understaffing and a shortage of investigating officers;145 the need to 
seek medical intervention for the suspect following an “aggressive arrest”;146 
as well as improper training policies, resulting in poor evidence-gathering 
abilities. As pointed out by six (6) OCs Legal,147 there was only one forensics 
laboratory belonging to the Nigeria Police Force, and that as a result of the 
distance involved, it took more than forty-eight hours merely just to transport 
the evidence to the laboratory, without factoring in the time it required to 
subject the evidentiary samples to the relevant testing and returning same to 
the police station. Additionally, five (5) of the police respondents who 
responded also attributed the delay in arraigning suspects in court to the 
practice of recording statements of accused persons in writing. The contention 
is that having to record statements in writing makes the process tedious, as 
opposed to the possibility of recording the statements of the accused with 
audio-visual equipment. 
 
145 This point was highlighted by five (5) of the fourteen (14) OCs Legal and two (2) Legal 
Aid coordinators 
146 A point raised by two (2) Legal Aid coordinators. 
147 Hereinafter referred to as “police respondents” 
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When asked how long it took on average to complete investigation and arraign 
a person after arrest, in Q3 there seemed to be a consensus among nearly all 
the respondents on both sides that the time needed to complete investigation 
varied from a few days to arraign on charges for the alleged commission of 
simple offences or misdemeanours, to anywhere from a few weeks to a few 
months for charges involving more complex offences.148 As highlighted in the 
previous section, arrested persons are usually not granted bail after arrest in 
Nigeria, for a plethora of reasons.149 Thus, the expectation, or the harsh reality 
of the situation is that arrested persons are detained for days or weeks before 
being arraigned, in spite of the provisions of the law. 
The population of such persons being detained without charge was alarmingly 
high in all the states under consideration: the responses indicated that, on 
average, eighty per cent (80%) of all detainees in the different states were 
being held without being formally arraigned on a formal charge. In the states 
where responses were obtained from the Legal Aid Coordinator as well, there 
was not found to be any great discrepancy in the estimates given by either 
side.150 
3.4.4.2 Poor Delivery of the Rights in Practice 
The respondents to the interview were asked specific questions about an 
accused’s right to silence and to legal advice and whether they were informed 
 
148 With the exception of one Legal Aid coordinator who alleged that an accused could be 
detained for as long as one year without being arraigned, and one police respondent, who 
argued that arraignments within their jurisdiction did not usually exceed forty-eight (48) 
hours. 
149 Section 3.3.4, Supra 
150 For example, in one state, the OC Legal alleged that 80% of detainees were Awaiting Trial 
inmates. In contrast, the Legal Aid coordinator placed that figure at 75% 
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of these rights before proceeding to ask, in Q19, what other rights arrested 
persons were entitled to whilst in custody. 
All respondents confirmed the existence of the rights to silence and to legal 
assistance, although two (2) of the police respondents and three (3) of the 
Legal Aid coordinators admitted that these rights only existed theoretically in 
their respective jurisdictions, stating that although they were aware that 
detainees were entitled to these rights, they were not usually afforded the 
rights in practice. When asked if they were informed of these rights, five (5) of 
the six (6) Legal Aid coordinators responded in the negative. Ten (10) of the 
police respondents said that they were informed, usually by the cautionary 
statement at the top of the confessional statement form, although four (4) 
claimed that additional steps were taken to ensure that they were informed 
verbally as well; although one officer stated categorically that arrested persons 
were not informed of their rights. The most common reason stated for the 
failure to inform arrested persons of their rights was a lack of knowledge on 
the part of the police officers of the rights available to the accused persons. 
Essentially, the police officers themselves were unaware that the arrested 
persons had these rights, so could not inform them. As one OC Legal 
remarked, “I joined the force as a graduate and we were trained for 18 months. 
But somebody who joins the force as a high school leaver is trained for just 6 
months. It is not enough. He cannot grasp all the rudiments of what he is 
supposed to do as a police officer within 6 months.” 
Arguably, the reliance on the cautionary statement might amount to a non-
information of rights. The words of the cautionary statement read as follows: 
 157 
“…having been duly cautioned in English Language that I am not obliged to 
say anything in answer to the charge unless I wish to do so, but whatever I say 
will be taken down in writing and may be given in evidence, voluntarily elect 
to state as follows:”151 
These words make no express reference to any rights, and imply prior verbal 
information of, essentially, the right to silence alone. Further, the words of the 
cautionary statement are not always consistent. Appended to this thesis are 
two versions of Nigeria Police Form P19, obtained from the same police 
station, and containing two different forms of cautionary statements,152 the 
latter containing only the words “I voluntarily elect to state as follows:”153 
Without an additional verbal statement of clarification, this can hardly be 
considered a valid information of rights, even with the most liberal 
interpretation of these statements. 
The inclusion of the provision that the caution be administered in the English 
language also brings up the issue of interpretation. What happens when an 
arrested person cannot read or write in the English language? This question 
was posed in Q12, and all twenty (20) respondents on either side noted that 
there was no specific procedure in place for the provision of an interpreter or 
interpretation services. The general practice, as pointed out by twelve (12) of 
the fourteen (14) police respondents and all six (6) Legal Aid respondents, is 
for the police to look in and around the police station for someone who can 
understand the language being spoken by the accused. The other two (2) 
police respondents who had a different response placed the onus of looking for 
 
151 Nigeria Police Force form P19. See Appendix 5 to this thesis, p 242, Infra 
152 Appendices 5 and 6, at pp 242 to 245 
153 Appendix 6, at p 244 
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an interpreter on the arrested person. As one of them retorted, “What is the 
business of the police in getting an interpreter for an accused person? If he or 
she cannot speak English, they should bring somebody who can speak it for 
them.” 
There are manifold issues with the lack of a formal procedure for providing 
interpreters, and the general reliance on the police for the provision of 
interpretation services. It should be noted that all twenty (20) respondents 
stated, in response to Q10 and Q20, respectively, that confessional statements 
are usually recorded in writing, and that the only persons generally present 
during interrogation are the suspect and the investigating police officer 
(IPO).154 In such a situation, where only an IPO and a suspect, and an 
interpreter appointed by the police and probably sourced from within the 
station, it becomes difficult to verify the original statement of the accused, or 
indeed the veracity and authenticity of the interpreted statement; and it also 
becomes difficult to separate the investigation process from potential 
allegations of bias, particularly as there is the potential to present a doctored 
and/or false confessional statement under the guise of having been interpreted 
to English language.  
As noted in the previous chapter, there were questions surrounding the 
provision of Section 35(5) of the CFRN, which establishes the right to remain 
silent pending consultation with a lawyer, including questions relating to the 
frequency of consultation, and whether the lawyer was permitted to be present 
 
154 Two of the Police respondents claimed that even though they recognized the right to have a 
lawyer present during interrogation, they tended to exclude them from interrogation 
proceedings as they were usually disruptive to the process. 
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during the interrogation; questions which had not been answered in any 
provision of the law or by any ruling of any court within the jurisdiction. 
Specific questions were asked concerning the right to silence and to legal 
advice, including what would happen if an accused insisted on exercising his 
rights, whether lawyers were permitted to be present during interrogation, and 
specific instances where lawyers were denied access to their clients. 
In the first instance, where an arrested person insists on exercising his rights, 
and not speak until given the opportunity to consult with a lawyer, only three 
(3) police respondents claimed that he was allowed to exercise his right 
outright. Nine (9) others claimed that he was entitled to exercise the right, but 
would be required to write down in clear terms that he was refusing to speak. 
One additional police respondent said that at this point, he would be taken 
before a magistrate and arraigned, as this would be viewed as an admission of 
guilt, and the final police respondent said that where he was arrested on 
suspicion of committing a capital offence, he would be forced to give a 
statement. Conversely, all the Legal aid coordinators who responded argued 
that if a person insisted on exercising his right, he would either be beaten (2 of 
the 6 respondents), forced or persuaded to talk or, according to two (2) 
respondents, tortured until he made a statement. 
In determining the points during which detention where consultation was 
permitted, two (2) police respondents claimed that, in their jurisdictions, 
lawyers were permitted at any time. Five (5) stated that lawyers were entitled 
access to their clients any time except during interrogation. An additional five 
(5) said that they would permit counsel to be present during interrogation, 
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provided they were not disruptive and merely played the role of an observer. 
The last two (2) police respondents stated categorically that lawyers were 
prohibited from interrogation; one of them quipping: “We are not interrogating 
lawyers, we are interrogating suspects and accused persons.” The other stated 
that, as a matter of fact, lawyers in his state were not permitted to see their 
clients until after they had been interrogated, and they were especially not 
allowed into the interrogation room because “their present [sic] can prevent 
the accused from saying or speaking the truth.” This is an obvious violation of 
Section 35(2) of the CFRN, which even in the absence of a proper delineation 
of the extent of legal advice guarantees, at the very minimum, access to a 
lawyer or legal practitioner before he proceeds to answer any questions or 
make any statements.  
The responses from the Legal Aid coordinators, predictably, painted a 
different picture. Only one (1) of the six (6) coordinators claimed that lawyers 
were permitted to be present during interrogation, or could consult with their 
clients at any time. Of the remaining five (5), two admitted that they had the 
right to be present during interrogation, but qualified this right with the 
contention that this probably only existed on a theoretical plane, as they very 
often excluded from consulting with suspects until after interrogation, and that 
consultations were also usually kept brief. 
Further, in assessing the conditions of consultation in the seemingly rare 
situations where arrested persons were allowed to consult with a legal 
practitioner; and in responding to Q27 and Q28, dealing with provisions for 
consultation with solicitors at the police station, all six (6) Legal Aid 
coordinators and thirteen (13) of the fourteen (14) police respondents said that 
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there were no special provisions for ensuring that the accused person 
consulted with his lawyer in private: consultations are usually held in the 
office of the police officers, and in the presence of a police officer. Five (5) 
police respondents stated further that they tend to insist, during the 
consultation, that the accused and his lawyer communicate in a language 
understood by the police officer present. The one police respondent who gave 
a different response stated that although there were no special measures in 
place to ensure privacy, they would permit the accused and his lawyer to 
consult out of earshot of any officer, provided they were within eyesight of the 
investigating police officer. Additionally, all six (6) Legal Aid coordinators 
said that there were usually no special measures in place to ensure that 
consultations between accused persons and their legal practitioners were held 
in private. 
Finally, on the point of legal advice in the police station, from the responses 
given, eleven (11) of the fourteen (14) police respondents claimed that, in 
situations where an accused was unable to afford the services of counsel, that 
they were duly informed that the Legal Aid Council could provide free legal 
assistance; although it was stressed by all fourteen (14) respondents that the 
onus to contact the Legal Aid Council lay on the accused, acting personally or 
through his family. All six (6) Legal Aid Coordinators corroborated this point. 
In response to Q19, which asked respondents to state the other rights available 
to accused persons detained within their jurisdiction. There was a consensus 
amongst all respondents that parties had the right to be treated with dignity, 
right to be informed of the reason for their arrest, right to bail, and a right to 
prompt arraignment. It is however contended, that in light of the 
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infrastructural insufficiencies discovered, these rights are also not being 
delivered effectively in practice 
3.4.4.3 Relationship of the Parties 
From the study, the relationship of the parties to the pre-trial process was also 
found to be a factor that affected the delivery of rights in practice. As has been 
mentioned frequently throughout this thesis, the Nigeria Police Force and the 
Legal Aid Council are on opposite sides of the adversarial scale.155 Naturally, 
the assumption is that there would be some sort of adversarial relationship 
between both parties. As alluded to in Section 3.4.2 above, by obtaining 
responses from both parties, the extent of this adversarial relationship was 
highlighted. 
Of the twenty responses collated, six (6) OCs Legal and two (2) Legal Aid 
Coordinators offered to give their responses in person. In responding to 
questions when discussing the other side, it seemed as though the relationship 
was more than just adversarial in nature, but showed traces of discord. 
Additionally, in responding to Q25, which dealt with reasons why lawyers 
were excluded from the interrogation room, four (4) of the police respondents 
claimed that lawyers who attend the interrogation tend to be disruptive and 
interrupt the entire process. One police respondent even went as far as 
accusing the lawyers of being overeducated and attempting to flaunt their 
education whilst making the police out to be ignorant. On the other hand, one 
 
155 Although the Police is not part of the adversarial scale, strictly speaking, this reference is 
used in the context that, particularly in Nigeria, it would appear that while the Legal Aid 
Council strives to defend an accused person or a suspect, the primary focus of the NPF 
appears to be striving to secure a conviction, thereby pitting both of them on either side of the 
adversarial balance.  
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of the Legal Aid coordinators accused the police of being corrupt, whilst 
another alleged that the reason for their exclusion from the interrogation room 
was to ensure secrecy, and prevent lawyers from bearing witness to any 
untoward interrogation methods or other activity. This creates the impression, 
in the opinion of the researcher, that the relationship between the parties is 
moving beyond the terrain of ‘mere’ adversarialism to a relationship that is 
antagonistic in nature; and this affects the delivery of rights into practice 
because, rather than approach the pre-trial and interrogation process with a 
mutual respect for the detainee’s rights at the fore, these rights have been 
relegated to the background, and the interaction between both parties is fuelled 
by conflict. 
3.4.5 Discussion 
The overall findings of this study give credence to the hypothesis that there is 
a huge lacuna between the rights as they exist in theory and as they operate in 
practice. It also, despite the limited weight that might be attached to it, seems 
to suggest that in the years following the study by Ajomo and Okagbue,156 
there has been little improvement in the protection of rights at the police 
station. 
The large number of infrastructural shortcomings that plague the system, 
coupled with the proliferation of the arrest-first mentality, continue to affect 
the pre-trial process, and are wont to suggest that it is a near-impossibility to 
properly arraign a person within the constitutionally sanctioned forty-eight 
(48) hour window within which to do so.  
 
156 n 11, Supra 
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Of particular, worrying note is the failure and blatant refusal to provide legal 
assistance at the police station. In Nigeria, as in England, lawyer-client 
communication, by law, ought to be treated as privileged communication.157 
Given the findings of the study, the right to legal advice can hardly be said to 
be provided for unequivocally, in its true, privileged form, if arrested persons 
are unable to meet with their solicitors in private, out of sight and out of 
hearing of the police. 
As stated earlier, this study was conducted in January 2013 and, fortunately, 
the enactment of the ACJA has brought forth a few favourable developments 
to address some of the issues unearthed by the study. Now, by virtue of 
Section 17(2) of the ACJA, any suspect desirous of making a statement is 
entitled to make same in the presence of a legal practitioner of his choice, or in 
the presence of an officer of the Legal Aid Council, or any other person of his 
choice. 
The ACJA does not, however, address all the relevant issues. Section 17(3) of 
the ACJA, for example, reaffirms the right of an accused person to an 
interpreter, but fails, as previous statutory instruments also failed, to establish 
a framework for the provision of interpretation services. At the very least, it 
also fails to place the burden or onus of procuring interpretation services on 
either party to the process; a situation which, as we have discovered, could 




157 Section 192, Evidence Act (Nigeria) 2011 
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3.5 OBSERVATIONS AND SUMMARY 
Attitudinal factors plague smooth transition of the rights from theory to 
practice in both jurisdictions. However, a clear statement of the law combined 
with a clearly delineated institutional framework increases the chances of a 
smoother transition to practice in England. 
Perhaps if Nigeria were to resolve the lacunae created in its frameworks as a 
resultant effect of the shoddy statement of the provisions in the numerous 
statutory instruments, this would be the first step in addressing the intrinsic 
shortcomings of its frameworks, and would potentially leave it better suited to 
deal with the attitudinal problems and the resultant negative effects on 
transition arising therefrom.  
However, in light of the findings of the present study by the researcher, and in 
light of the continued relevance of some of the issues unearthed in the study 
by Ajomo and Okagbue conducted more than twenty-five (25) years ago; it is 
suggested that the monitoring and realignment mechanisms in Nigeria have 
yet to yield as much success as has been the case in England. 
The enactment of the ACJA, as has been highlighted repeatedly throughout the 
thesis, is a welcome development, and a step towards an alignment towards 
the goal. However, the new Act is not without its shortcomings, and there are 
other shortcomings of the framework that do not come under the ambit of the 
ACJA such as, for example, the structure of the Nigeria Police Force, which 
perhaps might be better operating under a decentralised structure.158 
 
158 The issue of decentralized policing shall be considered in detail in Chapter 5, infra 
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Fixing attitudinal factors might not be as straightforward as rectifying 
shortcomings in the framework. Again, the arguments shall be considered in 
detail in Chapter 5, but one way to bridge the lacuna might be by widening the 
scope of the law and reducing self-regulation and the opportunity for 
discretion, or in the case of Nigeria, removing ambiguities from the statutory 
instruments which could give rise to a multiplicity of interpretation; a step 
that, in bringing the observation full circle, involves a clearer statement of the 
goal. 
Thus, it seems, that in the presence of attitudinal factors affecting delivery of 
the rights in practice, a clearer statement of the law as well as detailed written 
rules and statutory provisions might provide a greater chance of ensuring 
compliance with due process. 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, we have been able to answer the second, third and fifth 
research questions which the thesis has sought to answer, namely:  
i. How well are the detention rights observed in practice? Is there a 
disparity between the theoretical existence and the practical observance 
of these rights, and what are the factors responsible for this disparity, if 
any; 
ii. In bridging the gap between the theoretical existence and practical 
observance of these rights, what is the effect of detailed and clearly 
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stated legislative instruments in attempting to improve compliance 
with due process; and 
iii. In striving to achieve the best rights’ practice, are there any lessons to 
be learned by a state emerging from independence from the 
developmental challenges faced by its former colonial ruler? 
The answer to the second research question is that the detention rights are 
observed better in England than in Nigeria, and that this is for a number of 
factors which are prevalent in both jurisdictions. Some of the factors are 
intrinsic, and are as a result of the current setup of the legal and institutional 
frameworks available in both jurisdictions, whilst others are as a result of the 
attitudes of the parties involved in the pre-trial or custodial stage, including the 
relationship between the police and legal practitioners involved in the defence 
of the accused persons. There are also two factors peculiar to Nigeria that 
create a lacuna between the law in theory and practice that are not necessarily 
as a result of the legal and institutional framework, but are as a result of the 
Nigerian culture and society, generally speaking – the arrest-first mentality 
displayed by the Nigeria Police Force and Corruption. 
With regards to the third research question, it is vehemently contended, from 
the findings herein, that the effect of detailed and clearly stated legislative 
instruments in attempting to improve compliance with due process and bridge 
the gap between the delivery of custodial rights from theory to practice can 
neither be overstated or underestimated. 
As Dixon’s Culturalist theory suggests, procedural rules on their own are 
ineffective in controlling police behaviour, as there are certain occupational 
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cultures that must be taken into consideration.159 It is however contended, in 
light of Coppen’s assertion that the failure to delineate a minimum standard 
will create room for a multiplicity of interpretation,160 and ultimately, a non-
protection of the pre-trial rights in practice, that there is the need to provide a 
clearly delineated legislative instrument which establishes a clear minimum 
standard for the balancing of the powers of the police at the pre-trial stage and 
the rights and liberties of suspects and accused persons available at this stage. 
Furthermore, in respect of the fifth research question, it has been discovered 
that Nigeria, a state emerging from independence, stands to learn from the 
developmental challenges faced by England, its former colonial ruler. With 
particular reference to the power of the police to prosecute offences, as well as 
the mode of recording interviews, it appears as though present-day Nigeria is 
at par developmentally with pre-PACE England. The recommendations of 
JUSTICE and the RCCP which have hitherto been considered can quite easily 
be juxtaposed in the Nigerian custodial stage. It therefore is the opinion of the 
researcher that rights development is a work in progress, and that the starting 
point of any post-independence state in addressing policy issues might be the 
taking into account of any developmental challenges faced by its former 
colonial master, provided that the post-independence state is still operating a 
similar criminal justice system introduced during the colonial era. 
 
159 See Dixon, n17, pp 9 – 20. Hannah Quirk also discusses this in her article “The 
Significance of Culture in Criminal Procedure Reform: Why the Revised Disclosure Scheme 
Cannot Work” (2006) 10 E&P 42 
160 John Coppen, “PACE: A View from the Custody Suite”, in Ed Cape and Richard Young 
(Eds.), Regulating Policing: The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Past, Present and 
Future (Oxford, 2008), p 75, at 76 
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At this juncture, having examined the rights in practice in this chapter, and 
having evaluated the delivery of the rights in practice, which is the second part 
of the generally accepted tripartite form of regulation, we shall proceed, in the 
next chapter, to assess realignment mechanisms in both jurisdictions, and, it is 
hoped, provide an answer to the fourth research question, which is “What is 
the role of the regional human rights framework in achieving the best rights’ 
practice at the custodial stage of proceedings?” 
By virtue of the regional rights systems to which both jurisdictions are party 
to, and their respective operations and functions, there are, in addition to the 
internal realignment mechanisms, external factors and pressures to seek to 
achieve the best rights’ practice. Both the internal and external factors shall be 
considered in detail in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ACHIEVING THE BEST RIGHTS’ PRACTICE 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
To paraphrase Prof Yemi Osinbajo, SAN, as he then was,1 an effective 
criminal justice system, because it addresses behavioural issues, must be 
dynamic and proactive.2 To remain proactive, then, in every jurisdiction, there 
needs to be effective realignment mechanisms. 
To recall the central theme that has shaped the structure of this thesis, effective 
regulation must possess a tripartite form: a clearly stated goal, monitoring 
mechanisms, and effective realignment. Having juxtaposed the examination of 
the pre-trial and custodial rights of accused persons in both jurisdictions 
against the backdrop of the first two aspects of this tripartite form in the 
previous chapters, this chapter shall assess the realignment mechanisms, 
internal and external, available in both jurisdictions. 
Realignment, as highlighted by Cape and Young,3 becomes necessary where, 
having monitored the implementation of the goal in practice, there is found to 
be a lacuna, or lacunae, between the goal which was set out to be achieved and 
the delivery in practice. Having examined the legal and institutional 
frameworks governing pre-trial and custodial rights in England and Nigeria, 
and assessed the delivery of the rights in practice, there is incontrovertible 
evidence of lacunae between the provision of the rights in theory and the 
 
1 His Excellency, Prof Yemi Osinbajo, SAN, is the current Vice-President of Nigeria. 
2 Yemi Osinbajo, Proposals for the Reform of the Criminal Procedure Laws of Lagos State of 
Nigeria, (Lagos: Lagos State Ministry of Justice, 2004), Foreword   
3 See, generally, Ed Cape and Richard Young, (eds), Regulating Policing: The Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Past, Present and Future (Oxford, 2008), pp 1 - 21 
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subsequent implementation in practice in both jurisdictions. There is therefore 
a need to examine the mechanisms in place for realigning the operation of the 
rights in practice with the originally stated goals, in both jurisdictions. 
 
4.1 REALIGNING TOWARDS THE GOAL INTERNALLY 
The most effective, albeit not the only, means of realigning towards the goal 
internally, is through the making of necessary amendments to the legal and 
institutional framework. In both jurisdictions, this could be through legislative 
review or enactment, or as a result of judicial review and interpretation by the 
superior courts. 
Legislative enactment is the sole responsibility of the respective legislative 
arms, Parliament in England, and the National and State Houses of Assembly 
in Nigeria.4 Additionally, the powers of legislative review, although primarily 
falling under the scope of powers of the legislative arm of government, also 
arguably come under the ambit of the judicial arm, by virtue of the concepts of 
delegated legislation and judicial precedent, or stare decisis.5 From a purely 
theoretical perspective, following the monitoring of the goal in practice and 
 
4 Sections 4, 47 and 90 of the 1999 CFRN establish the Federal and State Houses of Assembly 
in Nigeria. See also, Gary Slapper and David Kelly, The English Legal System (15th Edition, 
Routledge, 2014), ch 3. 
5 For more on the principles of judicial precedent and stare decisis, see Obilade, The Nigerian 
Legal System (Sweet & Maxwell, 1979), pp 23 – 34. See also, generally, Cross and Harris, 
Precedent in English Law (4th Edition, Clarendon); Manchester, Salter and Moodie, Exploring 
the Law: The Dynamics of Precedent and Statutory Interpretation (2nd Edition, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2000); J. David Murphy and Robert Rueter, Stare Decisis in Commonwealth 
Appellate Courts (Butterworths, 1981); E. A. Ikegbu, S. A. Duru and E. U. Dafe, “The 
Rationality of Judicial Precedent in Nigeria’s Jurisprudence” (2014) 4 AIJCR (No. 5) 149; and 
Leesi Ebenezer Mitee, “Nigerian Judicial Precedents as a Source of Nigerian Law” (Nigerian 
Law Resources, 2012), available at http://nigerianlawresources.com/2013/08/14/nigerian-
judicial-precedents-as-a-source-of-nigerian-law/, last accessed on 10-10-2015 
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the discovery of lacunae between the theoretical rights and their delivery in 
practice, the legislative arms of government ought to enact new legislation, or 
amend already-existing laws, to attempt to bridge the gap between theory and 
practice or, in other words, realign towards the ideal. As a caveat, it should 
however be noted that, as Ashworth and Redmayne advise, although criminal 
procedure reform usually occurs in response to a miscarriage of justice or to a 
particular problem, it would be wrong to suggest that there is a simple causal 
process whereby a failing in the system leads to reform.6 
In England, the enactment of PACE itself can be seen as an attempt at 
realignment. Prior to the coming into force of PACE, the right to legal 
assistance at the police station and notification of the right to silence, for 
example, were provided for by the Judges’ Rules.7 The Judges’ Rules were 
only guidelines, and therefore not enforceable, meaning that there were no 
remedies available to an accused person if these rights were not made 
available to him. As a result of this, and following the recommendations of the 
Phillips-led Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, PACE and the 
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 were subsequently enacted, and the 
provisions of the Judges’ Rules were subsumed by PACE Code of Practice C.8 
In the thirty-two (32) years since the coming into force of PACE, the Codes of 
Practice have been the subject of frequent amendment, particularly, in 
 
6 Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process (4th Edition, Oxford, 2010), 9 
and 17. 
7 Practice Note (Judge's Rules) [1964] 1 WLR 152 
8 PACE Code of Practice C, published by the Home Office, available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/729842/pace-code-c-2018.pdf, last accessed on 15-08-2018 
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attempting to remain within the ambit of this thesis, code C.9 There have been 
three joint reviews of the Codes of Practice since 2002,10 and there have been 
four different versions of Code C published in the last decade, with the most 
recent version being published in July 2018.11 Additionally, other legislative 
instruments such as the Criminal Justice and Prosecution of Offences Act and 
the Access to Justice Act, for example, have been enacted, and subsequently 
entered into force, which have amended and repealed sections of PACE, and 
ultimately changed the criminal justice terrain in England. 
The frequent legislative activity displayed in England is indicative of a strong 
political will, as defined in Chapter 2.2. in direct response to the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, as well as 
joint academic research projects, and the resultant thoughts, opinions and 
recommendations emanating therefrom. On the face of it, it would appear that 
in England, there is the constant quest to remain contemporaneous in the 
protection of rights. 
In addition to the legislative activity discussed above, the courts in England 
have played their role in the internal realignment of the rights framework 
towards the goal. As even a perfunctory study of the common law or 
adversarial systems of justice would reveal, by virtue of the concept of stare 
 
9 PACE Code of Practice C deals primarily with the custodial regime in England. 
10 There were joint reviews of the Codes of Practice in 2002, 2010 and 2012, with the changed 
provisions entering into force in 2004, 2011 and 2014, respectively. 
11 Updated versions of PACE Code C were published in 2008, 2012, 2013 and 2014. The 
previous versions are available at https://www.gov.uk/guidance/police-and-criminal-evidence-
act-1984-pace-codes-of-practice#previous-versions, last accessed 24-09-2015. The 2014 
amendment was necessitated by the need to include a more detailed provision, in paragraph 
3.2, of the notification of the right of the accused to be informed of the rights available to him 
at the detention stage, in accordance with EU Directive 2012/13 on the right to information in 
criminal proceedings, which is discussed in greater detail in Section 4.2.1.1, below. 
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decisis or judicial precedent, decisions of the superior courts in the common 
law jurisdictions, of which England and Nigeria are a part of, form case law 
which usually becomes binding on lower courts and ultimately becomes a 
source of law within the jurisdiction.12 
There have been several landmark cases in the recent years which have 
amended the terrain of pre-trial rights protection in England, including Whitley 
v DPP,13 which, for example, prompted a ruling in respect of legal advice in 
cases involving a breath procedure; Saunders v R,14 and R. v Grant 
(Edward).15  
In Nigeria, a different story is told, and the internal mechanisms for 
realignment are found to be wanting. There is gross, visible, legislative 
inactivity, which, as has been highlighted, seems to derive from a lack of 
political will. 
On face value, one might be tempted to assume that the legislative instruments 
establishing the rights framework in Nigeria have been subject to recent 
review, particularly as the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) was 
passed in 2015, and the recently repealed CPA and CPC were both enacted in 
2004. However, upon closer inspection, this assumption is found to be a 
flawed one. As Comfort Chinyere Ani points out, the CPA, CPC and Police 
Act are “vestiges of… British colonization” which were essentially ‘rubber 
 
12 Not all precedent is binding. Some judgments are merely persuasive, and the principles of 
stare decisis vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For more on the principles of judicial 
precedent and stare decisis, see the various sources mentioned in n 5, Supra 
13 [2003] EWHC 2512 
14 [2012] EWCA Crim 1380 
15 [2005] EWCA Crim 1089. Other cases which have had an effect on the pre-trial terrain of 
England, particularly the right to legal assistance include: R v Samuel [1988] QB 615, R v 
Walsh (1990) 91 Cr App R 161, and R v Alladice (1988) 87 Cr App R 380 
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stamped’ under the guise of amendment, and effectively retained their original 
content from their initial promulgation in 1945, 1960 and 1943, respectively.16 
The other key instruments in the criminal justice sector, including the CFRN, 
the Legal Aid Act and the Evidence Act, have themselves been subjected to 
infrequent amendment masked by frequent ‘rubber stamping’.17  
As a result of this, the rights framework in Nigeria has been the subject of 
severe stagnation, as evidenced by the fact established in the previous chapter, 
for example, that the same issues which were found to be plaguing and 
hindering the delivery of rights in practice by Ajomo and Okagbue were found 
to still be in issue when the limited empirical study was conducted by this 
researcher nearly twenty-five (25) years later.18 
Perhaps curiously, in recalling the tripartite form of regulation, there have 
been fairly frequent monitoring exercises conducted. In addition to the study 
by Ajomo and Okagbue, there have been Law Reform Commissions, which 
were set up by some of the states in the federation, and even at the Federal 
 
16 Comfort Chinyere Ani, “Reforms in the Nigerian Criminal Procedure Laws” (2011) NIALS 
Journal on Criminal Law and Justice (Vol 1) 52, at 52 – 53. A former Chief Justice of Nigeria 
has also stated on record that the laws that regulate criminal justice administration in Nigeria 
are “relics of colonial legislations that ought to have been reformed long time ago”. See, 
Justice Aloma Mukhtar, “Reforming the Criminal Justice System”, available at 
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/reforming-the-criminal-justice-system/146972/, last 
accessed on 12-08-2015. Peter Ocheme even goes as far as contending that the CPA was first 
enacted as an Order-in-Council in 1916, although this claim is as yet unverified. See Peter 
Ocheme, “The Lagos Administration of Criminal Justice Law (ACJL) 2007: Legislative 
Rascality or a Legal Menu for Access to Justice?” (2011) NIALS Journal on Criminal Law 
and Justice (Vol 1) 131, at 132 
17 The Evidence Act, for instance, since the time of its original promulgation in 1945, has 
maintained its original provisions despite being “amended” in 1960, 1990 and 2004, with no 
significant amendment thereto for over sixty (60) years until the provisions were amended, in 
2011, to allow for the tendering of audio and video recordings, and other forms of computer 
generated evidence, during trial proceedings. 
18 Ajomo, M. A. and Okagbue, I. E. (Eds.), Human Rights and the Administration of Criminal 
Justice in Nigeria (NIALS Research Series No. 1, NIALS, 1991). See Section 3.4, Chapter 3, 
Infra 
 176 
level, but with seemingly little or no effect on the provisions.19 Also, there has 
been academic work conducted in the area of administration of criminal 
justice, not just restricted to the pre-trial process or the protection of rights at 
the police station or during detention, albeit infrequent work, and work which 
is limited in scope.20 However, none of the said academic work, or the several 
recommendations, thoughts and opinions expressed therein have had any 
noticeable effect, as very little or close to nothing has been done by the 
National Assembly of Nigeria, comprising the Federal House of 
Representatives and the Senate (NASS), in a bid to realign towards the goal 
internally. 
On the one hand, the gross legislative inactivity might suggest the absence of a 
strong political will, as evidenced by the constant rehashing of the laws and 
statutory instruments, not just those pertaining to the administration of 
criminal justice, but the entirety of the laws within the jurisdiction. However, 
it is herein argued that the limited scope of the previous academic thought, and 
the monitoring mechanisms more generally, might also pose a factor 
responsible for the ineffective internal realignment in Nigeria. 
As determined earlier on in this thesis, in Chapter 2, there is a poor statement 
of the goal in Nigeria: the provisions establishing the rights available to 
accused persons are only surface-level statements confirming the existence of 
the rights within the jurisdiction, but with no express provisions to dictate the 
 
19 The last two law reforms of note at the federal level resulted in the publishing of a 
compendium of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, in 1990 and 2004. In both, there are no 
revisions of note of any laws, let alone any of the specific statutory instruments which govern 
the administration of criminal justice. 
20 As has been highlighted at multiple points throughout this thesis, the dearth of academic 
work in Nigeria is one factor which was actually considered a limitation to the research 
undertaken by the researcher. 
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implementation of these rights in practice or, at the very least, a minimum 
standard for their delivery. As was subsequently discovered in Chapter 3, this 
has led to the creation of a number of ambiguities surrounding the delivery of 
the rights in practice, as well as a multiplicity of the nature of the rights and 
varied levels of actual implementation of said rights in practice. There are 
other factors which affect the implementation of rights in Nigeria, it is 
conceded, and as were also noted in the previous chapter. The problems 
surrounding implementation have been in existence within the jurisdiction for 
decades, and have been identified in several academic publications considered 
within this thesis, and yet very little has been done to attempt to address the 
issues in a timely manner. 
The enactment of the ACJA is seen as a welcome development towards better 
rights protection in Nigeria,21 but the background of the Act serves as further 
indictment of the lack of a political will. As noted by Ani, reform of criminal 
procedure has been an issue that has engaged the attention of practitioners and 
academics alike.22 The ACJA itself was drafted by the Presidential Committee 
on the Reform of the Administration of Justice in Nigeria and submitted to 
NASS as the Administration of Criminal Justice Bill 2005.23 Thus, essentially, 
it has taken ten years for the Bill to move through the houses of NASS, before 
it was subsequently enacted and assented by the outgoing President of Nigeria, 
Goodluck Jonathan on the 28th of May, 2015. Hearkening back to Osinbajo’s 
assertion of what an effective criminal justice system must be, it is stated that, 
quite simply, it neither a sign of dynamism nor proactivity that it takes ten 
 
21 The Administration of Criminal Justice Act was signed into law on the 28th of May 2015. 
22 Ani, n 21 
23 Ibid 
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years for a Bill to be passed into law in a bid to address problems that have 
plagued the criminal justice system in Nigeria for a lot longer.24 
Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 2, although it is contended that the Act is 
generally a welcome development, and has the potential to improve the terrain 
of pre-trial rights protection in Nigeria, it is not without its shortcomings. It 
also does not resolve the issue which is argued by this researcher as being the 
genesis of the failed delivery of rights in practice: the lack of a clearly stated 
goal. Perhaps interestingly, none of the works considered concerning Nigeria 
have attempted to show a link between the paucity of the words of the 
provisions establishing the rights to legal assistance and the right to silence, 
for example, and the inherent ambiguities arising therefrom as a result of the 
absence of a minimum standard for the protection of these rights.25  
It is however reiterated, for emphasis, that it is the contention of this 
researcher, that a mere statement of the rights available, with no expressly 
provided method of implementation, or at the very least, an establishment of a 
minimum standard of application, is tantamount to a non-protection of the 
rights within the jurisdiction. 
Nigeria is a federation, with legislative arms of government present at the state 
level.26 The state Houses of Assembly also have the power to enact or amend 
 
24 Ani, op cit. Also, see generally, Justice Aloma Mukhtar, “Reforming the Criminal Justice 
System”, available at http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/reforming-the-criminal-justice-
system/146972/, last accessed on 12-08-2015 
25 Sections 6(2)(b), 6(2)(c) and 17(2) of the ACJA, the combined provisions of which establish 
the right to legal assistance, and which provide for the presence of the legal practitioner during 
interrogation, for example, do not categorically state the party on whom the onus lies to make 
contact with the legal practitioner, a provision contained in Paragraph 3.23 of PACE Code C, 
by comparison. 
26 Section 90, 1999 CFRN 
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laws in a bid to realign with the goal.27 However, as has previously been noted 
in this thesis, only the Lagos State House of Assembly has taken any steps 
towards exercising this power of legislative enactment beyond the rubber-
stamp action of adopting provisions the CPA and CPC at state level with the 
enactment of the Administration of Criminal Justice Law of Lagos 2007, 
which was subsequently replaced by the Administration of Criminal Justice 
Law of Lagos 2009. This law is also not without its shortcomings,28 and, as at 
the date of the submission of this thesis, no attempt has been made by the 
Lagos State House of Assembly to address these shortcomings. The slow 
reaction of the Lagos State House of Assembly to attempt to address these 
shortcomings is perhaps further indication of a lack of political will across the 
length and breadth of Nigeria. 
The courts in Nigeria have also failed to effectively play their role towards the 
realignment towards the goal or towards better rights protection. As is the case 
in England, the courts ordinarily have the power to alter the terrain of the legal 
framework by virtue of the principle of judicial precedent. However, the 
courts have failed to address this issue effectively, by choosing to merely 
establish the existence of the right in the CFRN, without any comment or 




28 Ani, n 21, pp 57 – 63. 
29 See Chapter 2.3.2, Supra. See, for example, Amanchukwu v Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
[2007] 6 NWLR (part 1029) 1, where Udom-Azogu, JCA, in delivering the lead judgment 
merely stated the following on the issue of the right to legal assistance: “On the issue of 
counsel of accused choice… where he is denied bail and access to counsel of his choice, 
therefore making it difficult for him to prepare for his defence, it constitutes a complete 
violation of his right of fair hearing…” 
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4.2 EXTERNAL REALIGNMENT MECHANISMS 
In light of the revelation that a strong political will is a critical element in 
realigning the framework internally, in a quest for the best rights’ practice, and 
following from the discovery that there is a lack of political will in Nigeria, as 
evidenced by gross legislative inactivity and wholly insignificant contributions 
in the form of judicial interpretation by the courts, it becomes imperative to 
assess what external mechanisms exist for the purposes of realigning towards 
better protection of custodial rights. The different roles of the different 
regional rights systems to which both England and Nigeria belong are 
therefore considered in this section. Additionally, other concepts, which 
contribute to external pressures and external realignment, such as global 
convergence and cosmopolitanism, are herein analysed. 
4.2.1 The Role of The Regional Human Rights Systems 
Both England and Nigeria are treaty members of not just international human 
rights systems, most notably the United Nations,30 but belong to regional 
rights systems, which, by virtue of their constituent treaties and documents, as 
well as enforcement mechanisms, provide external pressures in a bid to ensure 
the protection of rights. Prior to work commencing on this chapter, it was 
hypothesised that, as has been the case in previous elements which have been 
assessed from a comparative perspective in this thesis, the role of the 
European system of Human Rights would have a greater effect as a 
realignment mechanism in England and/or its other member states than the 
African system would have on Nigeria and/or its other member states. 
 
30 Both states have ratified the UNDHR and the ICCPR, which, in sections 10 and 14, 
respectively, provide for fair trial rights. 
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4.2.1.1 The European Human Rights System 
Following the end of the Second World War, many of the European states 
were of the opinion that the time had come for the unification of Europe. The 
Council of Europe was founded in 1949, primarily to promote democracy, the 
rule of law, and greater unity amongst the European nations. The Council of 
Europe immediately, in 1950, signed the European Convention on Human 
Rights. This was done as an act of revulsion at the abuse of state power by 
member nations in the inter-war and war periods.31 It should be pointed out 
that even though other continental associations and bodies such as the 
European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) have made significant measures to enforce the protection of 
human rights, the term “European System of Human Rights” is more 
commonly used to refer to the system created within, and operated by, the 
Council of Europe.32 
The main human rights enforcement institution in Europe is the European 
Court of Human Rights.33 The EU Parliament has also recently been proactive 
in the quest for better protection of rights, as evidenced by the enactment of 
several EU Directives pertaining to the pre-trial process and the criminal 
process more generally. 
 
31 Richard S. Kay, ‘The European Human rights as a System of Law’, (2000) 6 Colum. J. Eur. 
L. 55, at 56. 
32 Peter Leuprecht, ‘Innovations in the European System of Human Rights Protection: Is 
Enlargement Compatible with Reinforcement?’ (1998) 8 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 313 
33 hereinafter, “ECtHR” or “the Strasbourg Court” 
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The European Court was established by Article 19 of the ECHR, as amended 
by Protocol 11 to the ECHR.34 The jurisdiction of the court extends to all 
matters relating to the interpretation and application of the ECHR, as 
prescribed by Article 32, which also gives the Court the power to determine its 
own jurisdiction.35 The procedure of the European Court is adversarial in 
nature, and its judgments are final, and are binding. Contracting states, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and individuals are all vested with the 
power to bring applications before the ECtHR. The provision allowing 
individuals to bring applications before it was an innovation, one that has been 
touted as a positive step in the enforcement of human rights.36 
In the context of custodial rights available to accused persons in Europe, there 
have been a few celebrated cases in Strasbourg jurisprudence, which have 
sparked amendments to the legislative framework of member states; with 
Salduz v Turkey arguably being the most celebrated of these.37 
In Salduz, the defendant had been arrested for taking part in an unlawful 
demonstration. He was reminded of his right to silence, and then he allegedly 
confessed. When brought before a judge the next day, he retracted the 
confession and alleged that it was the product of duress. The judge remanded 
him in custody, and only then was he allowed access to a lawyer. The 
defendant was subsequently convicted at trial and sentenced to two-and-a-half 
(2½) years’ imprisonment.  
 
34 For a detailed look at the jurisdiction, composition, appointment of judges and procedure, 
etc., of the European court, see Articles 19 – 51 of the ECHR; see also, Steiner, H. J.; Alston 
P. and Goodman, R., International Human Rights In Context: Law, Politics, Morals (3rd 
Edition, Oxford, 2007), pp 933 – 1018  
35 Article 32(2) 
36 See Kay, op. cit. 
37 Salduz v Turkey [2008] 49 EHRR 421. 
 183 
The accused eventually brought an application to Strasbourg, arguing that his 
article 6(3)(c) right, and the general right to a fair trial, had been violated by 
the delay in allowing access to legal advice, and that this right had been 
further breached by the failure to communicate the public prosecutor's 
opinion. The Chamber found no violation on the first ground, but found a 
breach on the second ground. The case was then referred to the Grand 
Chamber.  
Ultimately, the Grand Chamber unanimously found that there was a violation 
of Article 6 on both grounds: that the safeguards of article 6 apply, not merely 
to the criminal trial, but also to pre-trial procedures that have a bearing on the 
trial. In particular, “early access to a lawyer is part of the procedural 
safeguards” stemming from the privilege against self-incrimination.38 The 
precise statement of the Grand Chamber was that: 
“... an accused often finds himself in a particularly vulnerable position 
at that stage of the proceedings, the effect of which is amplified by the 
fact that legislation on criminal procedure tends to become 
increasingly complex ... In most cases, this particular vulnerability can 
only be properly compensated for by the assistance of a lawyer whose 
task is, among other things, to help to ensure respect for the right of an 
accused not to incriminate himself.” 
 “... as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first 
interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the 
light of the particular circumstances of each case that there are 
 
38 Salduz v Turkey, n 42, paragraph 54 
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compelling reasons to restrict this right. Even where compelling 
reasons may exceptionally justify denial of access to a lawyer, such 
restriction--whatever its justification--must not unduly prejudice the 
rights of the accused under art.6. The rights of the defence will in 
principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements 
made during police interrogation without access to a lawyer are used 
for conviction.”39 
As Ashworth contends, the decision is a continuation of the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR which is developing the right to access to legal advice,40 beginning 
with Murray v United Kingdom,41 through Magee v United Kingdom;42 to 
Brennan v United Kingdom,43 and beyond.  
 There are other decisions of the Strasbourg Court that have also sparked 
amendments to the legislative framework of member states. Funke v France,44 
for example, sparked amendments to the provisions of the right to silence and 
the freedom from self-incrimination, as did Saunders v United Kingdom.45 
As briefly mentioned above, the EU Parliament has also recently made 
noteworthy contributions to the protection of pre-trial rights with the drafting 
of several directives, which can be seen as legislative action based on the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence, beginning with the European Commission’s 
Proposal for a Framework Decision on Certain Procedural Rights which was 
 
39 Ibid, paras 54 – 55  
40 Andrew J. Ashworth, “Case Comment: Salduz v Turkey – Human Rights – Article 6 – 
Right to Fair Trial” (2010) CLR 419 
41 (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 29 ECtHR 
42 (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 35 ECtHR 
43 (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 18 ECtHR 
44 (A/256-A) [1993] 1 C.M.L.R. 897 (ECHR)  
45 (19187/91) [1997] B.C.C. 872 (ECHR) 
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issued in 2004.46 This initial proposed framework was never adopted, as its 
need as well as its legal basis was disputed by a few member states of the 
EU.47  
Following the abandonment of the Proposed Directive in 2007, a new 
proposed EU Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected or 
accused persons in criminal proceedings was adopted in 2009, which 
introduced six (6) measures and proposed directives to ensure better protection 
of procedural safeguards of accused persons.48 Presently, three (3) of the six 
(6) amended directives have been adopted: the Directive on the Right to 
Interpretation and Translation,49 the Directive on the Right to Information,50 
and the Directive on the Right of Access to a Lawyer have been adopted.51 
Curiously, England have presently opted out of the EU Directives, although as 
considered below, this might be due, in part, to the phenomenon of local 
resistance.52 
Additionally, England have previously run afoul of the provisions of the 
ECHR, in respect of pre-trial and custodial protections, and have had 
 
46 Proposal for a ‘Council Framework Decision on certain Procedural rights in Criminal 
Proceedings throughout the European Union’, Brussels, 28 April 2004, COM (2004) 328 
final, 2004/0113 (CNS)  
47 Ilias Anagnostopoulos, “The Right of Access to a Lawyer in Europe: A Long Road Ahead?” 
(2014) 4 EuCRL 3, at 7 
48 Roadmap For Strengthening Procedural Rights Of Suspected Or Accused Persons In 
Criminal Proceedings (2009/C 295/01) 
49 Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32010L0064, last 
accessed on 13-08-2015 
50 Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32012L0013, last 
accessed on 13-08-2015 
51Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:294:0001:0012:EN:PDF, last 
accessed on 13-08-2015 
52 See Section 4.2.3, Infra 
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judgments entered against them in Strasbourg on a number of occasions.53 The 
rulings of the ECtHR have nevertheless been subsumed into the jurisprudence 
of rights in England, and have enabled realignment towards the goal. 
However, as a result of the aforementioned strength of its internal realignment 
mechanisms, England is very often viewed as one of the frontrunners in the 
protection of pre-trial rights of accused persons. Additionally, in the study by 
Spronken and Attinger following the proclamation of the EC Framework 
proposals,54 England was generally found to already be in tune with the goals 
articulated by the different EC Directives, save for a few exceptions. Thus, 
even though the external influence of the ECtHR and the EC Directives has 
fulfilled some external realignment purposes in the local protection of pre-trial 
rights in England, the full extent of its influence, especially in recent years, 
might not be overly significant in value. 
As a result, it is hereby contended that, in order to fully appreciate the 
influence of the ECtHR and the EU Directives as an external realignment 
mechanism, there is the need to step a little bit outside the ambit of this thesis 
and assess their effect on other jurisdictions which are treaty members of the 
European System, but have hitherto not been critically analysed in this thesis. 
As has already been established, England has always been abreast of the goal 
and the quest to achieve the best rights’ practice, and have not had to 
implement too many drastic changes, or indeed changes of much severity, to 
keep in line with the EU directives. There have, however, been a few member 
states of the EU that have had to make notable amendments to their legislative 
 
53 For example, in the cases mentioned by Ashworth, in n 45, Supra 
54 Taru Spronken and Marelle Attinger, Procedural Rights in Criminal Proceedings: Existing 
Level of Safeguards in the European Union (European Commission, 2005) 
 187 
framework to better realign with the position in Europe. Notable amongst 
these are France, Scotland, The Netherlands, Belgium and the Republic of 
Ireland. 
As Giannoulopoulos has discussed in a number of publications, the decision in 
Salduz sparked, although not immediately, a reform of the regime of custodial 
stage in France, including reforms to the right to legal advice and the right to 
information.55 Following the decision in Salduz, a chain of events commenced 
in France, with a view to reforming its custodial regime, which culminated in 
the enactment of the law of 14 April 2011, which gave accused persons greater 
access to legal assistance.56 Additionally, the decision in Salduz has been 
applied in several decisions of the UK Supreme Court, beginning with the 
decision in Cadder v HM Advocate,57 which has impacted on the pre-trial 
regime in Scotland. Likewise, the Salduz decision has sparked favourable 
reform in the custodial regimes of Belgium and the Netherlands.58 
As an external realignment mechanism, the European System has impacted 
heavily on its members, and there is an increasing convergence in the 
custodial practices across all of Europe. The decisions of the Strasbourg Court 
have impacted on not only the local practices, but have also influenced the 
debates surrounding the proposed EU Frameworks that have yet to be 
 
55 See Dr Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos, “‘North of the Border and Across the Channel’: 
Custodial Legal Assistance Reforms in Scotland and France” (2013) CLR 369 and Dr 
Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos, “Custodial Legal Assistance and Notification of the Right of 
Silence in France: Legal Cosmopolitanism and Local Resistance (2012) 24(3) Criminal Law 
Forum 291 for a detailed discussion of the reform in France and Scotland following the Salduz 
decision. 
56 Ibid 
57 [2010] UKSC 43 
58 See, generally, Dimitrios Giannouloupolous, “Strasbourg Jurisprudence, Law Reform and 
Comparative Law: A Tale of the Right to Custodial Legal Assistance in Five Countries”, 
Human Rights Law Review (forthcoming) 
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adopted.59 Its effect cannot be underestimated, but there are nevertheless a few 
divergent views.  
As far as England is concerned, we do observe that in recent times some 
limitations have been imposed to accessing legal advice, such as where 
restrictions are placed on face-to-face custodial advice for certain offences,60 
and these can actually be viewed as a step back for England, but this does not 
detract from the fact that the European System has played a very important 
role as a key external realignment mechanism. As Markesinis argues, 
England’s position in the EU cannot be understated, because by remaining in 
Europe, it is in a position to teach and learn simultaneously from Europe.61 
To summarise the points raised in in this section, the European System is an 
effective external realignment mechanism, despite not posing any significant 
challenge to the custodial regime in England in recent times, due in large part 
to the strength of its internal realignment mechanisms. However, as displayed 
by the reforms in other jurisdictions in order to remain in alignment with the 
position in Europe, the importance of the ECtHR and the EU Directives 
should not be ignored. Hypothetically, and in agreeing with Markesinis’ claim, 
the current tide places England in arguably a position to teach, but that does 
not preclude the possibility of England once again, some day in the future, 




60 See, generally, Lee Bridges and Ed Cape, “CDS Direct: Flying in the Face of the Evidence” 
(2008), Centre for Crime and Justice Studies 
61  
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4.2.1.2 The African Human Rights System 
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, many of the African states gained 
independence, and in 1963, the Organization of African Unity (hereinafter 
called “OAU”) was formed. The OAU, it must be mentioned, did not have the 
protection of human rights as one of its core objectives; rather it placed it on 
the back burner62. The primary objective of the OAU was for the removal of 
all forms of colonial domination, the abolition of apartheid and the promotion 
of unity amongst the African states63. The OAU was eventually transformed, 
in 2002, to the African Union (hereinafter called “AU”), and Nigeria is a 
treaty member of the African Union. It was with this transformation that the 
protection of human rights became the focus of the regional body.64 
The key instruments in the African human rights system, for purposes of the 
context of this thesis, are the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,65 
which in Article 7 thereto, provides for the right to a fair trial, and the Protocol 
to the African Charter on the Establishment of an African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights,66 which establishes the African Court of Human Rights. 
 
62 The Charter of the OAU only made a passing reference, in its preamble, to the adherence to 
the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human rights. See Christof Heyns, ‘The 
African Regional Human rights System: The African Charter’ (2003 – 2004) 108 Penn St. L. 
Rev. 679, at 681. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. Heyns however contends that because the OAU Charter sought to abolish colonialism 
and apartheid, it (the Charter) is also seen as a Human rights document. 
65 OAU/CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5.  Signed in 1981, and entered into force in 1986. Hereinafter 
referred to as “The African Charter” 
66 Adopted in 1998, entered into force 2004. 
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The two main institutions in Africa set up to enforce the rights sought to be 
protected by the Banjul Charter are the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights;67 and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.68 
The African Commission seeks to “promote human and peoples’ rights and 
ensure their protection in Africa”69. Applications may be brought before the 
Commission by state parties to the African Charter, individuals and NGOs.70 
However, the African Commission has been the subject of a lot of criticisms; 
it has even been labelled a “toothless bulldog”.71 Some of the criticisms which 
have been raised include: the lack of effective access to the Commission by 
individuals;72 the lack of actual enforcement power: in the event that a case is 
brought before the Commission, its findings are ‘reported’ back to the AU, it 
does not give judgments, rather it makes recommendations, and these 
recommendations are not binding: they cannot award damages, or make 
orders;73 and finally, the lack of independence of the Commission: the staff of 
the Commission are employed by the AU, and its investigative processes are 
heavily dependent on the Heads of States and other Heads of Government, the 
same persons they are meant to be investigating. These criticisms, and other 
weaknesses of the Commission, it has been suggested, is why the Protocol 
establishing the African Court of Human and Peoples’ rights was signed in 
1998, in a bid to give ‘bite’ to the already-existing ‘bark’ of the Commission. 
 
67 See established by the African Charter Article 30 of the African Charter. 
68 established by the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
establishment of an African Court 
69 See Article 30. The functions of the commission are listed out in detail in Article 45 
70 See Articles 47 – 56. 
71 See generally, U. O. Umozurike, “The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
Suggestions for More Effectiveness”, (2007) 13 Ann. Surv. Int’l & Comp. L. 179 
72  
73 See Udombana, “Toward the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better Late 
than Never” (2000) 3 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 45 
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The African Court was established by the Protocol to the African Charter on 
the Establishment of a Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The African 
Court was set up to give teeth to the toothless bulldog that is the African 
Commission; however, this has yet to happen. The Protocol establishing the 
African court came into force in 2004, but not much has been done to 
accomplish this task. It took years to appoint the judges of the court and years 
for the Court to establish its rules of procedure.74 At present, the court has 
handed out only three (3) judgments and, rather unfortunately, none of the 
reliefs sought were in relation to custodial interrogation and the rights 
thereto.75 Also, a Protocol was signed by the AU in 2008, which seeks to 
merge the African Court of Human Rights and the African Court of Justice to 
create a single African Court of Justice and Human Rights.76 This, according 
to Christof Heyns,77 would mean that the African Court, which has been 
struggling to find its feet and has not even so much as adopted rules of 
procedure would have to start all over. 
The unfortunate position of the African System of Human Rights is that, at 
present, there is no external pressure from the regional body on Nigeria, or 
indeed any other African state, which could spark a move of realignment 
towards a better rights regime. Thus, in seeking the best rights practice, greater 
 
74 The court only became fully operational in 2009. See International Federation for Human 
Rights, Practical Guide, “The African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights: Towards the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights” (2010), available at 
https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/african_court_guide.pdf, last accessed 16-10-2015 
75 George Mukundi Wachira, “African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Ten years on 
and still no justice”, (2008), being a report of Minority Groups Rights International, available 
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/48e4763c2.pdf, last accessed on 30th January, 2010. 
76 This protocol was adopted in 2008, but is not yet in force. International Federation for 
Human Rights, n 79. 
77 n 67. 
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emphasis is again placed on internal realignment, which, as noted above, has 
been debilitated by a lack of political will in Nigeria. 
4.2.1.2.1 The ECOWAS Court 
In addition to being a treaty member of the African Union, Nigeria is also a 
member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
which also has its own court, the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice 
(ECCJ), with jurisdiction on matters relating to the protection, or lack thereof, 
of human rights by its member states. 
The original ECOWAS Treaty of 1975 intended to establish a tribunal for 
enforcing the observance of law and justice in the interpretation of the 
provisions thereto, and to settle such disputes as may be referred to it by the 
member states. However, such a tribunal was never established until a 
Community Protocol created the court in 1991, and the amended ECOWAS 
Treaty of 1993 subsequently established the ECCJ, although the first crop of 
judges to sit at the court were not appointed, nor the court fully functional 
until 2002.  
Curiously, in the initial period following its establishment, it was only 
Member States that could bring applications before the court, which also 
resulted in stagnation, and an unfortunate situation wherein nationals of a 
Member State had no redress before the court. 
The jurisdiction of the court was further amended in an additional Protocol, 
and following the decision in Olajide v Nigeria,78 was extended to cases 




who, following the expansion of the jurisdiction of the court, could bring 
individual applications before the court.79 
In a brief, cursory study of the different enforcement mechanisms in the 
different regional human rights regimes across the world, including the 
European and American Systems, the ECCJ possesses two significant traits 
that are perhaps unique to it, and perhaps raise questions about its suitability as 
an external realignment mechanism: its wide berth of rights jurisdiction, and 
the absence of a clearly delineated relationship between the ECCJ and the 
national courts of Member states of the ECOWAS. 
In regard to the first unique trait of the ECOWAS Court, even the most 
cursory of excursions into the historiography of ECOWAS would reveal that, 
as a regional body, the Community was established to streamline economic 
activities and provide some sort of economic regulation amongst member 
states.80 The establishment of ECOWAS was motivated by ‘the overriding 
need to accelerate, foster and encourage the economic and social development 
of their states in order to improve the standard of living of their peoples’. 
Accordingly, the aim of the Community was ‘to promote cooperation and 
development in all fields of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, 
agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions 
 
79 The decision in Olajide denied individuals (nationals of ECOWAS) the power to initiate 
proceedings before the ECCJ, but was the springboard that launched the arguments and 
campaigns, which resulted in the extension of power of institution of proceedings to 
individual nationals of ECOWAS member states, although the significance of these 
campaigns in expanding the access of the courts have also been the subject of some academic 
debate. 
80 The preamble to the ECOWAS Treaty 1975 
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and in social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of 
living of its peoples, of increasing and maintaining economic stability’.81  
Human rights protections were arguably introduced as an afterthought,82 as a 
result of which, the Community did not establish its own rights treaty or other 
similar document. Even Article 3 of the Supplementary Protocol on the court, 
which amends Article 9(4) of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty and vests the 
ECCJ with jurisdiction over human rights issues does not make provisions to a 
specific treaty, choosing instead to simply state: “The Court has jurisdiction to 
determine case of violation of human rights that occur in any Member 
State.”83 This presumably raises the question of legitimacy and curiosity 
concerning what clearly stated rights regime the ECCJ seeks to protect.  
The jurisprudence of the court sheds some light on this, as applications that are 
brought before the court seeking remedies of human rights violations tend to 
cite provisions of, separately or collectively, and to varying degrees, the 
UDHR, ICCPR, CEDAW, the Banjul Charter, et cetera.84 However, and as 
Ebobrah has also argued,85 this raises questions about the legitimacy of the 
ECCJ’s mandate to determine questions of human rights violations when it 
assumes jurisdiction over a rights terrain established by a separate regional 
 
81 Ibid 
82 Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer, and Jacqueline R. McAllister, “A New International 
Human Rights Court For West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court Of Justice” (2013) 
107 AJIL 737 
83 Article 3, Supplementary Protocol to the ECOWAS Court 
84 See Ugokwe v Nigeria 
85 Solomon T. Ebobrah, “Critical Issues in the Human Rights Mandate of the ECOWAS Court 
of Justice”, (2010) JAL 1, at 
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instrument with its own enforcement mechanisms, however limited,86 and by 
seeking to enforce rights provisions which are not ordinarily enforceable.87 At 
present, however, the ECCJ continues to assume jurisdiction over applications 
relating to alleged human rights violations by Member states. 
The second unique, albeit potentially problematic, feature of the ECOWAS 
Court is found in its relationship with national courts, particularly in the 
absence of a clearly delineated hierarchical structure. The ECCJ, in its 
establishment protocol, and in the supplementary protocols thereto, contain no 
express provision requiring that aggrieved persons seeking redress before it 
exhaust all possible local remedies before filing an application, a position in 
stark contrast with the norm in other international courts and tribunals;88 and 
the court itself has ruled that it was not established to serve as an appellate 
court in respect of judgments from the national courts of its member states.89 
Additionally, the Court has held in a number of cases that where the same 
matter has been instituted before a national court, or before another 
international court, it (the ECCJ) lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the 
matter, to eliminate the possibility of res judicata or double jeopardy.90 The 
 
86 The African Court of Human Rights, despite its shortcomings and relative activity, is the 
body vested with jurisdiction to determine questions of rights violation under the Banjul 
Charter 
87 The UDHR, ICCPR, et al, are all part of the UN Rights Regime, and these treaties and 
international documents were not conceived as enforceable legislation, but were rather 
intended to serve as guidelines. See … for more on this. 
88 Enabulele, A. O., “Sailing Against the Tide: Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies and the 
ECOWAS Community Court of Justice”, (2012) JAL 268 
89 Ibid. See, also, S. T. Ebobrah, “The role of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice in 
the integration of West Africa: Small strides in the wrong direction?” (2015) iCourts Working 
Paper Series, No. 27 
90 This was the ruling of the court in Aliyu Tasheku v Federal Republic of Nigeria [2011] 
ECW/CCJ/APP/13/11 and Sa’adatu Umar v Federal Republic of Nigeria [2012] 
ECW/CCJ/APP/12/11 
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ECCJ also has no appellate division, meaning that it is at the same time, a 
court of first instance, and the highest court within the enforcement 
framework. 
The overall impact of the unique traits of the ECCJ place the court in an 
awkward position when viewed through the lens through which other 
international courts and tribunals are viewed. On the one hand, the court 
creates an unfortunate position for itself wherein it is placed in an indirect 
position of competition for jurisdiction with the national courts. As has been 
previously highlighted, where an application for has been brought before the 
ECCJ on a matter already pending before a national court, the court would 
usually decline jurisdiction. Also, in the absence of a specific ECOWAS rights 
instrument, the ECCJ can be criticised for attempting to overstretch its 
jurisdiction and creating an opportunity for potential forum shopping by 
would-be applicants.91 
Further, as Ebobrah argues, rather creatively, in the specific issue of fair trial 
rights, the absence of an appellate jurisdiction from national courts coupled 
with the absence of an appeal route within the ECOWAS framework results in 
the situation where, whether a party chooses to seek local remedies or chooses 
the ECCJ as the court of first instance; in the event where one or both parties 
is dissatisfied with the decisions of the court, or alleges that the trial was 
conducted unfairly, in violation of the right to a fair trial,92 there is no avenue 
available for a review of the trial process; thus, the right to a fair trial is 
 
91 See Ebobrah, n 94 
92 Including, and extending to the pre-trial or custodial stage. 
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axiomatically hindered.93 Perhaps coincidentally, there are, at present, no 
decisions of the ECCJ relating to custodial rights, or the right to a fair trial in 
general. 
Despite these unique and problematic traits of the ECCJ, the Court is generally 
viewed as a welcome development,94 which would suggest that there is the 
potential for it (the ECCJ) to make crucial contributions to the protection of 
rights (including fair trial and custodial rights) as an enforcement mechanism 
within the ECOWAS regime; provided that the requisite steps are taken to 
resolve the problematic issues identified with its mandate and jurisdiction. 
At present, it appears as though, as far as Nigeria is concerned, the external 
realignment mechanisms available via the regional rights systems to which it 
belongs are either in purported stages of infancy (the African Court of Human 
Rights), or plagued with problematic issues (the ECCJ). As a result, the 
regional systems currently place no pressure whatsoever on Nigeria in a bid to 
realign towards the best rights’ practice. 
Fortunately, there are other avenues via which external pressures for 
realignment might present themselves, as shall be analysed in the next two 
sections. 
4.2.2 The “Tipping Point” Analysis 
In the absence of any significant realignment pressures coming from the 
regional organisations, there are possibilities for external realignment via legal 
comparativism. This can occur in a variety of ways including through the 
 
93 Ebobrah, n 94 
94 Ibid 
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phenomenon known as the “tipping point” analysis, a phrase coined by 
Christine Boyle and Emma Cunliffe.95 
The theory of the “tipping point” analysis was borne from the analysis of the 
Canadian legal landscape and the decision in R v Sinclair.96 In Sinclair, the 
defendant, after arrest, was advised of his right to counsel, and managed to 
speak with a lawyer of his choice via telephone, twice. After speaking with his 
lawyer, he was subsequently interviewed by the police for several hours. 
During the interview, the defendant stated several times that he did not wish to 
continue with the interrogation, and requested to speak with his lawyer again. 
His request was denied, the interview continued, and subsequently, statements 
were made which implicated the defendant and he was subsequently convicted 
of manslaughter. 
On appeal, he sought a declaration that the refusal to stop the interview 
constituted a violation of his right to counsel, as provided for by Section 10(b) 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Canadian Supreme 
Court held that there was no violation of his Section 10 right to legal advice. 
Thus, as Boyle and Cunliffe deduce from the decision in Sinclair,97 detained 
persons in Canada have a right to counsel at the point of arrest, but the on-
going right to counsel is limited in nature, more so than is the case in England, 
the United States, and a handful of other common law jurisdictions. 
 
95 Christine Boyle and Emma Cunliffe, “Right to Counsel During Custodial Interrogation in 
Canada: Not Keeping Up with the Common Law Joneses”, in Paul Roberts and Jill Hunter 
(Eds.), Criminal Evidence and Human Rights: Reimagining Common Law Procedural 
Traditions (Hart, 2012), pp 79 - 102 
96 R v Sinclair [2010] SCC 35 
97 Boyle and Cunliffe, n 100, at pp 81 – 82  
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In analysing the Canadian legal landscape, the authors contend that there is an 
international dimension to the landscape, as the Supreme Court of Canada has 
often, upon the discovery of an absence of an express statement or legislative 
provision, turned to the provisions of Customary international law and the 
provisions of other common law jurisdictions to aid in its decision-making.98 
Not content with the use of this comparative international dimension, Boyle 
and Cunliffe postulate that the Canadian Supreme Court should include a 
“tipping point” principle in its role of constitutional interpretation. They define 
the “tipping point” as: 
“a call for remedial action where analysis of other common law 
jurisdictions and international aspirations shows that Canada has 
fallen behind in the protection of human rights.”99 
In applying the argument for a “tipping point” to the context of this thesis, it is 
suggested that it might perhaps be a positive step to apply legal comparativism 
to judicial interpretation and use same as an external realignment mechanism, 
and this is possible for the superior courts in any jurisdiction so to do. As 
Giannoulopoulos points out, legal comparativism formed a significant basis of 
the decision-making process of the Irish Supreme Court in DPP v Gormley.100 
The Irish Supreme Court, in its ruling on the defendant’s right to custodial 
 
98 A few cases such as R v Hape [2007] SCC 26 and US v Burns [2001] SCC 7, for example, 
were cited by the authors as instances where the Canadian Supreme Court had demonstrated 
its international dimension. See Boyle and Cunliffe, p100 
99Boyle and Cunliffe, n 100, at p81 
100 DPP v Gormley and DPP v White [2014] IESC 17. See Dr Dimitrios Giannouloupolous, 
“Strasbourg Jurisprudence, Law Reform and Comparative Law: A Tale of the Right to 
Custodial Legal Assistance in Five Countries”, Human Rights Law Review (forthcoming), 
where he discusses in great detail the arguments considered in the decision of the Irish 
Supreme Court, and also discusses the extent and effect of not just Strasbourg jurisprudence, 
but also legal comparativivism on the decision of the Court. 
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legal assistance, relied on not just the Salduz and post-Salduz decisions of the 
ECtHR, but also employed legal comparitivism in its decision-making; as 
evidenced by its citing notable cases from a few common law jurisdictions, 
including the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
However, it is suggested, albeit purely on conjecture, that an increased 
reliance on trying to keep up with the Common Law Joneses, as Boyle and 
Cunliffe describe the phenomenon, might also call into question the purported 
sovereignty and supremacy of the courts of the relevant jurisdiction. 
4.2.3 Cosmopolitanism and Global Convergence 
The logic behind the “tipping point” theory is, it is herein opined, remarkably 
similar and closely linked to the ideas of cosmopolitanism and global 
convergence. Admittedly, the concepts are distinct from one another, but their 
effectiveness as external realignment mechanisms are, for purposes of this 
chapter, considered together. 
As comparative scholars have argued for years, there has been significant 
convergence of procedural traditions in recent times. This convergence, 
according to Jackson and Summers, for example, is attributable to a myriad of 
factors, including “National legal systems plagued by common problems of 
rising crime, concern for victims and the growing cost and delay in processing 
cases”,101 which creates a “willingness to seek ‘foreign’ solutions to similar 
problems.”102 
 
101 Jackson, J. D. and Summers, S. J., The Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence: Beyond 
the Common Law and Civil Law Traditions (Cambridge, 2012), p3 
102 Ibid 
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As Jackson and Summers also note, there exists external pressures on states to 
find common transnational solutions to deal with problems of organised crime 
and drug trafficking.103 Without limiting the external pressures to merely the 
need to combat the aforementioned criminal activities, it is perhaps sacrosanct 
that external pressures exist to find similar solutions to common problems 
faced by states. 
As already identified, the regional rights systems, particularly the European 
system, create external pressures on its member states to reform their local 
procedural mechanisms to the point where there is convergence.  
Similar to realignment mechanisms, there are, as Giannoulopoulos suggests, 
internal and external cosmopolitan attitudes.104 A good example of noteworthy 
internal cosmopolitan attitudes is perhaps the attitude displayed by the Irish 
Supreme Court in Gormley. 
It is perhaps unfortunate, then, that the African Rights System is as 
underdeveloped as it is, and has had little to no influence or caused no attempt 
at converging the procedural practices of its member states. 
 
4.3 OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The relationship between internal and external realignment mechanisms was 
examined by Giannoulopoulos. Local resistance and cosmopolitanism is the 
relationship between internal and external mechanisms. External mechansims 
in Africa are either in shambles or in infancy, local resistance being a very 
 
103 Ibid 
104 Giannoulopoulos, “Legal Cosmopolitanism and Local Resistance”, n 60 
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important factor in the ultimate reduction of external influences to local 
situation. An apparent lack of anything more than a metaphorical slap on the 
wrists for failure to implement results in an unwillingness of African states, 
including Nigeria, to conform to the external pressures presented via these 
external realignment mechanisms. Counter this with Giannoulopoulos’ 
assertion that France, for example, were wary of the prospect of continued 
judgments against it, and so decided to realign. Thus it would seem that 
ultimately, speculatively, especially in Africa, local resistance would be the 
most important factor to take into consideration. Thus, even though urgent 
reform is being clamoured for in Africa and Nigeria, perhaps internal 
realignment should be the focus, and as theories revolving around 
convergence, cosmopolitanism and the like, Nigeria should not be afraid to 
look beyond the regional influence and extend its scope to other common law 
countries, as Canada and Ireland did.105 The only problem with attempting to 
do this is that looking beyond the regional influence to other jurisdictions 
requires a strong political will which, as has previously been determined in 
this chapter, is glaringly absent in Nigeria, and indeed, Africa.  
Even the willingness to respond to the pressures of the regional external 
realignment mechanism requires a strong political will. Strasbourg’s influence 
on its member states, for example, is undeniable and also laudable, as 
evidenced by the relatively swift reaction by Scotland, France, Belgium, et al, 
even within a few months of one another.106 The Netherlands, as 
Giannoulopoulos mentions, have not made conclusive amendments to their 
 
105 Canada did it, as discussed by Boyle and Cunnilife, n 103, and Ireland did it as reported by 
Giannoulopoulos, n 60. 
106 Starting with Scotland in August 2010, France in June 2011, and Belgium in August 2011, 
as highlighted by Giannoulopoulos in n 63 
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custodial regime, but the fact that debates to do so have been set in motion is 
arguably further influence of the external pressure of the ECtHR. Presently, 
neither the African Court of Human Rights nor the ECOWAS Court have 
made any potentially ground-breaking decisions on pre-trial rights. Indeed, 
both regional systems are yet to provide any significant pressure on Nigeria, or 
any of their member states, for the reasons established herein. However, the 
link between external pressures and internal realignment mechanisms cannot 
be understated. If, as is the case in Nigeria, a bill takes years to move through 
the legislative houses before subsequent enactment107 in any of the countries 
which have responded to the Salduz decision, would the amendments thereto 
still have been considered timely? Ultimately, it is opined, the political will 
required for efficient internal realignment plays a role in the reception of 
external pressures from the external realignment mechanisms. 
In answering the fourth research question, it is perhaps suffice to simply state 
that, from the findings within this chapter, that the regional rights systems 
have a role to play in the quest to achieve the best rights’ practice, and this 
role ought not to be overlooked or merely glanced over. 
 
 





5.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
As a call back to the central idea of this thesis, the findings are herein 
summarized in answer to the five research questions conceived at the 
beginning of the research process.1 
In answer to the first research question, “What rights do suspects have in 
England and Nigeria during detention before a formal charge and detention 
pending the determination of the case brought against them?”, it was 
discovered that suspects in both jurisdictions were essentially vested with the 
same rights at the custodial stage, namely: the right to information pertaining 
to the reasons for their arrest, and of the rights available therein; the right to 
legal assistance; the right to silence; and the right to a speedy arraignment, or a 
right not to be held in detention indefinitely. The significant difference 
between the two jurisdictions, one that has proven to be detrimental to the 
protection of rights in Nigeria, is that the statutory provisions are sparsely 
worded. As a result of this, ambiguities abound, and the provisions of the law 
are open to a multiplicity of interpretation which, very often, amounts to a 
non-protection of rights in practice.2 
In answering the second research question, “How well are these rights 
observed in practice? Is there a disparity between the theoretical existence and 
the practical observance of these rights, and what are the factors responsible 
 
1 See Chapter 1.3, Supra 
2 See Chapter 2 
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for this disparity, if any?”, it was first discovered that, albeit common-sensical, 
there is naturally a chasm between the rights as they existed in theory and their 
operation in practice. The factors responsible for this chasm, in answer to the 
third research question, was discovered to be attributable to a number of 
intrinsic institutional shortcomings and some attitudinal factors which 
beleaguered the institutions that operate within the pre-trial regime in both 
jurisdictions.  
In answering the third question, “In bridging the gap between the theoretical 
existence and practical observance of these rights, what is the effect of 
detailed and clearly stated legislative instruments in attempting to improve 
compliance with due process?”, the importance of a clearly delineated legal 
framework and clearly stated statutory provisions is established in Chapter 3, 
and it was established that the absence of this in Nigeria was the genesis of a 
number of issues plaguing the institutional frameworks therein. 
In answering the fourth question, “What is the role of the regional human 
rights framework in achieving the best rights’ practice at the custodial stage of 
proceedings?”, the answer was, for the most part, a simple one: realignment. 
In addition to the available internal realignment mechanisms that exist, the 
role of the regional rights’ systems as external realignment mechanisms were 
considered. 
Finally, in answering the fifth question, it has been discovered that Nigeria, a 
state emerging from independence, stands to learn from the developmental 
challenges faced by England, its former colonial ruler, and it is the opinion of 
the researcher that rights development is a work in progress, and that the 
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starting point of any post-independence state in addressing policy issues might 
be the taking into account of any developmental challenges faced by its former 
colonial ruler. 
Speaking succinctly, the two most important findings were that, as 
hypothesised, a clearly stated and detailed legislative framework was essential 
in ensuring compliance with due process at the custodial stage, and that rights 
development is indeed a work in progress, the regulation of which takes the 
generally-accepted tripartite form. 
With respect to the findings in respect of the effect of a clearly delineated legal 
and institutional framework, it is conceded that this finding is not sacrosanct 
because, as Dixon’s Culturalist theory suggests, procedural rules on their own 
are ineffective in controlling police behaviour, as there are certain 
occupational cultures that must be taken into consideration.3 It is however 
contended, in light of Coppen’s assertion that the failure to delineate a 
minimum standard will create room for a multiplicity of interpretation,4 and 
ultimately, a non-protection of the pre-trial rights in practice, that there is the 
need to provide a clearly delineated legislative instrument which establishes a 
clear minimum standard for the balancing of the powers of the police at the 
pre-trial stage and the rights and liberties of suspects and accused persons 
available at this stage. It might perhaps be an area where the creation of 
knowledge remains a possibility, as it might be worthwhile for further research 
 
3 See David Dixon, Law in Policing: Legal Regulation and Police Practices (Clarendon, 
1997), pp 9 – 20. Hannah Quirk also discusses this in her article “The Significance of Culture 
in Criminal Procedure Reform: Why the Revised Disclosure Scheme Cannot Work” (2006) 10 
E&P 42 
4 John Coppen, “PACE: A View from the Custody Suite”, in Ed Cape and Richard Young 
(Eds.), Regulating Policing: The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Past, Present and 
Future (Oxford, 2008), p 75, at 76 
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into the relationship between the legalistic-bureaucratic and culturalist theories 
propounded by Dixon.5 
Following on from the findings unearthed during this study, it behoves this 
researcher to, in concluding the aim of this thesis, propose recommendations 
for better realignment towards the goal of effective custodial rights protection 
in both jurisdictions. These recommendations, it should be noted, are not to be 
taken as purely policy recommendations, but are intended to highlight possible 
areas of further research. 
 
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Following on from the separation of realignment mechanisms into internal and 
external groupings, the recommendations herein proposed are also grouped 
into internal and external recommendations.6 
5.2.1 England 
5.2.1.1 Recommendations for Internal Realignment 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, the regulatory framework of the pre-trial stage in 
England is a good example of the tripartite form of regulation, and only three 
(3) intrinsic institutional shortcomings were identified; namely: self-regulation 
by the police; heavy reliance on the duty-solicitor scheme; and the framework 
for the provision of interpreters. 
 
5 See David Dixon, n 3 
6 See Chapter 4. 
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In the opinion of this researcher, there is no concrete recommendation for 
internal realignment. As was earlier discussed, the intrinsic institutional 
shortcomings identified in England have had no overwhelmingly adverse 
effect on the provision and protection of the custodial rights available at the 
pre-trial stage.7 Additionally, as was discussed in Chapter 4, England appears 
to possess a strong political will, within the parameters of the definition 
employed within this thesis,8 which is arguably the most important ingredient 
which ensures effective internal realignment. As such, it is the further opinion 
that, by possessing a strong political will, and by operating a good example of 
the tripartite form that any regulatory framework must possess, England is 
capable of effective internal realignment if the regulatory framework were left, 
as it were, to develop organically. 
As a result of the foregoing, the recommendations for internal realignment are 
two-fold. First, in echoing the arguments put forward by Bridges and Cape,9 it 
is herein submitted that a proper review of the Duty Solicitor Telephone 
scheme, and the requirement for the provision of telephone-only legal advice 
be conducted, in a bid to ensure that effective, confidential legal advice is 
available, at all relevant times, for suspects and arrested persons in detention. 
The second recommendation for internal realignment in England is in respect 
of the framework for the provision of interpretation and translation services. 
As was discussed earlier,10 the current Framework agreement between the 
MoJ and CapitaTI for the provision of interpretation and translation services 
 
7 See Chapter 3.2.1 
8 See Chapter 4.1 
9 Lee Bridges and Ed Cape, “CDS Direct: Flying in the Face of the Evidence”, (2008) Centre 
for Crime and Justice Studies, p19. 
10 See Chapter 3.2.1.3 
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was met with dissatisfaction by a number of professional interpreters. As the 
framework agreement is set to expire in 2016, it is herein recommended that 
the appropriate steps be taken, in a bid to optimise the interpretation and 
translation services available in England, and to streamline same with the 
provisions of the EU Parliament Directive on the Right to Interpretation In 
Criminal Proceedings.11 
 
5.2.1.2 Recommendations for External Realignment 
5.2.1.2.1 England in Europe 
As has hitherto been established, the European Human Rights System, in its 
present form, is arguably the most efficient and effective Regional Rights 
System in existence today. As a result, there is little doubt of its effectiveness 
as an external realignment mechanism. 
The recommendation for external realignment in England is a relatively 
straightforward and simple one, but is seemingly made more important by 
recent political events: To achieve the best rights practice, England ought to 
remain a member of the European Human Rights System.  
Following the re-election of the Conservative Party in the 2015 General 
Elections, Prime Minister David Cameron announced plans to scrap the 
Human Rights Act and introduce a British Bill of Rights which would, inter 
 
11 Directive 2010/64/EU of 20th October, 2010. 
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alia, give the Courts in England the power to depart from decisions of the 
ECtHR in situations where it does not agree with the position of the Court.12  
It is the humble contention of this researcher that this would constitute an ill-
advised move. Despite the claims that the proposed Bill of Rights would 
mirror the provisions of the ECHR, it is contended that the removal of the 
external pressure posed by the ECtHR, and the EU Parliament, would be a 
step in the wrong direction. 
It is not the suggestion of this researcher that a departure from Europe would 
suddenly bring about anarchy or a non-protection of rights, but it is submitted 
that, as established in Chapter 4, the best rights practices cannot be achieved 
without a well-struck balance between internal and external realignment 
mechanisms, similar to two hands washing the other. As a result, it is 
suggested, again, that the recommendation for external alignment for England 
is that it remains a member of the European Human Rights System. 
 
5.2.2 Nigeria 
5.2.2.1 Recommendations for Internal Realignment 
As established throughout the thesis, the custodial rights regime in Nigeria is 
fraught with a number of shortcomings. The following are the 
recommendations for the internal realignment towards achieving the best 
rights practice in Nigeria. 
 
12 Mark Leftly, “British Bill of Rights to be fast-tracked into law by next summer”, available 
at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/british-bill-of-rights-to-be-fast-tracked-into-
law-by-next-summer-a6698261.html, last accessed on 20-10-2015. 
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5.2.2.1.1 Gross Amendments of the Legal and Institutional Framework 
As expressed in Chapters 2 and 3 herein, the custodial rights regime in 
Nigeria, when assessed vis a vis the tripartite form of regulation, fails at the 
first hurdle. As has been established, there is no clearly established goal. The 
provisions of the relevant statutory instruments are sparsely worded, and thus 
present many ambiguities when it comes to the subsequent interpretation 
thereof. Additionally, there is a multiplicity of legislation which all provide for 
the same rights and for different elements of the custodial rights regime. 
The recommendation in this regard is a relatively straightforward one. There 
needs to be a gross amendment of the legal framework in Nigeria. The 
overlapping laws need to be repealed, and more detail injected into the 
provisions of the statutory instruments. 
The Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) has taken a few steps in 
the right direction by repealing the CPA and the CPC, and offering 
clarification on a few ambiguities which had hitherto existed.13 However, there 
is still a lot of room for improvement within the custodial rights regime 
proposed by the ACJA. There is still the need to provide better information to 
suspects, and there are still ambiguities that abound within the provisions of 
the ACJA which require clarification. 
As stated earlier in this thesis, the clear statement of the goal is perhaps the 
most important part of the tripartite form of regulation, for if the goal is not 
clearly stated, there can neither be effective monitoring, nor any proper 
attempt at realignment. Thus, for the custodial rights regime to attain any 
 
13 See Chapter 2.3.6 
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significant improvement, there must be gross improvements to the legislative 
framework. 
The institutional framework is also in need of realignment. As is the case in 
England, and as was discussed in Chapter 3, there is no clearly delineated 
framework in place for the provision of interpretation services. Additionally, 
the Legal Aid Council is grossly understaffed,14 and as a result, the provision 
of custodial legal advice is grossly hindered. 
The foregoing, in addition to the infrastructural insufficiencies discussed in 
Chapter 3,15 are issues which ought to be addressed, and would ensure 
effective realignment towards the effective and efficient protection of 
suspects’ rights at the custodial stage in Nigeria. 
5.2.2.1.2 Revamping the Nigeria Police Force 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, the police force, generally speaking, serve as the 
point of entry into the Criminal Justice System, and as such, are arguably the 
most important party at the pre-trial or custodial stage.16 It therefore stands to 
reason that any problems beleaguering the police force in any jurisdiction 
would have a great effect on the protection of rights at the custodial stage. 
In chapter 3, the shortcomings and challenges of the Nigeria Police Force and 
its effect on the transition of rights from a theoretical plane to a practical one 
were analysed, and the major issues attributable to the police force were 
 
14 See Chapter 3.2.2.5 
15 Chapter 3.2.2.4 
16 Chapter 2.1.2. See, also, Bryan Gibson and Paul Cavadino, Introduction to the Criminal 
Justice Process (2nd Edition, Waterside Press, 2002), p54 
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problems stemming from its centralised nature,17 the Nigeria Police Force 
being vested with the power to prosecute offences,18 and the poor training 
regimes available within the force. 
In proposing recommendations for realignment and/or better rights’ 
protection, the Nigeria Police Force might be the most challenging party at the 
pre-trial stage. The first recommendation calls for the provision of better, 
improved training regimes. This is perhaps the most straightforward 
recommendation concerning the police, but is potentially thwarted by the 
centralised nature of the Nigeria Police Force. 
As Dambazau contends, the “over-centralised” nature of the Nigeria Police 
Force has resulted in a situation where there is too much control of resources 
at the centre without an adequate distribution system, with the result that 
regardless of what is spent at the Force Headquarters, not much effect is felt at 
the local police stations.19 This contention by Dambazau is extended to the 
recommendation of this researcher that better training regimes be employed by 
the police. If better training regimes are implemented, then while there might 
be improved rights protection within the urban areas, what hope lies in store 
for police officers stationed in the most remote parts of the country? 
This recommendation segues easily into the second recommendation put 
forward for the best rights’ protection in Nigeria – a decentralised police force. 
With the different issues and challenges emanating from the Nigeria Police 
 
17 Chapter 3.2.2.2 
18 Chapter 3.2.2.3 
19 A. B. Dambazau, Law and Criminality in Nigeria: An Analytical Discourse (University 
Press, 1994), pp 155 - 156 
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Force operating under a centralised structure in mind,20 it perhaps ought to a 
straightforward recommendation that Nigeria decentralise its police force, and 
establish multiple police forces across the Nation, in a bid to prevent the 
frequent and incessant transfer of police officers from one state command to 
the other, in a bit to realign to the best rights practice. 
This recommendation is by no means original, and there have been previous 
calls for the decentralisation of the Nigeria Police Force. However, as 
welcome as the recommendation might seem, achieving this aim might be 
immensely difficult. The Nigeria Police Force, as previously noted,21 is 
established by Section 214 of the 1999 CFRN, which expressly states that 
there is to be only one police force in Nigeria. Thus to amend the structure of 
the Nigeria Police Force, there would be the need to amend the provisions of 
Section 214 of the 1999 CFRN, which is arguably an insurmountable task.22 
As a result, rather than wholly adopt previous recommendations for the 
decentralisation of the Nigeria Police Force, it is suggested that the 
organisational and administrative structure of the Nigeria Police Force be 
altered, particularly as relates to transfers of officers within the force. It is 
contended that if more stringent provisions relating to the transfer of officers 
 
20 See Chapter 3.2.2.2 
21 See Chapter 2.2.2.1 
22 Section 9 of the 1999 CFRN, which provides the mode of altering provisions of the 
Constitution expressly stipulates that an Act of the National Assembly for the alteration of the 
1999 CFRN shall not be passed in either House of the National Assembly (the Senate or 
House of Representatives) unless the proposal is supported by not less than two-thirds 
majority of all the members of that House, and is also supported by a resolution of the Houses 
of Assembly of not less than two-thirds of all the States of the Federation. It is the humble 
submission of the researcher, and also a common belief held by a number of Nigerian 
academics, that the amendment provisions are an act of subterfuge – the conditions for 
amendment of the Constitution are so stringent as to make amendments nearly impossible, yet 
it cannot be argued that there are no provisions within the 1999 CFRN which allow for 
amendment of its provisions. 
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were in place, for example, placing restrictions on frequency of transfers, or 
placing geographical limits on how far across the federation an officer might 
be transferred, the attendant risks and issues highlighted in Chapter 3 might be 
avoided. 
The final recommendation put forward in respect of the Nigeria Police Force 
is the removal of its powers of prosecution. As the criminal justice system in 
England is the progenitor of the system in Nigeria, it ought to serve as the first 
port of call, when making comparisons and seeking to realign towards the best 
rights practice. To this end, recourse is made to the reasons put forward by 
JUSTICE in their 1970 report, The Prosecution Process in England and Wales 
(1970), wherein they recommended the separation of the powers of 
prosecution from the police.23 The reasons put forward by the Commission are 
as relevant in Nigeria today as they were in England more than forty (40) 
years ago, and this researcher adopts same as the reasons for the removal of 
the powers of prosecution from the Nigeria Police Force. 
The obvious challenge with the implementation of this recommendation is the 
existence of the decision of the Supreme Court in FRN v. Osahon,24 which 
grants police officers with the power to prosecute. As it were, the only way to 
implement this recommendation would be via an Act of the National 
Assembly. 
It ought to be noted that, if this recommendation were to be adopted, that the 
statutory instrument removing the power to prosecute offences ought to be 
 
23 See Chapter 3.2.2.3 
24 FRN v Osahon [2006] 5 NWLR (pt 973) 361. 
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carefully drafted. The recently enacted ACJA does the position of the law in 
Nigeria no favours in this regard. Section 106 of the ACJA seems to have 
removed the powers of prosecution from the police by omitting police officers 
from the list of persons vested with the power to undertake the prosecution of 
offences in court. However, Section 268(2) of the same Act states that “where 
proceedings in respect of an offence are instituted by a police officer, it shall 
be in the name of the Inspector-General of Police or Commissioner of Police, 
as the case may be.” It is therefore unclear whether the ACJA truly intends to 
remove the power of prosecution from the police. 
As it were, it is recommended that any statutory instrument seeking to remove 
the powers of prosecution should clearly and categorically repeal the powers 
of prosecution vested in the police – clear, unambiguous legislation being one 
recommendation already put forward in a bid to realign Nigeria to the best 
rights practice. 
5.2.2.1.3 Improving Political Will 
The third recommendation put forward is one for which the means of 
implementing is admittedly unknown to this researcher. The recommendation 
itself is only predicated upon the discovery, in Chapter 4, that a strong 
political will is necessary for effective internal realignment, and the argument 
therein that Nigeria suffered from a lack of political will. 
The recommendation is thus an axiomatic one borne out of the belief that an 
improved political will would result in more effective internal realignment. 
This, it is humbly submitted, is perhaps a potential topic for further research: 
how does a state improve its political will? 
 217 
5.2.1.2 Recommendations for External Realignment 
5.2.1.2.1 Streamlining the Human Rights Jurisdiction of the ECOWAS 
Court 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the African Court of Human Rights has not 
delivered any judgments in the area of custodial rights, so at present, it is 
unclear how effective an external realignment mechanism it might be. 
However, from a purely theoretical position, the framework in place is one 
that holds promise. 
Thus, the only recommendation for external realignment for Nigeria is the 
streamlining of the Human Rights Jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Court. As 
noted in Chapter 4,25 the ECOWAS Court, unlike the African Court of Human 
Rights, or indeed the ECtHR, has a wide berth of jurisdiction, as it was not set 
up to enforce a specific Human Rights treaty, and as such, can pick and choose 
the rights instruments to deliberate upon. Additionally, there is no clearly 
delineated relationship and/or hierarchy between the local courts of ECOWAS 
Member States and the ECOWAS Court. This, as was discussed, poses a 
number of issues which limit its role as a potential external realignment 
mechanism. 
The recommendation in this regard is a straightforward one: the Community 
need to regularise its position by establishing its own Human Rights Treaty for 
the Court to deliberate upon, and the relationship between the Court and the 
local courts of Member States needs to be expressly, and clearly delineated. 
 
 
25 Chapter 4.2.1.2.1 
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5.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In concluding this thesis as succinctly as possible, it is reiterated that, as 
suggested by Cape and Young,26 any effective regulation must take up a 
tripartite form: the goal, the monitoring stage, and realignment towards the 
goal. 
Of these three elements, it is the contention of this researcher that the goal is 
the most important, and there is the need for the goal to be very clearly stated, 
and free from ambiguities, for it is only where a clearly stated goal exists that 
it becomes possible to monitor its transition into practice effectively and 




26 Ed Cape and Richard Young (Eds.), Regulating Policing: The Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 Past, Present and Future (Oxford, 2008), p2 
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APPENDIX 1 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR NIGERIAN POLICE OFFICERS 
1. Please describe the nature of your job/ your role in the Nigerian 
Police Force 
2. Could you please give an overview/ brief description of what 
happens from the point of arrest to the point where the detainee is 
arraigned in Court? 
3. Even though the Constitution and both the Criminal Procedure Act 
and Criminal Procedure Code stipulate, in the relevant provisions, 
that a person should be arraigned within 48 hours of arrest, I have 
read that this is not always the case. In your experience, what 
factor(s) contribute to creating a difficulty in keeping to this time 
frame? 
4. How long, on average, would you say it takes to arraign a person 
after he has been arrested? 
5. Is this time affected by the gender and/or age of the accused person? 
6. Where are persons who have been arrested, but refused Police bail 
detained? 
7. Where are persons who have been charged with an offence detained 
pending the determination of their case? 
8. What percentage of persons detained in the state are awaiting a 
formal charge? 
9. What percentage of detained persons are on awaiting trial status? 
10. During the interrogation of suspects, how are statements usually 
recorded? Is it done in writing or with the use of audio visual 
equipment? 
11. Where are suspects interrogated? Are they interrogated in the 
detention cell, or is there a specific room in the station for 
interrogation? 
12. If required, what is the procedure for providing interpreters? 
13. Do arrested persons have the right to remain silent? 
14. Do they have a right to consult with a lawyer? 
15. If yes, are they informed of their rights? 
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16. If yes, how soon after arrest are they informed? 
17. How are they informed of their rights? Verbally or in writing? 
18. If no, why are they not informed of their rights? 
19. What other rights do accused persons have whilst they are in 
custody? 
20. Generally, what parties are present during interrogation? 
21. If, at the point of interrogation, an accused person refuses to answer 
any questions or states that he is exercising his right to silence, what 
happens next? 
22. If he states that he wishes to remain silent pending consultation with 
his lawyer, what happens then? 
23. Are lawyers permitted to be present during interrogation? 
24. If yes, what roles do the lawyers play during interrogation? 
25. If no, what are the reasons for their exclusion from the interrogation? 
26. At what stage whilst a person is in Police custody are lawyers 
permitted? Is there any stage where the lawyer is denied access to his 
client? 
27. Where does the lawyer-client consultation usually take place? Is 
there a specific room provided for consultation? 
28. Are any special measures taken to ensure that the arrested person 
consults with his lawyer in private? 
29. Is there any limit to the length or frequency of the consultation? 
30. If a person is desirous of having a lawyer present, but claims to be 
unable to contact one or afford one; what remedies are available? 
31. Finally, what, in your opinion are some of the problematic areas of 
the Nigerian Pre-Trial Process, and the Criminal Justice System 





TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW WITH OFFICER IN CHARGE OF 
LEGAL AND PROSECUTION (“OC LEGAL”), [REDACTED] STATE, 
NIGERIA 
Please describe the nature of your job/ your role in the Nigerian Police 
Force 
“I am a general duties Police officer. I am also an attorney. So my major role 
right now is that of an officer in charge of the prosecution and the legal section 
of the Nigerian Police. But that is also combined with the investigation of 
cases where necessary and we also have other activities like the supervision of 
our subordinates. Sometimes we are given special duties like going to conduct 
elections and other ad hoc duties. That is basically what we do. You know 
what the Police job is all about: enforcement of law and order, protection of 
life and property and other duties that are given to us in the Constitution. That 
is what I do now, as an Officer in charge of Legal and Prosecution. We have 
like 10 lawyers in my department, but mostly we defend cases that are brought 
against police officers like the Inspector General of Police, the State 
Commissioner of Police and other officers. We cannot take external briefs 
because we are still in salaried employment so mostly our duties as attorneys 
are just within the Force.” 
Could you please give an overview/ brief description of what happens 
from the point of arrest to the point where the detainee is arraigned in 
Court? 
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“When a suspect is arrested, his statement is recorded. If he cannot write, the 
Investigating Police Officer writes down the statement for him. Whatever he 
says is recorded in writing by the Investigating Police Officer, called the IPO. 
Thereafter, the IPO reads it back to the suspect. If the suspect says that that is 
what he said, he is then asked to sign or make a thumbprint to authenticate the 
statement. After the statement is recorded you now interrogate based on the 
allegations that were made. You start asking the suspect questions relating to 
what was alleged against him. If the statements recorded did not cover most of 
the areas that were alleged, you now put questions to the suspect. Also, his 
answers are recorded: as you are interrogating him, you are recording the 
answers. Thereafter, you now go out with the information you’ve gathered 
from him to find out if he was actually the person who committed that offence; 
that is the investigation aspect now. When you find out that what was alleged 
is not true, the suspect is allowed to go unconditionally. But where you still 
have a lot of work to do, like maybe travel out of station, or whatever, the 
suspect is now kept in detention to allow you time to gather all the evidence 
you might need with which to prosecute him. When that is done, if you now 
have concrete or vital evidence or you have found out you have gotten to the 
end of your investigation, you put up your investigation report then you now 
proffer a charge and then take the suspect to court. So what happens is that 
after arrest, there is interrogation; after the interrogation you go into an in-
depth investigation. Thereafter, if you are satisfied that there is a prima facie 
case or that an offence has been committed you now arraign the suspect in 
court.” 
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Even though the Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Act both 
stipulate that a person should be arraigned within 48 hours of arrest, I 
have read that this is not always the case. In your experience, what 
factor(s) contribute to creating a difficulty in keeping to this time frame? 
“There are many things. Sometimes because of a lack of manpower, one IPO 
is investigating about five criminal matters. There is no way to divide yourself 
into five places. Sometimes for a suspect that is arrested here you may have to 
go to [REDACTED],1 he might have mentioned two or three other areas or 
other people that are either his accomplices or other suspects; you need to 
arrest all those other people to get all the information you will need to 
conclude your investigation. And we have a very slow pace of working. We’re 
not into the IT thing: the computer thing, for now. Most of our things are still 
analogue: you have to record statements in writing; it’s just now we’re trying 
to build a database of criminals that you frequently see: we have fingerprints 
and photographs; so that somebody who is a habitual criminal, if he is arrested 
and if we had that data, you would just go into the records and pick up and it 
reduces all the other work you have to do. But most times a suspect can be in 
detention for 3 to 5 days, instead of the 48 hours. Whereas if we had the 
manpower we need, you do not need more than 48 hours, and a minor offence 
like stealing could be wrapped up in 2 days and the person arraigned. Also, 
there is only one forensic laboratory belonging to the Nigerian Police Force. It 
is in Oshodi, Lagos and is supposed to serve the entire force; sometimes it 
takes more than 48 hours just for a sample to get to the lab, so before it gets 
tested and is returned to the station, the suspect has already been in detention 
 
1 A city in a different state, approximately 630km away 
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for days. Sometimes too, the personnel that we work with are not very 
grounded educationally: they are trained, but I would require that they 
improve on the basic training they give to our subordinates. I joined the force 
as a graduate and we were trained for 18 months. But somebody who joins the 
force as a high school leaver is trained for just 6 months. It is not enough. He 
cannot grasp all the rudiments of what he is supposed to do as a police officer 
within 6 months. So training and re-training could help to give them speed. If 
you go to the scene of a crime and you know that you should cordon off the 
area, you know the people to ask questions to get all your information 
speedily. Somebody who just finished high school may not know that if you 
train him for just 6 months and most times they are the foot soldiers; we just 
supervise. I have seen that in most cases where you do not supervise closely, 
they make so many mistakes and end up messing up the matter. So when you 
are investigating a matter, the officer has to be up and doing. There are many 
times I have had to turn complainants into suspects. Sometimes they come and 
tell you lies and if you do not listen to both parties first, the lower policeman 
would just, after recording his statement, put the suspect in the cell. That is not 
right. You should first of all investigate and go in-depth into the allegation that 
was made. You could find out that it was just trivial, flimsy, out of malice and 
then you throw somebody in detention when he is not supposed to be there. So 
most times when we say “Get me the complainant, let me hear the petition he 
made to the Commissioner of Police” you hear frivolous things and thereafter, 
sometimes we have had to charge such complainants for giving false 
information to the police and it deters them from coming. So the reason why 
we do not charge people to court within 48 hours is because we have a lot of 
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limitations: we do not have equipment to work with, we cannot go as fast as 
we can, and sometimes the IPO that is handling a particular accused person is 
transferred. Most times, even when we get to court, for the IPO to come and 
give evidence, you hear he is not in the station anymore, he has to come from 
[REDACTED]2 to come and give evidence, his salary is so small that he does 
not have transportation to come from there. I learnt that before I joined the 
Force, they used to have money for witnesses, and it was the judiciary that 
used to give it. Once you come to give evidence, your transportation 
allowance and everything is paid to you. Now it is not there, so if I want a 
constable to come from [REDACTED],3 I have to give him his transport. If he 
is not given, he cannot afford it. So that slows down a lot of things. That is 
basically all. The difficulties that we have are that the younger ones who are 
the foot soldiers are not properly trained, they have too many things on their 
hands, and then we are not well-funded and all the things that should be in 
place for an investigation to go freely are not there, because of the system.” 
How long, on average, would you say it takes to arraign a person after he 
has been arrested? 
“One week. But it depends on the nature of the case too. Like if it’s a matter 
like illegal bunkering and vandalisation of oil pipelines and such matters that 
require that sometimes we have to go to the scene, some of them offshore, to 
get samples and take them to the lab, it takes like one week, or at most two 
weeks. Then for murder cases and all those capital offences like armed 
 
2 A city in a different State, approximately 1,286km away. 
3 Ibid 
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robbery you have to be very sure so it takes time to go through. But for minor 
offences like assault, stealing, all those simple offences, 2 – 3 days.” 
Could you please give a rough estimate of how long it takes to arraign 
persons suspected of committing Capital Offences? 
“Two weeks at the most; because right now, because of the democratic 
regime, people know their rights, so once a suspect is being kept for longer 
than necessary, their lawyers go to get a Fundamental Human Rights Order for 
us to either produce the person in court or restrain us from further detaining 
them. So we try as much as possible to arraign them within two weeks. 
Sometimes even within a week if it’s not in a difficult terrain for us to get 
samples of the necessary evidence/exhibits to go to the lab.” 
Is this time taken to arraign a person affected by their gender and/or age? 
“The time taken to arraign a suspect is not affected by gender or age, a crime 
is a crime. Once it is committed all suspects are treated the same way.” 
Where are persons who have been arrested, but refused Police bail 
detained? 
“In every Police station we have a cell where detainees are kept. They are kept 
in this cell.” 
Where are persons who have been charged with an offence detained 
pending the determination of their case? 
“If it is a capital offence, and most times because we do not want to keep them 
in police cell, we arraign them in the magistrate court; and the magistrate court 
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has no jurisdiction, so the magistrate would now decline jurisdiction, remand 
them in prison custody and remit the file to the DPP for advice.” 
Is this what is known as the “Holding Charge”? 
“That is what is called the “Holding Charge”; but they are saying the Holding 
Charge is illegal. The last time we had the conference of prosecutors, they 
were saying that it is not illegal per se, but that it is just a way of decongesting 
the Police cell, and since they say a person should be arraigned within 24 or 48 
hours, and within 48 hours you have not been able to get the information to 
file an Information at the High Court. And you know the police only prosecute 
in the Magistrate court; although now as attorneys in the Police, we file 
charges directly in the Federal High Court and the State High Court. Before 
now, it was only the Ministry of Justice, so before you finish your 
investigation for the State Counsel to file Information, the person would have 
been in the Police Cell for like 2-3 weeks, so the best thing is to take the 
person to court, and let the State Counsel give advice on if the person has a 
case to answer or not and then file their Information. So, when they are taken 
to court, if it is a capital offence, and the person was not arraigned in the high 
court, the Magistrate will now remand him in Prison Custody until they file a 
charge and start his prosecution; but if it is a minor or simple offence which is 
bailable, the magistrate just grants him bail and the prosecution continues.” 
What percentage of persons detained in the state are awaiting a formal 
charge or are on awaiting trial status? 
“Let us take [REDACTED] prisons as an example. It is like 80 per cent. The 
[REDACTED] prison was built for a capacity of 800 persons. Right now, each 
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time we go there, they have about 2,300 inmates or thereabout. Out of these, 
200 are convicted criminals serving their sentence. The rest are awaiting trial 
inmates. It is horrible. I have gone with the Chief Judge of the State several 
times when they go for ‘gaol delivery’ and it is usually horrible. The awaiting 
trial inmates, because they don’t have proper accommodation, they are just in 
one hall; if you see how many are sick with different diseases: HIV, 
tuberculosis, etc. Oh, it is terrible. Some of them, their case files are missing. 
Between the Police and the Director of Public Prosecutions, they do not have 
any case files anymore, they do not know anything about their cases, and they 
have stayed for like 6 years; probably for an offence that he would have served 
2 years, he has already spent 6 years just awaiting trial, and the trial is not 
going on. So most times when we go with the Chief Judge and we look at the 
cases as they are, if you were supposed to serve a sentence of 5 years or 3 
years, as the case may be, they will just discharge you. You have already 
finished serving the sentence, so why should they continue trial? But for those 
that their trials are on-going, they are not considered for the gaol delivery. So 
the percentage is very high, let us say 80 per cent.” 
During the interrogation of suspects, how are statements usually 
recorded? Is it done in writing or with the use of audio visual equipment? 
“Statements are recorded in writing, and now the amended Evidence Act is 
saying that if an accused person is going to make a confession it should be 
captured with audio visual equipment, because the courts are tired of doing 
trial within trial; accused persons coming to say they did not confess. If there 
is no recording device, the lawyer, or if the accused has no lawyer, a relation 
of the accused person should be with the accused person and the police when 
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you are taking the accused’s confessional statement; so that he does not go to 
court and say “I did not confess.” So, the statements are recorded in writing 
and now it has been added that if a confession is to be made, it should be 
captured with audio visual equipment. Sometimes when we have big cases, 
like robbers are arrested; like there was one robber, he claimed to be a medical 
student. His victims were usually women. In the evenings, at about 7 or 8pm, 
he would pick up these victims as a drop (car hire) and then take you and 
make a detour with you to a lonely place and there he would rob them, 
sometimes even rape them. When he was finally arrested, we would now 
record with audio recording. In fact that particular man, he was flashed in the 
media.” 
Where are suspects interrogated? Are they interrogated in the detention 
cell, or is there a specific room in the station for interrogation? 
“Every Police formation with an investigative outfit has an interrogation room. 
That is the specific room where interrogations are done.” 
If required, what is the procedure for providing interpreters? 
“There is no laid down procedure but when an interpreter is required he is 
sought for by the IPO and after the interpretation he counter signs the 
statement as having interpreted.” 
Do they have the right to remain silent? 
“Well, normally if an arrested person says “I do not want to say anything until 
I see my lawyer”, he is asked to put it down in writing. Does that mean they 
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have the right to remain silent? Because the first thing we want is to record 
your statement.” 
After he has written that down, is he still required to give a statement 
before his lawyer arrives? 
“No.” 
Then I guess we can say he has the right to Silence. Do arrested persons 
have a right to consult with a lawyer? 
“Yes. They do.” 
Are they informed of their rights? 
“Well, it is not like the way they are supposed to as we see in other more-
developed countries. Here it is called a cautionary statement, but that is typed 
in our statement form, at the beginning. You read this to him (the accused) and 
inform him that what he says will be reduced in writing and will be used as 
evidence against him. So they are informed of their rights.” 
How soon after arrest are they informed? 
“As soon as possible.” 
How are they informed of their rights? Verbally or in writing? 
“The suspects are informed of their rights verbally and at the top of the 
statement form the caution is boldly printed and this is also read to the suspect 
who accept they understand before they proceed to make their statement 
which means they are informed in writing too.” 
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What other rights do accused persons have whilst they are in custody? 
“The right to be treated with dignity, the right to be fed, right to visits from 
family, right to know his offence, and the right to be arraigned within time 
stipulated by law.” 
Generally, what parties are present during interrogation? 
“The only parties during interrogation are the suspect and the IPO. Only in the 
case where the suspect is about to make a confessional statement the law 
requires that his counsel or relative be present as a witness where there is no 
sure person the confession is to be recorded on video.” 
If, at the point of interrogation, an accused person refuses to answer any 
questions or states that he is exercising his right to silence, what happens 
next? 
“He is asked to reduce that intention to remain silent into writing and sign.” 
If he states that he wishes to remain silent pending consultation with his 
lawyer, what happens then? 
“He is equally expected to put it in writing that he intends to wait for his 
counsel before saying anything.” 
Are lawyers permitted to be present during interrogation? 
“Not really, because it is their right, but our lawyers, they want to sit with the 
accused when he is making his statement and they would be saying “No, do 
not say this. No do not say that.” They start to tell you what to say and what 
not to say, so we do not allow them to sit with him. Instead we say to you “Let 
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him make his statement. After that you can now help him with whatever else 
you want to help him.” We are not enlightened enough to the level where you 
just sit with him, and without guiding him, let him say exactly what happened; 
but they would say “No. Do not say it like that.” “You do not have to answer 
that question, we are not in court.” thereby interrupting and rubbishing the 
entire process of interrogation. So we do not usually permit lawyers to sit with 
their clients during interrogation, but you can see your client thereafter.” 
What are the reasons for their exclusion from the interrogation? 
“The reason is that if the counsel is present he begins to interject and tutor the 
suspect on what to respond to questions put to him in order to make his work 
in court easy.” 
At what stage whilst a person is in Police custody are lawyers permitted? 
Is there any stage where the lawyer is denied access to his client? 
“The only time where lawyers, and even family, are denied access was when 
we used to have the issue of kidnapping, and when the suspects are arrested in 
the act; we don’t allow them see anybody until the investigation is wrapped 
up. Hardened criminals, those involved in armed robbery, particularly where 
police officers are killed, or people generally are killed, their lawyers are not 
allowed to see them. Those are the only extreme cases, but at any stage after 
we have recorded their statements, lawyers can see their clients.” 
Are they allowed to see their clients before the statements are recorded? 
“No. We do not allow that.” 
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Where does the lawyer-client consultation usually take place? Is there a 
specific room provided for consultation? 
“There is no specific room. They meet in any room provided by the IPO and 
these meetings are supervised so that the suspect is not given any harmful 
thing to take into the cell. The IPO may not be close to where he can hear 
them but must be where he can see them very well.” 
So there are no special measures taken to ensure that the arrested person 
consults with his lawyer in private? 
“The only measure is that he consults with his counsel within the view of the 
IPO.” 
Is there any limit to the length or frequency of the consultation? 
“There is no limit to length or frequency of their consultation.” 
If a person is desirous of having a lawyer present, but claims to be unable 
to contact one or afford one; what remedies are available? 
“There is this Memorandum of Understanding that the police have with Legal 
Aid for them to be providing duty solicitors in target police stations so that 
where an accused person does not have access to a lawyer, he could help, give 
advice, and all that. Then the last time we had a seminar together to work out 
modalities, it was argued that if you are bringing lawyers to the station who 
would be defending these people, then we are not working on the same level: 
we are prosecuting them and you are defending them. It is good that those who 
do not have lawyers should have, but not at the point where they have not 
begun recording statements you begin to administer legal aid. No, you should 
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wait until when we have finished with them before you can now go and defend 
them in court; those who do not have legal aid. It is just in the process. We do 
not have those remedies in place yet, but we are in the process of making it so 
that someone who is an indigent person who cannot afford legal 
representation, these lawyers from the Legal Aid Council can represent them; 
and I think it is only now they are amending the law to include capital 
offences. Before they were only representing those accused of committing 
simple offences, not like murder or armed robbery.”  
Finally, what, in your opinion are some of the problematic areas of the 
Nigerian Criminal Justice System that need to be addressed, and what 
solutions would you proffer? 
“The problems are many. Lack of enlightenment: we do not know our rights. 
We believe that it is only the complainant that has rights; the accused person 
does not have rights. But the accused person has rights too. He should be 
treated well, not tortured, until such a time as the courts say he is guilty. But 
the prosecutor should be biased to get him convicted. The person who is 
arrested does not know his rights. Even though we know he has rights, those 
rights are dimmed by the fact that as a prosecutor you are already biased, and I 
do not really know if that affects the criminal justice system, that is just my 
personal opinion. Again, like we said, the speed with which we investigate is 
so slow. We are still moving at a snail’s pace and I think there should be a 
reorientation whereby you do not detain a suspect until you know that letting 
him go will jeopardize your investigation. Ask basic questions first because 
the allegations could be false. Sometimes too, immediately after you have 
detained somebody your superior comes in and says you have to go to Aba on 
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another matter, and then that person is forgotten. You now go to do those other 
things and you keep the person in the cell for so long. It is not right. Also, if 
there was a situation where we could work with State Counsel, immediately 
we know that a person has committed an offence, they can file a charge 
directly to the High Court without taking him first to the Magistrate Court, 
especially as we have 48 hours to arraign him. Before now, we also had the 
issue of remitting files from the police station to the Ministry of Justice. When 
I got to the State CID as “OC Legal”, we did not have any facilities like 
photocopying machines to duplicate case files and send as they come. So 
sometimes I use my own money to do it because if you get to the prisons, 
except you are a witch, you would feel sorry, and will want to do everything 
within your power to ensure that these files go. But now, we have devised a 
means: the Chief Judge gave a practice direction where the files that go to the 
Magistrate Court go in duplicate. So the original case files, if the magistrate is 
going to order for it to go to  the DPP it is left with the court clerk and the 
police come back with the duplicate; so the issue of files not going fast is not 
there anymore. From there it goes to the Chief Registrar of the State Judiciary 
and the Chief Registrar will send it to the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of 
Justice have also devised a means of bringing advice out speedily. If people 
will be educated and we all become IT compliant it will make it faster. The 
Attorney-General the other day was saying they have devised a means where 
all the cases will be computerized so that they can track them, even the ones 
on trial and make sure that they are dispensed with. Sometimes too, there are 
politically-motivated cases, the government is interested, and you cannot 
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release the person because your hands are tied. He who pays the piper dictates 
the tune.”  
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APPENDIX 3 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF THE LEGAL AID 
COUNCIL OF NIGERIA 
1. Please describe the nature of your job/ your role in the Legal Aid 
Council 
2. Could you please give an overview/ brief description of what 
happens from the point of arrest to the point where the detainee is 
arraigned in Court? 
3. Even though the Constitution and both the Criminal Procedure Act 
and Criminal Procedure Code stipulate, in the relevant provisions, 
that a person should be arraigned within 48 hours of arrest, I have 
read that this is not always the case. In your experience, what 
factor(s) contribute to creating a difficulty in keeping to this time 
frame? 
4. How long, on average, would you say it takes to arraign a person 
after he has been arrested? 
5. Is this time affected by the gender and/or age of the accused person? 
6. Where are persons who have been arrested, but refused Police bail 
detained? 
7. Where are persons who have been charged with an offence detained 
pending the determination of their case? 
8. What percentage of persons detained in the state are awaiting a 
formal charge? 
9. What percentage of detained persons are on awaiting trial status? 
10. During the interrogation of suspects, how are statements usually 
recorded? Is it done in writing or with the use of audio visual 
equipment? 
11. Where are suspects interrogated? Are they interrogated in the 
detention cell, or is there a specific room in the station for 
interrogation? 
12. If required, what is the procedure for providing interpreters? 
13. Do arrested persons have the right to remain silent? 
14. Do they have a right to consult with a lawyer? 
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15. If yes, are they informed of their rights? 
16. If yes, how soon after arrest are they informed? 
17. How are they informed of their rights? Verbally or in writing? 
18. If no, why are they not informed of their rights? 
19. What other rights do accused persons have whilst they are in 
custody? 
20. Generally, what parties are present during interrogation? 
21. If, at the point of interrogation, an accused person refuses to answer 
any questions or states that he is exercising his right to silence, what 
happens next? 
22. If he states that he wishes to remain silent pending consultation with 
his lawyer, what happens then? 
23. Are lawyers permitted to be present during interrogation? 
24. If yes, what roles do the lawyers play during interrogation? 
25. If no, what are the reasons for their exclusion from the interrogation? 
26. At what stage whilst a person is in Police custody are lawyers 
permitted? Is there any stage where the lawyer is denied access to his 
client? 
27. Where does the lawyer-client consultation usually take place? Is 
there a specific room provided for consultation? 
28. Are any special measures taken to ensure that the arrested person 
consults with his lawyer in private? 
29. Is there any limit to the length or frequency of the consultation? 
30. If a person is desirous of having a lawyer present, but claims to be 
unable to contact one or afford one; what remedies are available? 
31. What, in your experience, are some of the problems or problematic 
factors which prevent the Legal Aid Council, and lawyers in Nigeria 
generally, from providing effective legal assistance to accused 
persons throughout the criminal process? 
32. Finally, what, in your opinion are some of the problematic areas of 
the Nigerian Pre-Trial Process, and the Criminal Justice System 




LEGAL AID COUNCIL OF NIGERIA 
RESPONSE TO INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR PHD RESEARCH ON 
DETENTION RIGHTS OF ACCUSED PERSONS IN ENGLAND AND 
NIGERIA 
 
1. The nature of my job involves providing legal services both criminal 
and civil to the indigent in Nigeria, particularly in [REDACTED] State 
where I am presently stationed. 
2. After an arrest is made, the suspect is taken to the relevant police 
station where he/she is interrogated/interviewed. The suspect may be 
allowed to contact family members before getting to the police station 
or at the police station. Following investigation of the offence and 
where necessary, the suspect is arraigned in court. 
3. There are a number of factors which include but are not limited to the 
following: 
a. Investigation could involve a cumbersome process of 
several witnesses, unavailable data and an unwilling suspect 
b. Administrative delays 
c. Suspect may need medical attention following aggressive 
arrest 
d. Point of arrest may be far from relevant police station and 
could take a while to connect 
e. Complainant or family members may not facilitate a speedy 
investigation 
4. Subject to the offence for which he is suspected to have committed and 
other intervening factors, graver offences may take about a week or 
more but simple offences could be overnight or a day 
5. Not necessarily, but men are usually detained longer 
6. In police cells, if they were arrested by the police. 
7. In the federal prisons found in every state of the federation 
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8. One cannot be certain but taking a wild guess, I would say about 10% 
of detainees 
9. Still uncertain but in my humble opinion about 80% of detainees 
10. Interrogations are usually recorded in writing 
11. To the best of my knowledge, interrogations take place outside the 
cells. Some police stations have special rooms, others undertake the 
exercise in the Investigating Police Officer’s office space 
12. In practice, the police usually ask persons in or around the police 
station to volunteer interpreters. 
13. Theoretically – yes. In practice – NO! 
14. Theoretically – yes. In practice – not usually encouraged  
15. I am not aware of the police having informed anyone of their rights 
16. – 
17. – 
18. The suspect may become uncooperative 
19. They may have restricted visits, meet with their lawyers and can be 
bailed at the police station following investigations 
20. The suspect and the investigating officer 
21. He/she will be persuaded to talk 
22. He/she will be advised to talk to the police then to his/her lawyer 
23. Only on very, very rare cases with the Legal Aid Council lawyers 
24. Where the Legal Aid Council lawyers are allowed in at interrogations, 
they serve as checks to police excesses even not allowed in most cases 
to “protect” the suspect where he/she is being badgered 
25. – 
26. The lawyer may see his client after the suspect’s personal 
interrogation. The lawyers are usually not allowed to see clients before 
the initial crucial interrogation except when invited 
27. No, not usually. Most lawyers are left to interview suspects through the 
cell bars or in the very attentive presence of the Investigating Police 
Officers 
28. No 
29. Consultations are usually kept very brief 
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30. The Legal Aid Council has entered into a formal agreement with the 
police where suspects are to be informed of the ready services of the 
Council lawyers for free which is styled the “POLICE DUTY 
SOLICITOR SCHEME”. Sometimes the suspect or other family 
members contact the Legal Aid Council offices for assistance 
31. Some problems of effective legal assistance by the Legal Aid Council 
include but are not limited to: 
a. Slow judicial process 
b. Corruption 
c. Lack of adequate funding 
d. Fibbing clients 
e. Uncooperative police officers 
32. The most problematic area of the pre-trial process and the criminal 
justice system involves cases where the first court of arraignment is the 
Magistrates courts which have no jurisdiction to entertain certain suits 
charged before it but is absurdly armed with the authority to remand in 
the same cases! 
I proffer the solution that matters that cannot be ordinarily entertained 
at the Magistrates courts should be filed directly to the High courts that 
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